University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2019

Courtroom Wars: Constitutional Battles over Conscription in the
Civil War North
Nicholas Matthew Mosvick
University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Mosvick, Nicholas Matthew, "Courtroom Wars: Constitutional Battles over Conscription in the Civil War
North" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1572.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1572

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

COURTROOM WARS: CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLES OVER CONSCRIPTION IN THE
CIVIL WAR NORTH

A dissertation submitted
to the University of Mississippi in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by
Nicholas Matthew Mosvick
May 2019

Copyright © 2019 by Nicholas Mosvick
All rights reserved.

ABSTRACT
In February 1863, Congress considered a bill to create for the first-time conscription at
the national level. Democratic politicians vigorously protested that the proposed act was
unconstitutional and destroyed the state militias. When Congress passed the Enrollment Act,
commonly known as the “Conscription Act,” on March 3, 1863, outcry from Democrats about
the unconstitutionality of national conscription immediately followed. In New York and
Pennsylvania, Democratic newspaper editors and politicians decreed the act the worst among the
Lincoln war measures in threatening to subvert the constitutional republic and to transform the
United States into a despotism under the control of an autocratic President. The act was “utterly
repugnant” to the Constitution and the structure of federalism that left states to control their own
militias. Quickly, these constitutional criticisms transformed into court challenges to the act.
These challenges were usually based on drafted soldiers seeking writs of habeas corpus to be
released from federal authority in the form of the provost marshal. New York state courts
focused most often on the question of state jurisdiction, with New York’s judges divided on the
meaning of the Supreme Court precedent of Ableman v. Booth and whether it precluded state
court jurisdiction over questions concerning the constitutionality of Congressional acts by writ of
habeas corpus. One judge, John McCunn of the City Court of New York and a well-known
Democrat connected to Tammany Hall, issued an opinion in the midst of the New York City
Draft Riots claiming that the act was unconstitutional, but New York’s higher courts never
answered the question. In Pennsylvania, both federal and state courts decided on the
constitutionality of conscription. Federal District Court Judge John Cadwalader upheld the power
to conscript in two 1863 decisions but frustrated the Lincoln administration both by maintaining
a role for federal judges to review the decisions of the Boards of Enrollment and his issuing of
writs of habeas corpus to release soldiers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued the most
important case on the subject in November 1863, Kneedler v. Lane, finding the Conscription Act
constitutional. The constitutional conservative victory was short-lived, as the decision was
overturned two months later. As the history of twentieth-century conscription cases evidences, it
would be the last time the courts seriously considered the constitutional argument against
conscription.
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INTRODUCTION

In the middle of 1863, New York’s Metropolitan Record published a pamphlet imaging
President Lincoln on trial for crimes against the Constitution. In the “Trial of the Constitution,”
Lincoln was charged by the “Spirit of the Constitution” with violating the Constitution with
every war-time measure passed by his administration and the Republican Congress. The “Trial of
the Constitution” envisioned the Founding Fathers, from Washington to Jefferson to Madison to
Hamilton, alongside the political triumvirate of Webster, Clay, and Calhoun putting Lincoln on
the stand to be cross-examined. They accused Lincoln of ignoring the long-standing
constitutional traditions dear to many Americans, through his war policies of suspending habeas
corpus, his emancipation policy, and putting the whole able-bodied male population at his
command by conscription. The pamphlet called conscription an infamous law that was not only
“subversive of the Constitution” but also but transgressed state sovereignty.1 It was a visceral
image that encapsulated the contentious public constitutional debate occurring throughout 1863
in the north over Lincoln’s war measures.
While constitutional conservatives challenged policies like confiscation, emancipation,
and the suspension of habeas corpus on constitutional grounds, the locus of public constitutional
debates in 1863 centered on conscription. By the twentieth century, from the terrors of the

1

“Trial of Abraham Lincoln by the great statesmen of the republic: A council of the past on the tyranny of
the present. The spirit of the Constitution on the bench-Abraham Lincoln, prisoner at the bar, his own counsel,” New
York Metropolitan Record (1863), 5-11.
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trenches in World War I to the horrors of the Vietnam War, judicial receptivity to constitutional
claims against conscription had faded even if many remained convinced the draft is
unconstitutional. This dissertation shows that most constitutional arguments against conscription
were exhausted during the Civil War and while the twentieth century saw new spins upon those
constitutional objections, the judiciary become unwilling to listen despite attempts to revisit the
issues despite the serious challenges brought before them.
As Timothy Huebner suggests, nineteenth-century Americans embraced a constitutional
culture that looked to protect the traditions of the founding generation. Shared constitutional
culture refers to the ways in which nineteenth-century Americans saw the Constitution as a
central feature of intellectual life. The popular veneration for the founders’ Constitution helped
develop American nationalism, as the “memory and history of the creation of the republic
formed the basis of a nascent national identity that bound Americans.”2 Nineteenth-century
Americans spoke regularly about the Constitution in newspapers, letters, and political resolutions
and were genuinely committed to the maintenance of the founders’ Constitution. That
commitment was thick and genuine in the sense that Americans at the time did not treat
constitutional values as a substitute for political ideology but believed upholding the
Constitution’s meaning was part of their identity as Americans. Notably, constitutional culture
transcended political ideology, forcing both Democrats and Republicans to take constitutional
arguments seriously and to stake out respective constitutional values. Americans expected their
political representatives to speak constitutionally and address the constitutional issues of the day.
Thus, constitutional conservatives felt that their best avenue for redress against the Conscription
Act was through public constitutional debates and judicial action, not extrajudicial violence or

2

Timothy Huebner, Liberty and Union: The Civil War Era and American Constitutionalism (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2016), 19.
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protest like the New York City draft riots or other popular constitutional action. They crafted
plausible, well-considered arguments with older roots in the Jacksonian tradition and the broader
constitutional culture. Supporters of conscription, who held the same common constitutional
culture values, responded in kind, certain that the founders’ Constitution and past tradition
granted the federal government sufficient power to pass national conscription. This dissertation
highlights this constitutional resistance through the study of previously understudied and
unearthed court cases, petitions, and briefs alongside extensive research of newspapers and the
congressional record which constituted the public constitutional debate.
Conscription in the north during the American Civil War is a prime example of the
expansion of federal power that occurred as a result of the war. Despite the overwhelming
volume of historical inquiry into the American Civil War, relatively few works of history have
been focused solely on the constitutional history of the war, let alone conscription itself. Yet, the
battles over the constitutionality of conscription in the courtroom reflect the high stakes of
deciding constitutional issues during the nation’s bloodiest war. The result of these battles was
contingent, as it briefly appeared that the Supreme Court could take a case on appeal to strike
down conscription. This case was Kneedler v. Lane, decided on November 9, 1863 by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which represented a high-water mark for constitutional
conservatives opposing conscription. The 3-2 decision saw three Democratic state judges, led by
Chief Justice Walter H. Lowrie, emphasize the threat the Conscription Act posed to antebellum
federalism and the residual powers of states over their militias. The Court issued a temporary
injunction which theoretically precluded federal officers from administering the draft in
Pennsylvania, but the federal government moved quickly to reverse the decision and by January,
with Lowrie replaced by the constitutional nationalist Republican Daniel Agnew, the injunction

3

was reversed. It was as close as constitutional conservatives got to achieving their goal of getting
the issue before the Supreme Court to finally strike down the act.
When the Civil War broke out in 1861, conscription was widely considered a tyrannical
measure only resorted to by despots. Voluntarism was the preferred method of recruiting an
army in a democratic republic and resorting to conscription implicitly suggested the failure of
volunteer citizen-soldiers. In the largest conflict before the Civil War, the Mexican-American
War, over 68 percent on the soldiers who fought were volunteer citizen soldiers. As historian
Peter Guardino shows, nineteenth-century Americans distrusted the regular army and saw it as a
“last resort” for desperate laborers.3 However, after the failures of the Militia Act of 1862, the
Union established national conscription in March 1863 through the Enrollment Act-known to its
critics as the “Conscription Act.”4 The act authorized the enrollment and drafting all eligible
male citizens twenty to forty-five, including those aliens who declared their intention to become
citizens. Enrolled men were divided into classes based on age, with those between twenty and
thirty-five to be drafted first. Exemptions were granted to those families with two or more men
already serving, but no occupational or religious exemptions were authorized by the act, and
male citizens could also avoid the draft by paying a $300 commutation fee or securing a
substitute. Section fourteen allowed for exemptions to be granted only once a citizen was

3

Carl Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1999),
The two legacies of England passed to American colonists were fear of standing armies and a reliance upon citizen
soldiers, or militiamen, for defense, noting that 164,087 of the 395,858 men-41.5%- who served in the
Revolutionary War were militiamen; Peter Guardino, “Gender, Soldiering, and Citizenship in the MexicanAmerican War of 1846-1848,” American Historical Review, Vol. 1 (2014), 26-27 Guardino notes that both sides in
the Mexican-American War did not trust their regular army forces, a “last resort” for laborers, and used thousands of
citizen-soldiers, with the United States enrolling volunteers in regiments for limited terms-in total, American forces
were 27,000 regular army soldiers and 59,000 volunteers, or 68.6%. Still, during the War of 1812, 458,000 out of
the 528,000 soldiers who fought were militiamen, while only six regiments were volunteer regiments. Donald R.
Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 77.
4
“An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes (The Enrollment
Act),” Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 731 (1863) Hereinafter known as “The Conscription Act.”)
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actually drafted. Ultimately, the draft brought many more men into the army by bounty and
substitution than by conscription itself.5
The wartime expansion of the central Federal government were embodied by
conscription and the suspension of habeas corpus and these significant, novel changes were
contested in state courts. Although President Davis and the Confederate Congress had instituted
national conscription by April 1862, the arrival of conscription in the north was wholly new to its
citizenry.6 My contribution is to resurrect the significance of the overlooked public constitutional
debate over conscription by constitutional conservatives in the north. This dissertation reveals
the intensity of the debates and the ways constitutional opponents of conscription employed the
Constitution as their preferred tool to oppose the draft. Finally, it adds to both the narrative of
nineteenth-century constitutional culture and to the expansion of the national government both
during and after the Civil War.
Ultimately, the participants in this public constitutional debate hoped to influence the
courts with their arguments. This public debate is the first part of the story, which shows how
constitutional conservatives and constitutional nationalists crafted and spread their arguments in
Congress and the press. The second part of the story is showing how judges and lawyers brought
this debate within the courts. To understand how the government nearly lost the constitutional
battles over conscription, this dissertation explains how suits challenging conscription in New
York and Pennsylvania primarily came by writs of habeas corpus. Although it is not a focus of

5 James W. Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1991), 66. 65% of those examined under the 1863 draft call were released for physical disability or hardship
and of the 88,171 men held to service, 52,288 paid the $300 fee and 26,002 furnished substitutes. Thus, only 9,881
men became conscripts in 1863 out of 292,441 called out. Ibid, 67. Overall, of the 1,261,567 troops raised between
1863 and 1865, 46,347 were conscripts, or 3.67%, and 118,010 were substitutes, or 9.35%, leading to a total of
164,357 men or 13% brought to the Union army by the draft. Ibid, 84.
6
Act of April 16, 1862, Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of
America, 1st Sess., chap. 31, 29-32.
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this dissertation, the vast majority of these habeas cases were suits on the behalf of minor
soldiers. Significantly, they came before both state and federal judges, including the central
judicial figures of this dissertation such as Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge John
Cadwalader and Judge George Washington Woodward of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
These were generally not constitutional cases like Kneedler, but allegations by parents that their
minor child was in the “unlawful custody and control” of a federal officer and “illegally
restrained of his liberty” without being charged with a crime.7 While these cases are an important
part of legal resistance to the Conscription Act, they tell us little about constitutional resistance
outside the desire of constitutional conservatives to maintain the right of parents to file for
habeas writs in state court. The core objections to conscription never wavered from a focus on
preserving antebellum federalism, but many courtroom battles hinged instead on the propriety of
state court jurisdiction over habeas claims against federal draft officers.
As chapter two explains, those legal conflicts over jurisdiction harkened back to the
conscription debates during the War of 1812 and the jurisdictional battles over the Fugitive Slave
Act in the 1850s which resulted in the Supreme Court’s 1859 decision in Ableman v. Booth
which appeared to end such state jurisdictional claims.8 Broadly, this dissertation argues the

7

These cases were consistent in their language and claims, referring to minors not being legally competent
to enroll in the army. See In Re John Reed (E.D. Pa. September 4, 1863) Judge Cadwalader granted writ, soldier
taken before he was 19, restrained of his liberty without any criminal charge by the Provost Marshal; In Re Cyrus A.
Bell (E.D. Pa. August 22, 1863); In Re Connell (E.D. Pa. September 7, 1863) Father claimed son was drafted against
his consent, “contrary to the Act of Congress”-the Conscription Act; The exception was a claim like James Larash’s,
which was based on the July 1862 Militia Act and argued he had “not entered into the service of the United States in
pursuance of the said draft” and improperly held in custody as a deserter. In Re Larash (E.D. Pa. September 14,
1863). Similar arguments were made in state court. See Kern v. Wright, Pennsylvania State Archives Before Chief
Justice Walter Lowrie of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that he was “illegally and wrongfully for no
criminal or supposed criminal matter” held by Captain Wright; Petition for Habeas Corpus To the Honorable James
Thompson, July 22, 1863, Pennsylvania State Archives Judge Thompson ordered Colonel Small to discharged Emile
Badger; To the Honorable George W. Woodward and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, March 17,
1863, Pennsylvania State Archives Henry and Clara Boyle petitioned the Supreme Court on behalf of Alfred Henry
MacNeil as a minor and Woodward granted the writ; Sharpley v. Finnie, Petition to Eastern District, Pennsylvania
State Archives.
8
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
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constitutional controversy over conscription and other Union war policies can be seen as a
continuation of the constitutionalism in the north regarding the Fugitive Slave Act. In both cases,
citizens were confronted with unprecedented expansions of governmental power that had a
profound impact upon individuals. In the case of the Fugitive Slave Act, the federal government
could suddenly compel individual northerners to aid in the capture of fugitive slaves in northern
states. Northern citizens were asked as a result to confront issues of slavery and federalism
against the backdrop of individual rights. Conscription similarly asked northern citizens to
forcibly give their bodies and labor to the federal government in aid of the war effort.
The primary constitutional opposition to conscription came from constitutional
conservatives.9 They occupied a kind of middle ground between the radical Peace Democrats of
Clement Vallandigham and Fernando Wood and War Democrats who fiercely support the war
measures of the Lincoln Administration as necessary to win the war and preserve the republic.
As historian William Harris observes, many historians have contrasted War and Peace
Democrats, with war Democrats having a traditional adherence to strict construction while
supporting most war policies. Often ignored in accounts of the Civil War are those Democrats
who “remained faithful to the old party of Andrew Jackson” and its constitutional tenets while
supporting the war but opposing Lincoln and the Republicans.10 Constitutional conservatives

9

This dissertation employs “constitutional conservatives” in order to link the constitutional resistance to
conscription back to a long tradition of skepticism of federal power which included ensuring the federal government
could not usurp state power over the militia. The term is used both in the historiography and by historic actors and
remains a common term deployed to signal the belief that government should be limited by the text, structure, and
traditions of the Constitution
10
William C. Harris, Two Against Lincoln: Reverdy Johnson and Horatio Seymour: Champions of the
Loyal Opposition, (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2017). 2. Constitutional conservatives opposed the
adoption of “radical and rash measures” that might have established “unwise constitutional and political
precedents.” Despite the “shrillness of their language,” they pursued a “conservative course” between the
Republicans and Copperheads. Ibid 216. As an example of the split between constitutional or Jacksonian
conservatives and Vallandigham, in March 1863, during a meeting of Democrats in Albany, New York, Seymour
insisted to Vallandigham that Northeastern Democrats opposed any peace party that conceded Southern
independence and that he would not abide by an anti-war platform for the party, forcing Vallandigham to tone down

7

were loyal Democrats who saw Republican policies as unwise precedent and a serious threat to
civil liberties and the system of federalism established by the founders. They opposed the
Conscription Act primarily as unconstitutional because it altered the system of federalism as
originally constructed by the founders or “antebellum federalism.”11 As Jack Rakove notes,
“respect for federalism was a dominant value of early nineteenth-century and antebellum
constitutionalism.”12
Constitutional conservatives were almost exclusively Democrats.13 The term as used in
this dissertation is intended to not obscure political reality, but to focus upon the constitutional
arguments they choose to make as their primary means of opposing conscription. In order to
argue constitutional conservatives, including judges, were purely political actors, historians have
often treated strict constructionism as a vehicle merely for protecting states’ rights for political
purposes. Doing so effectively marginalizes their constitutional arguments by linking them to a
word tainted by secession and nullification. Understood according to their own words, they were
committed to the founders’ constitution and the antebellum federalism they believed conscription
threatened. My purpose here is not to evaluate whether or not these actors correctly interpreted
the Constitution. Nor is the goal of this dissertation to decipher the precise relationship between
politics and constitutional arguments.

his peace rhetoric and focus on constitutional criticisms of the Republican war measures like conscription. Ibid at
141-42.
11
Ibid., 138. Thus, Seymour, in his January 1863 inaugural address, held that the war had to be fought with
fidelity to state sovereignty and strict constitutional accountability, as “a consolidated government” would “destroy
the essential home-rights and liberties of the people.”
12
Jack Rakove, “Two Foxes in the Forest of History,” Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, Vol. 11, no. 1
(1999): 200.
13 As Chapter two suggests, there were some Republicans who were more conservative and fit a broad
“constitutional conservative” label. A fitting example is Illinois’ Lyman Trumbell, one of the only Republicans to
oppose parts of the Conscription Act and the only Republican to support James Bayard’s March 2nd attempt to
indefinitely postpone passage and debate on the Conscription Act. Conservative Pennsylvania Republican Edgar
Cowan likewise fit the label of a moderate constitutional conservative committed to the volunteer tradition and
militia power who nevertheless supported national conscription.
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This is precisely because the relationship between politics and constitutional arguments
was not static, but in constant flux. Like the multiple loyalties David Potter discusses in
addressing southern nationalism and Confederate citizens, Northern citizens who had shared
values about the importance of upholding constitutional tradition and the founders’ Constitution
disagreed not only about interpretation, but varied in the degree to which their constitutional
values weighed against their support for the war and sanctioning the power necessary to save the
nation. Additionally, constitutional values represented aspirational ideals, as few political and
legal actors could truly separate their constitutional positions from politics but believe they
should make all efforts to do so. Finally, this dissertation shows that constitutional arguments
were often crafted in political arenas—in Congress, political newspapers, and through partisan
bodies—a reflection of the emotional resonance of these constitutional arguments, inextricably
linked to northern Democratic resistance to Republican policies they believed shifted the war
from one to save the Union and Constitution to an abolition war. Yet, over the course of 1863,
constitutional conservatives also honed their core constitutional arguments in order to prepare
successful judicial challenges to the Conscription Act.
Constitutional conservatives understood themselves as adhering strict constructionism as
an interpretive approach for understanding the Constitution, going back to the Anti-Federalist
and Jeffersonian traditions.14 However, in order to fully describe their interpretive approach, this
dissertation will use the term “historical originalism” to describe the commitment to textual
limitations on federal power, rejection of implied powers, and opposition to an evolving

14
Nolo Plain English Dictionary gives a fair definition for strict constructionism: “Interpreting a legal
provision (usually a constitutional protection) narrowly. Strict constructionists often look only at the literal meaning
of the words in question, or at their historical meaning at the time the law was written. Also referred to as "strict
interpretation" or "original intent," because a person who follows the doctrine of strict construction of the
Constitution tries to ascertain the intent of the framers at the time the document was written by considering what the
language they used meant at that time.” https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/strict-construction-term.html.
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Constitution. Constitutional conservatives thus believed in narrowly interpreting the powers of
the federal government and protecting the reserved powers of the states according to the original
understanding of federalism.15 Conscription threatened to upend their constitutional values and
required both political and legal action to halt it. While this dissertation focuses on the
resurrecting the way constitutional conservatives opposed conscription with constitutional
arguments, it also shows how constitutional nationalists spoke constitutionally as well.
Republican newspapers, politicians, and lawyers took seriously the need to craft constitutional
arguments in support of the Conscription Act and their efforts must also be understood as
sincere.
Three terms are important for understanding this public constitutional debate are related
but distinct. States’ rights was the phrase most widely used by nineteenth-century actors.
However, Republican critics of the Democratic opposition tended to use it as an invective against
administration opponents. They felt those who supported states’ rights likely also supported
nullification, slavery, and immediate peace with the Confederacy. Historians have often mirrored
the language and assumptions of Republicans. States’ rights have come to mean a commitment
to slavery under state law embodied by the Confederate Constitution. Federalism was less
commonly used by constitutional conservatives, but the term avoids the pejorative nature of
states’ rights while embracing the commitment of strict constructions to the original
constitutional structure. Federalism refers to the division of power under the Constitution
between state and federal governments. As Timothy Zick argues, federalism indicates but does
not define state sovereignty.16

15

Hereinafter, the understanding of federalism employed by constitutional conservatives will be referred to
as “antebellum federalism.”
16
Timothy Zick, “Are The States Sovereign?,” Washington University Law Review, Vol. 83, no. 1 (2005):
29.
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State sovereignty is a related but distinct constitutional principle. Sovereignty is an
amorphous concept that continues to produce debate amongst scholars as to its precise meaning.
This dissertation does not look to enter the debate over sovereignty. Rather, this dissertation only
argues that constitutional conservatives also employed the language of state sovereignty as part
of their arguments to sustain antebellum federalism. By state sovereignty, they meant the power
states held within their own borders over internal governance including the military that the
Conscription Act necessarily interfered with. Constitutional conservatives felt state sovereignty
remained powerful enough under the Constitution that states maintained exclusive control over
all powers of internal governance not otherwise explicitly granted to the federal government.
They pointed to Hamilton’s Federalist 32 which states governments “clearly retain all the rights
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not ... exclusively delegated to the United
States."17 Constitutional conservatives aimed to protect the balance of power as originally
constructed under the Founders’ Constitution. As with federalism, understanding state
sovereignty helps to unfurl the meaning of states’ rights in the nineteenth-century.
Finally, the principle of separation of powers holds that the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments be separate and distinct. As James Madison noted in Federalist 47, the
principle was derived from the political maxim of Montesquieu which held, “There can be no
liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates,'' or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers.”18 Accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial power in one body was a danger
17

Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 32,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed32.asp.
James Madison, “Federalist No. 47,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed47.asp. See also James
Madison, “Federalist No. 51,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp (“In order to lay a due foundation
for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on
all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its
own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in
the appointment of the members of the others.”) Madison was also clear in Federalist 47-51 that he did not mean
18
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to liberty and the definition of tyranny. This was a fundamental constitutional principle that
constitutional conservatives believed must be upheld. They saw the Conscription Act as
tyrannical in part because it ignored separation of powers in granting the President and executive
officers legislative and judicial powers.
In defense of these principles, constitutional conservatives employed three constitutional
arguments against conscription. First, they rejected the Conscription Act on federalist grounds,
arguing that it unlawfully encroached upon state militia powers. Second, they attacked
conscription for its interference with separation of powers, particularly the Boards of Enrollment
as constituting an improper delegation of legislative power. Finally, they argued that
conscription, like the suspension of habeas corpus, violated individual liberties. Historians have
often anachronistically examined Civil War dissent with the expectation that the grounds of
objection to conscription would begin with civil liberties violations. In contrast to these
assumptions, constitutional conservatives emphasized maintaining antebellum federalism first
and separation of powers and personal liberties arguments second. Constitutional conservatives
drew heavily on constitutional tradition and history to support these arguments. As chapter two
discusses, they not only looked to the founding, but the experience of the War of 1812 and the
constitutional objections to Secretary of War James Monroe’s attempt to pass national
conscription.
As noted, supporters of conscription or constitutional nationalists-Republicans and War
Democrats-made their own constitutional arguments in defense of the act. Constitutional
nationalists were portrayed by constitutional conservatives as constitutional nationalists prepared
to create a federal despotism, but they saw themselves as following from Hamiltonian principles

complete separation of powers, as some blending of powers would be necessary, but to protect against “overruling
influence” and against the invasion of one department over another.
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in upholding the residual powers of nation states to defend their existence. If constitutional
conservatives believed they followed the Jeffersonian and later Jacksonian tradition, nationalists
were affirmatively Hamiltonians. For them, constitutional history provided ample precedent for
conscription and the incidental powers of national government needed to be sufficient to deal
with a threat to the government’s existence. However, given the uncertainty of any outcome
before the Taney Court, the Lincoln Administration’s strategy for dealing with constitutional
controversies was to avoid the Supreme Court if possible. Supporting the war effort at all costs
ultimately trumped constitutional concerns, even if Lincoln himself and cabinet members like
Samuel Chase and Edward Bates took those arguments seriously. At the same time, the need to
act pragmatically while attending at times to the relevant constitutional arguments suggests that
the Lincoln administration was both unsure they would win such a case before the Supreme
Court and concerned with proving the Conscription Act was on solid constitutional footing. This
meant avoiding any state court decisions that decided upon pertinent constitutional questions
which could be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Yet, privately, Lincoln took the matter seriously enough to sketch out his own
constitutional arguments in support of the Conscription Act. In late 1863—possibly in response
to the Kneedler decision in Pennsylvania-he prepared an opinion on the draft law never issued or
published while he was alive.19 Lincoln reasoned that the power of Congress to conscript was
expressly given and this was the first time a power of Congress was questioned in a case “when

19

See Mark E. Neely, Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), 248 fn55 (Neely observes that John G. Nicolay and John Hay, in their 1890 history of Lincoln, dated the draft
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the power is given by the Constitution in express terms.”20 Lincoln saw this as the first case to
deny power which was “plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution,” pointing to the
power to “raise and support” armies. This, he thought, was the “whole of it.”21 Lincoln, like
many Republicans, felt it was apparent that the law was constitutional because Congress had its
choice of means in prosecuting the war. The Constitution did not determine or prescribe the
mode for raising armies but gave it “fully, completely, unconditionally.” Constitutional
nationalists, including Lincoln, were as invested as constitutional conservatives in proving their
positions harmonized with the founders’ constitution. Before lawyers could contemplate
constitutional arguments and legal strategies in the fight over conscription, these arguments were
first tested and constructed through the debate in Congress.
When considering the constitutional debate over conscription in 1863, the fact that
congressional speeches were political tools meant to be shared with public and not necessarily
connected to the process of making the laws themselves speaks to their value within the public
constitutional debates. The meandering polemics given by constitutional conservatives against
the Conscription Act in February 1863 were intended not just to flesh out the constitutional
objections to the bill, but to do so with the hope of spreading those objections widely to the
people. As Rachel Shelden notes, in the antebellum period, senators and representatives
generally attended to the needs of their constituents by making congressional speeches.22
Shelden rightly observes the limitations of the Congressional Globe, which offered the only
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“official record” of political negotiation versus what happened behind the scenes.23 The Globe,
along with the National Intelligencer, were reprinted in newspapers around the country and the
nation's main access to Congress, but both papers were selective in their coverage, as leading
speeches were included with lesser attempts left out and abstracts of debate were patchy and
focused on proceedings.24
Significantly, congressmen were allowed to edit, remove, or substantially add to speeches
given in Congress when they were preparing them for publication in newspapers or pamphlets.25
Yet, congressmen did this in response to public interest and demand. As Joanne Freeman states,
in the antebellum period, "Congress was where the action was" and got the "lion's share of
column inches," as newspapers routinely printed lengthy summaries of congressional debates
and commentary.26 While congressional speeches may have been designed mostly for partisan
purposes and to reach constituents, if the content of those speeches were principally about the
constitutional defects of the Conscription Act, it reflects that these concerns were relevant to the
public. This dissertation does not aim to argue about reception of these arguments by the public,
but rather the choices made by elite voices whom felt constitutional arguments were central to
the objections to the Conscription Act they shared publicly with their constituents.
Once the Conscription Act was signed into law on March 3, 1863, public debate over the
constitutionality of conscription quickly emerged. New York and Pennsylvania were particular
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hotbeds of those constitutional battles. It was in these two states that the most significant judicial
actions occurred, with both also home to an explosion of commentary about conscription in the
newspapers and pamphlets. Certainly, opposition to the war and resistance to the conscription
itself was widespread in the north, particularly in the Midwest. And Democratic papers from
Wisconsin to Chicago to Connecticut to Cincinnati to Detroit to Maine published constitutional
arguments against the Conscription Act. Connecticut’s Democratic gubernatorial candidate
Thomas Seymour openly opposed conscription, while states like New Jersey and Connecticut
reacted early with resolutions from Democrats opposing the constitutionality of conscription.27
New Jersey’s House of Representatives even passed resolutions of March 17, by vote of 38 to
13, stating that the people of the state felt the war powers “within the limits of the Constitution,”
were “ample for any and all emergencies” and all assumptions of power beyond the
Constitution’s grant were without “warrant or authority” and it permitted to continued would
“encompass the destruction of the liberties of the people and the death of the republic.”28
However, no other states had comparable amounts of judicial action in combination with
ongoing, robust public constitutional debate. It appeared possible for a moment in the summer of
1863 New York courts might overturned the Conscription Act, while the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would in fact do so in November.
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As Iver Bernstein observed in his landmark study of the New York City draft riots, the
Conscription Act highlighted explosive issues in mid-century New York City, namely class
issues, racial issues, and the divide between the national government and state and local
governments.29 The historiography tends to pay more attention to the draft riots than other forms
of opposition to conscription, namely constitutional resistance. Thus, this dissertation will not
examine the draft riots themselves, which were not acts explicitly connected to any constitutional
arguments. Rather, this study focuses on the responses to the riots in the press and the battles in
New York courtrooms. Governor Horatio Seymour and other New York Democrats saw the
Conscription Act as unconstitutional subordinating state and local authority and believed that the
courts were the proper venue for redress. Over the course of 1863, New York courts saw
numerous challenges to conscription, but constitutional conservatives only managed one victory
before being bogged down in arguments over jurisdiction. Simultaneously, the city’s partisan
newspapers battled over the course of the year over the act’s constitutionality. According to
Stephen Engle, New York City was a loyal city that nevertheless became the “nations’
battleground over conscription.”30
Like New York, Pennsylvania saw plentiful popular resistance to conscription, especially
in the anthracite mining regions in the north.31 Philadelphia Democrats, led be a cadre of
experienced lawyers and aristocratic politicians, became the principal leaders of the fight against
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conscription. Four in particular-Charles Ingersoll, George Biddle, George Wharton, and Peter
McCall-helped bring a case claiming the Conscription Act was unconstitutional before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the fall of 1863. By November, in the case of Kneedler v. Lane
they achieved the most significant victory for constitutional conservatives when the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on a 3-2 margin declared the act unconstitutional. Within just over
two months, their judicial victory would be reversed, the consequence of an electoral loss for the
Democrats. Constitutional conservatives in Pennsylvania failed to get the state federal courts to
overturn conscription, but they had enough success getting citizens released by writs of habeas
corpus to frustrate Lincoln himself.32
The focus of this dissertation is on the public constitutional debate and cases involving
conscription in the north in 1863. Although the perspective of constitutional conservatives on
abolitionism and emancipation is discussed, this dissertation does not aim to evaluate the
connection between race and constitutional arguments. There is no question that constitutional
conservatives partly criticized the Republican war measures for aiming to support an abolitionist
war, not a war for restoring the Union and the Constitution as it was. They also criticized the
Conscription Act for forcing white soldiers to serve alongside black soldiers. Constitutional
conservatives were undoubtedly racist and often openly stated their support for the continued
protection of slavery alongside their cries for the maintenance of the Union and Constitution as it
was. Yet, few, if any, of their federalism-based constitutional arguments were explicitly linked to
the racial arguments. The most obvious exemption is that the tradition of a volunteer militia
system inherently meant a white-only system. Further, many believed that volunteerism would
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have remained sufficient to fight the war if the administration had never converted the war’s
aims from one to restore the Union as it was to an abolition war. Thus, Republican war measures
were problematic both because they were unconstitutional and because they were made
necessary by the abolition war.
This dissertation focuses on the history of constitutional ideas and is not a history of
politics. By making the argument that constitutional ideals and arguments can be held separately
from political beliefs, this dissertation is about rhetoric over action. Yet, as noted, the
relationship between politics and constitutional arguments was in constant flux. That
constitutional values and principles could override and come before political obligations and
partisanship does not mean this was always or usually the case. The constitutional debate
involved actors on both sides of the issue wavering between constitutional commitments and
partisan battles. The public constitutional debate over conscription and other war issues was
limited to elite, educated white men. Women certainly were among those resisting conscription
and undoubtedly influenced the filing of habeas petitions on behalf of their children and even a
handful of women brought suits themselves.33 But they were limited in the roles they could play
in the courtroom, unable to practice law, and thus were not among the class of lawyers,
politicians, and newspaper editors debating conscription. Likewise, African-Americans were
purposefully banned from participating in the public constitutional debates and there is
unfortunately little history covering the reactions of African-Americans to the Civil War draft.
This dissertation also does not deal extensively with the problem of loyalty. Certainly,
loyalty colored the constitutional debates over conscription just as race did. Republicans and War
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Democrats in particular frequently scolded constitutional conservatives and brandished them as
potential traitors and southern sympathizers for having the temerity to question the constitutional
footing of conscription. For constitutional nationalists and supporters of conscription,
constitutional arguments and personal loyalty were connected. Because they desired to secure the
state and the nation, they were wary about constitutional objections which were powerful enough
to dislodge policies they believed were necessary to win the war. Constitutional conservatives
tried to make clear that their criticism had nothing to do with southern sympathy or attempts to
end or frustrate the war effort outside of ensuring the war remained one fought for Union and the
Constitution as it was. Yet, arguments about loyalty were not ultimately about the Constitution,
instead reflecting how many Americans valued the security of the nation over their constitutional
values in the midst of the Civil War. Studies of loyalty during the Civil War are properly their
own subset of Civil War history. Even dealing with the question of loyalty and draft resistors
have produced several notable studies.34 Thus, it falls outside the limits of this dissertation,
which aims to understand constitutional arguments not questions of personal loyalty.
Historiographical Review
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The historiography of the Civil War draft has largely ignored constitutional opposition to
conscription. Most historians who covered the draft looked to explain the mechanics and
effectiveness of the draft, not its constitutionality. Even studies of resistance to the draft tend to
marginalize constitutional arguments, as social historians focused on the actions and discontent
of groups. The handful of constitutional histories about the north tend to spend little time on
constitutional arguments resisting conscription, focusing on the growth of the nation and
challenges to other policies like the suspension of habeas corpus and Lincoln’s blockade. Only
Mark Neely has specifically addressed at length the New York and Pennsylvania conscription
cases in a single monograph. This dissertation aims to understand the constitutional arguments of
both constitutional conservatives and constitutional nationalists on their own terms. In doing so,
it disputes both Neely’s interpretation of the conscription cases and debates and the
marginalization of constitutional arguments in the historiography.
Constitutional history of the Civil War starts with the work of James Randall, who wrote
the bedrock of Civil War constitutional history in 1926, Constitutional Problems Under
Lincoln.35 Randall interpreted the judicial cases on issues of federal power like conscription as
reflecting the presumption among legal and political actors in favor of strong national power. He
argued that constitutional arguments against conscription were prompted by the desire to save
drafted men from punishment for desertion. For Randall, opponents of conscription usually
utilized the “state-rights’, strict-constructionist” arguments that centered on the distinction
between the militia and the army by arguing the militia was a state institution.36 He rightly
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identified that they employed constitutional tradition to argue the founding fathers had not
contemplated such sweeping powers as conscription and had limited Congress to reliance on
voluntary enlistments to ensure that wars had the check of the people’s consent.37 However,
Randall, writing in the wake of World War I and the Supreme Court’s unanimous approval of
conscription in Arver v. United States, denied the accuracy of these constitutional arguments,
making normative claims that the powers to “declare war” and “raise armies” were without
qualification.38 Since Randall’s work, historians have tended towards a Lincoln-centric,
nationalist model of interpretation.
Following Randall’s seminal work, between his 1935 biography of Roger Taney and his
1974 posthumous Oxford history of the Taney Court, legal historian Carl Brent Swisher detailed
overview of constitutional cases during the Civil War period including the conscription cases. As
Mark Neely notes, Swisher’s work is sobering because it reminds readers that the Supreme Court
spent most of the war reviewing issues related to land titles in California.39 Swisher wrote that
conscription ran “counter to prevailing beliefs in American liberty” and “carried a stigma in that
it implied a lack of courage and willingness to fight.”40 Because it flouted American
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constitutional tradition, he argued that in the minds of “legalistically trained persons, these
objections were rationalized into constitutional or other legal objections.”41 Swisher correctly
summarizes that constitutional objections to conscription as centering on the argument that the
power to raise and support armies extended only to raising armies of volunteers and calling into
federal service the militia of the several states. Swisher notes that the question of the
constitutionality of the act never reached the Supreme Court, but some state courts and lower
federal courts did answer it without “eliciting (an) definitive answer.”42 He rightfully understood
understand the constitutional battles over conscription as not definitively supporting the
constitutionality of the act and to recognize the heightened role of state courts. Still, Swisher’s
synthesis of the Taney Period necessarily was limited in its treatment of the Civil War
conscription cases given the Supreme Court’s absence.
Interest in the constitutional history of the period faded for decades until legal history saw
a broad revitalization starting in the late 1960s and 1970s. Yet, by the 1970s, Randall’s
nationalism thesis remained strong.43 In Harold Hyman’s 1973 work A More Imperfect Nation,
he wrote that Lincoln’s vision of the constitution triumphed over the view of Chief Justice Taney
and dissenting Democrats. Hyman argued the country shared Lincoln’s pragmatism concerning
the constitution and the needs of the war effort and accepted his “adequacy” thesis, which
suggested the Constitution’s principal concerns were the maintaining the government and
protecting the general welfare instead of merely protecting individual rights.44 In 1982, Hyman
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gave greater consideration to individual cases when he teamed with legal historian William
Wiecek to produce a synthesis of constitutional development between 1835 and 1875.
Hyman and Wiecek rightly understood that the Lincoln administration engaged in a
strategy of avoidance on constitutional questions. They observed how Lincoln “tried to keep off
the Court’s docket other litigation involving habeas corpus, treason, martial law, conscription,
emancipation, or the novel wartime income tax” because they feared its effect on the nation’s
war capacity.45 Hyman and Wiecek believed Lincoln was wise to pursue avoidance, given that
Chief Justice Taney had prepared opinions privately that declared arbitrary arrests, emancipation,
and conscription unconstitutional.46 They also took a dim view of the constitutional arguments of
Democrats, seeing them as merely retaining “concepts of liberties only in the traditional context
of fixed constraints on wrongs that the government must not commit” and constraints that
operated to limit national power at all times.47 Significantly, Hyman and Wiecek understood the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Kneedler v. Lane to be the result of Democratic
judges acting in a “highly politicized situation” to declare conscription unconstitutional before
reversing itself.48 Thus, rather than address the particular constitutional arguments or why they
choose them, Hyman and Wiecek discarded appeals based on constitutional conservatism as
sheer partisanship. They celebrated the pragmatism of Lincoln’s constitutionalism over what
they saw as stagnate opposition.
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Not all historians have taken such a cynical view of the Democratic opposition and their
constitutional arguments. The resurrection of the Democrats as a loyal opposition with serious
arguments came with Joel Silbey’s 1977 work, A Respectable Minority. In it, Silbey sought to
understand what he deemed “constitutional conservatives” at the center of the respectable
minority party who were committed to constitutionalism. These Democrats held certain “deeply
ingrained Democratic beliefs about limited government, the Constitution, and conservative social
policy.”49 In particular, Silbey thought conscription intensified Democratic anger since it was
both contrary to the “genius and principles ore republican government” and “foreign to the
American experience, destructive of American liberties, and part of a larger and unacceptable
commitment to state control over individuals and their behavior.”50 Two related and traditional
themes structured all Democratic arguments-a limited-powers constitutionalism based in
Jacksonian politics alongside fear of social revolution.51
Silbey’s work divides Democrats into competing camps, with the “extreme peace
Democrats” or purists in one group, including figures like Ohio Representatives Clement
Vallandigham and George Pendleton, Connecticut Governor Thomas Seymour, and New York
Mayor Fernando Wood, “legitimists” or moderate Peace Democrats like Ohio Representative
Samuel S. Cox and New York Representative David Turpie in a second group and War
Democrats in a third.52 The legitimists looked to emphasize points of agreement among
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constitutional conservatives who felt that Lincoln’s policies hurt the war effort and made peace
“all but impossible.”53 They wished in Congress to establish a clear record of war support and
reaffirmation of the Union while maintaining their opposition to the administration. As the New
York World wrote, these Democrats discriminated between the “constitutional and
unconstitutional measures of the administration, zealously supporting the former and vigorously
repudiating the latter.”54 “Purists” were reflexively anti-war and in fighting to preserve the
Constitution, “they bitterly attacked, as did their Legitimist brethren, the centralization of power,
abolitionism, and the Republican party.”55
Silbey also shows the vital role of newspapers in spreading party platforms, including
their constitutional arguments. The role of the widespread, vigorous Democratic press during the
Civil War in major urban centers and state capitals throughout the North was to remind the
“faithful” voters through editorials and news stories of “their past commitments, exhorting them
to turn out on election day, and reestablishing in every Democratic mind the negative images of
the opposition.”56 New York papers were at the center of this machine. By 1863, the New York
World had become the “leading national organ of the party” and was the center of a “functioning
Democratic machine.”57 Even if it was doubtful the formal arguments of their platforms and

attention, Copperheads “tarred” the Democratic Party with the image of disloyalty. Gienapp, Abraham Lincoln, 117.
Philllip Shaw Paludan likewise notes that legitimists shared the conservative constitutional and social philosophy of
purists but recognized that “ideological purity required the ballast of realism if ideals were to be executed by an
elected administration.” Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest: The Union and Civil War: 1861-1865 (New
York: Harper’s Row & Co., 1988), 247.
53
Silbey, A Respectable Minority, 95.
54
Ibid., 97. (New York World, February 17, 1864)
55
Ibid., 101-02 Legitimists “deceived themselves” by believing they could support the war and preserve
the Constitution. As former New York Mayor Fernando Wood said, there could be “no such thing as a War
Democrat, because when a man is in favor of the war, he must be in favor of the policies of the war as it is
prosecuted by the party in power, with its unavoidable tendency to destroy the Constitution and the Union.”
56
Ibid., 65.
57
According to Joanne Freeman, by the 1850s, New York City editors gained prominence over
Washington as the major sources of congressional news coverage and became power brokers who could "make or
break Congressional careers." Freeman, The Field of Blood, 184. The World was edited by Manton Marble in the
1860s, a moderate, hard-money “Swallowtale” Democrat. Erik B. Alexander, “The Fate of Northern Democrats after

26

literature would be “read all the way through or clearly understood by all readers,” they provided
guides for most to understand what was being argued as well as symbols to reduce complex
policy matters and the use of negative imagery. Speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper editorials
did the work of repeating and clarifying the desired signals of the parties.58 Broadly, these were
conversations about war policy itself and the public debate over conscription mirrored that of
loyalty through the work of Democratic politicians and newspaper editors. This dissertation aims
to build on Silbey’s work in understanding the rhetoric of constitutional conservatives, including
their constitutional opposition to conscription, and the role of partisan newspapers.
Historians have recently revisited Silbey’s interpretation. William Harris’s 2017
monograph, Two Against Lincoln, paints Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson and New York
Governor Horatio Seymour as leaders of a constitutional conservative loyal opposition during the
war.59 Harris correctly observes that historians have often understood Democrats during the Civil
War by contrasting war and peace Democrats. He argues that frequently neglected in accounts of
Civil War Democrats are those who “remained faithful to the old party of Andrew Jackson” and
its constitutional tenets, supported the war but opposed Lincoln and the Republican.60 Harris
calls these Democrats “loyal Democrats,” viewing Seymour as their leader. They articulated
constitutional and political principles for constitutional conservatives and Democrats in
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speeches, pamphlets and letters and saw Republican policies as a serious threat to civil liberties
and the “federal system of government created by the Founders.”61 As this dissertation argues,
loyal Democrats felt a need to uphold antebellum federalism. This conservative opposition was
distinct from Copperheads because it provided a serious challenge to the Republicans and their
war policies. As opposition, loyal Democrats emphasized the original Union purpose of the war
and reminded Americans “that constitutional principles should not be sacrificed.”62 This
dissertation employs the foundations provided by Silbey and Harris’ work in establishing the
significance of constitutional conservatives who followed Jacksonian strict constructionism.
Outside of works of political history and general constitutional histories of the Civil War
and those focused on Abraham Lincoln, the historiography is relatively devoid of scholarship
focused on constitutional arguments. Undoubtedly, no modern historian has analyzed the Civil
War’s constitutional history as much as Mark Neely. In his most recent work, Lincoln and the
Democrats, Neely gives his most complete assessment of the Democratic opposition to the
Lincoln Administration’s war measures, including conscription. Neely rightly notes that we
“simply do not understand the Democrats, study them enough, or make much of an attempt to
see the Civil War through their eyes.”63 Yet, Neely could admonish himself along the same lines,
as he fails to take seriously the ongoing public constitutional debate over conscription. He openly
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questions the sincerity of constitutional conservative objections to conscription. Finally, Neely’s
work fits alongside the Randall school that sees the constitutional history of the Civil War as a
victory for nationalism and pragmatism.64
Neely’s core argument is that constitutional history during the nineteenth-century was a
subset of political history. He believes constitutional arguments and action were mere politics.
Thus, Neely sees Civil War Democrats as not particularly attached to conservative
constitutionalism, but rather prone to the “irresponsible behavior endemic” to the American twoparty system in which wars “generally send the opposition political party into a desperate search
for constitutional issues.”65 Neely has support, as in a recent essay, Jennifer Weber briefly
examines the Kneedler case as partisan judicial decision-making because it broke down upon
party lines, as the opponents of conscription were “not without allies especially within the
judicial system” and that circumstances surrounding the case were “highly political.”66 Neely
argues that this was a transition, as Democrats “surrendered their central constitutional principle
and floundered from careful dissent in 1862 into desperate pseudo-constitutional posturing by
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1864.”67 He admits that not every Democrat gave up on those old principles during the war,
saying that as late as the middle of 1863, the New York World was “willing to fire off one more
volley on behalf of the principles,” decrying how an assertion of the doctrine of state sovereignty
could be regarded as remarkable when it was the cornerstone of the Democratic faith.68
Several issues arise in Neely’s analysis which this dissertation will help rectify. First,
Neely presumes that the Democrats or any opposition party search for constitutional issues
rather than discover them and form constitutional arguments as part of a legal and political
strategy. This fails to recognize the novel constitutional questions brought on by Lincoln’s war
policies. Federal conscription, like the broad suspension of habeas corpus and the income tax,
were bold assertions of federal power beyond prior precedent. Precedent existed going back to
the Revolutionary War for state militia drafts, but not for the nationalized versions seen during
the Civil War.69 Additionally, if constitutional conservatives were simply “looking around” for
constitutional issues, given that they complained about the suspension of habeas, the income tax,
the Legal Tender Act, and the Indemnity Act, that does not explain why their constitutional
arguments and judicial actions primarily focused on conscription in 1863.70 Conscription was an
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obvious target for constitutional conservatives precisely because it broke with constitutional
tradition and was based on a novel assertion of a power not enumerated to the federal
government under Article I. There is meaning to the choices and arguments made by
constitutional conservatives that Neely does not sufficiently acknowledge.
Second, Neely’s presupposition that all constitutional arguments were political
misunderstands nineteenth-century constitutional culture. Because nineteenth-century Americans
regularly engaged with the Constitution in newspapers and pamphlets, they demanded wellconsidered constitutional arguments from their political representatives given that Congress was
the most powerful political body of the time. Genuine constitutional concerns could come first
and inform both legal and political strategy and action. Third, Neely’s argument that Democrats
were inconsistent in their constitutional positions ignores the public constitutional debate of
1863. For Neely, the Civil War was a “great constitutional embarrassment for Democrats who
floundered from position to position,” abandoned Jacksonian constitutional principles, and
crafted a “ridiculous” and unconstitutional platform in 1864 aimed at creating new law rather
than the usual language of preservation.71 Yet, even if true, this ignores the ways in which
Democrats, as constitutional conservatives, argued consistently throughout 1863 that the
Constitution needed to remain fixed despite the circumstances of war. If constitutional
conservatives were desperate, it is precisely because the conditions of war heightened the
significance of these constitutional battles by making them time-sensitive.

Ricketts, 3 Grant 420 (Pa. 1863) (upholding Section IV as constitutional under the precedents of Cohens v. Virginia
and Martin v. Hunter).
There is, unfortunately, not space here to sufficiently cover those cases or issues. And neither issue occupied the
same space in the public constitutional debate nor court actions.
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Because Neely assumes that constitutional law is window dressing for politics, he misses
that constitutional values and politics were constantly in dialogue in nineteenth-century America.
Nineteenth-century political debate often took the form of constitutional dialogue, but not all
constitutional arguments were necessarily driven by politics itself. Constitutional conservatives
genuinely believed in a strict interpretation of the Constitution. Likewise, Lincoln and the
constitutional nationalists engaged with constitutional conservatives on the meaning of the
Constitution. Their views must, therefore, likewise be taken as sincere. The Constitution was a
nationalizing document which created a common American language even if Americans
disagreed on interpretation and application. Constitutional arguments mattered broadly enough
for American citizens generally to be comfortable talking about the Constitution.72 Political
parties needed to worry about constitutional arguments because they believed such arguments
mattered to voters who already valued them independent of politics through a common
constitutional culture which celebrated the founding. As legal historian Michael Les Benedict
attests, the national political platforms of the Civil War Era, between 1856 and 1876, attest to the
centrality of constitutional issues to politics.73
Neely’s argument that Democratic judges developed arguments against the
constitutionality of conscription in 1863 ignores the role of the public constitutional debates
throughout 1863 in crafting those arguments.74 Constitutional arguments against conscription
were readily available in the press and as party members, it is reasonable to assume that these
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state judges would have had access to them. For instance, 1863 state convention literature shows
the serious attention paid by Democrats to constitutional arguments.75 This reflects once more
Neely’s inability to take constitutional conservatives and their constitutional arguments
sincerely. His contention that arguments in the courts focused on state rights, a term ill-defined
by Neely, does not carefully consider arguments focused on federalism and the Constitution’s
structure and history. Neely seems to employ states’ rights as a pejorative standing for arguments
in defense of white supremacy. As noted, Democrats certainly made voracious arguments against
“abolitionist war” and the policy of emancipation and confiscation. But they did not see
conscription as unconstitutional because Republicans had converted the war to an effort in favor
of abolition-that fact made the policy unjust to Democrats and a reason for them to oppose it
politically. Democrats adopted numerous positions abhorrent to current moral standards, but
attributing all their choices to racism would miss nuance.
Much of the evidence for this dissertation comes from the November 1863 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision of Kneedler v. Lane which declared the Conscription Act
unconstitutional. Neely’s minimizes Kneedler because he seems unable to be convinced by their
constitutional arguments, making a normative claim that few if any good arguments exist against
national conscription.76 Neely believes that the best constitutional attack was in defense of state
militias and the notion that the act threatened state power by allowing the federal government to
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conscript all able-bodied males, but Neely also calls these arguments “backward-looking
positions rooted in an all but Balkanized vision of states’ rights” necessary because Democratic
judges had “nowhere else to go.”77 States were not, Neely claims, “ancient cities to be walled off
from the power of the national government.”78 Yet, regardless of whether or not the arguments of
constitutional conservatives were correct, they were part of an intense public constitutional
debate during 1863 in a search for the best arguments against an act they felt was surely against
constitutional tradition. Constitutional tradition is necessarily backward-looking, but because it
was such a strong political and cultural value of the time, it was not merely a constricting
worldview for desperate Democrats.79
Neely’s comments are not without precedent. In 1967, the American Bar Association
published an article by J.L. Bernstein describing the “amazing case” of Kneedler v. Lane.80 John
W. Delehant, a Federal District Court judge, responded to Bernstein’s article in the same 1967
ABA journal. Delehant’s examination of Kneedler found it to be “not so amazing” in that the
preliminary injunctions granted in November were never issued and thus, essentially
meaningless. Upon review, he found that Kneedler was “quite inadequate to prompt” or even
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support “a conclusion or a suspicion that the present” draft was unconstitutional.81 Delehant was
dismissive of the three-judge majority, saying they could not exactly identify a “rational
approach” to explain why the draft was unconstitutional and an invasion of the rights of the
states and citizens, nor did it adequately support the exercise of jurisdiction by the Pennsylvania
courts to enjoin the actions of the United States. Delehant notes that it was “not without at least
minor significance” that some if not all the opinions possessed “notably political overtones.”82
Ultimately, Delehant minimized Kneedler’s significance both by treating it as a political act and
by endorsing the veracity of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arver v. United States in 1918.
Like Neely, by treating Kneedler as a overt political act without practical meaning ignores that
the decision, even if it did had no practical legal effect to stop the federal draft, met the goals of
constitutional conservatives by finding the Conscription Act unconstitutional in court, opening
the door for the Supreme Court to finally resolve the issue.
In earlier works, Neely made similar dismissive arguments about the conscription cases.
In his 2011 Lincoln and the Triumph of Nation, Neely argued that the only Supreme Court
decision of any note about the war issue during the war was the Prize Cases in 1863.83 He rightly
notes that the state courts offered the greater number of venues to hear the complaints of citizens
and judges could issue writs of habeas to examine cases of wrongful restraint of their states’
citizens.84 Thus, the “real constitutional history of the Civil War” in the North was fought at
levels below the appellate. Confusingly, Neely argues that this door was “opened by the bias
toward freedom in the American constitutional and legal system,” which made conscription
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“seem unthinkable to some judges, despite the law of Congress and the plain wording of the
Constitution on the power to raise armies.”85 He is clear again that he believes the arguments
against conscription to be wrong. For him, regarding volunteering for military service as purely
contractual, as Justice James Thompson did in Kneedler v. Lane, displayed the legal bias in favor
of freedom.86 Neely appears to both be openly skeptical of the principle stare decisis and the
importance of precedent in the American legal system, as he later quips that Democratic judges
were “stubbornly independent by trade and slaves to precedent by inclination.”87 Ultimately,
Neely must mean that judges were only right if they placed loyalty and fidelity to the nation
above commitment to stare decisis.
Between Neely’s multiple works, he has consistently argued that the constitutional battles
of the Civil War show how national interests ultimately trumped constitutional resistance. In
those battles, he sees the Democrats as rightful losers. Given his voluminous work on the subject
compared to the paucity of other historic works on it, it is necessary to grapple with Neely’s
arguments. He did the important work of analyzing the constitutional opposition and identifying
the significance of the state courts during the Civil War. However, this dissertation argues that
Neely made an error over his many works in failing to take seriously the constitutional
arguments of Democrats-particularly constitutional conservatives. By doing so, he missed the
ongoing public constitutional debate in 1863 over the difficult question of whether conscription
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was constitutional. Finally, his work runs counter to recent works of legal scholars who have
helped move the historiography away from the nationalism paradigm towards internalist
explanations focused on doctrine and constitutional ideas.
As much as historians have grappled with the constitutional history of the American Civil
War, they have often missed the importance of legal doctrine and precedent. Michael Les
Benedict notes that historians wrestle “with the relationship between legal doctrine and what is
being called ‘popular constitutionalism,’ and the even more blurry line between politics and
law.’”88 As Cynthia Nicoletti in her brilliant study of Jefferson Davis’s treason trial, Secession on
Trial, shows, legal doctrine mattered a great deal to Civil War lawyers. Americans looked to the
massive armed conflict to determine the legitimacy of the ultimate expression of state
sovereignty-the right of secession-over the legal process. Americans thus also faced the
“uncomfortable realization” that their society, despite its enlightened rationalism and adherence
to rule of law, used a repudiated medieval superstition-”trial by battle”-to confront succession
and thus the war had affected “monumental constitutional change through extraordinary and
extra-constitutional mines.”89 For this dissertation, this means one cannot understand the
importance of the constitutional debate over conscription without first considering it from the
standpoint of lawyers.90 For lawyers arguing before courts, writing pamphlets, and speaking as
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representatives in Congress, conscription was a novel issue because it had never been decided
before by an American court. This dissertation does not address Nicoletti’s argument about trial
by battle but seeks to show how constitutional conservatives were among the Americans who,
realizing how the war was altering the Constitution, tried to fight back through the legal process.
Along with Nicoletti’s important work, Peter Charles Hoffer’s 2018 Uncivil Warriors:
The Lawyers’ Civil War makes apparent the impact of lawyers on the Civil War. Hoffer, one of
the foremost modern legal historians, aimed to show how lawyers-especially politicians trained
as lawyers and government lawyers- played a vital role in the Civil War. Their influence went
beyond courtroom pleadings and judicial opinions to executive orders, treatises, election debates,
journal entries and letters “filled with legal ideas.”91 Hoffer emphasizes how the legal training
and experience of Civil War lawyers framed the issues and handling of the great questions of
secession and the war. He argues that as a result of the influence of lawyers, the Civil War was
transformed and relatively restrained, making “ours a Civil War by lawyers, of lawyers, and in
the end, for lawyers.” The war both provided new venues for legal work and “changed the very
nature of federalism,” with the national government no longer a “junior partner in the federal
system.”92 As this dissertation argues, the constitutional arguments and cases concerning
conscription help to explain how the war changed the nature of federalism despite the opposition
of constitutional conservatives.
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The influence of lawyers went right to the top of government. Hoffer observes that
President Lincoln, a lawyer, put together a cabinet with an “imposing team of lawyers” that
resembled a law partnership.93 In particular, he notes that Congress too was led by lawyers, as
“Radical and conservative, Republicans demonstrated their faith in the power of legislation at
one time or another in the wartime Congress.”94 Hoffer understands the use of constitutional
tradition by Civil War lawyers to question Lincoln war policies. As he says, “using originalism
to construe the meaning of the fundamental law was not an invention of Attorney General Edwin
Meese or Justice Antonin Scalia,” but rather a “well-established constitutional heuristic in the
nineteenth century.”95 Hoffer calls the approach of constitutional conservatives “historical
originalism,” using Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson and Maryland Senator Reverdy
Johnson as examples of legal actors who used the past as a set of standards rather than a rigid
rule.96 This dissertation follows Hoffer’s example, using “historical originalism” to describe the
interpretive approach of constitutional conservatives following the Jacksonian tradition.
Finally, legal historians have recently touched on the connection between nineteenthcentury constitutional law and judicial politics. Many of the cases and judges discussed in this
dissertation were in state courts. The judges were all popularly elected, which to the modern can
lead to assumptions of bench politics. However, scholars argue in the nineteenth-century, judicial
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politics was more complicated. Jed Shugerman argues that the adoption of popularly elected or
partisan judicial elections in the nineteenth-century was as much a reflective of a widespread
commitment to judicial independence as the rejection of popular elections were in the
twentieth.97 Shugerman argues that judicial elections came about in order to ferment
accountability to the people while increasing separation of powers and judicial independence
from the threat of corrupt legislatures.98 The adoption by New York of judicial elections in 1846
“triggered a national revolution in judicial politics,” as many states, including Pennsylvania,
followed suit into the 1850s.99 The result was state courts much more likely to use the power of
judicial review than any other prior period. As a result, judicial elections increased the use of
judicial review, because judicial power and independence could “be defended simultaneously as
the guardians of democracy and the guardians against too much democracy.”100 Thus, at the time
of the Civil War, elected judges were a growing norm in state judiciaries and it is not clear this
led to politicization of the bench. This dissertation builds on Shugerman’s work by arguing that
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court used judicial review to protect the state’s sovereignty and
democratic character against what they believed to be a tyrannical federal majority.
Even after nearly a century, James Randall’s influence remains predominant, as
historians tend to view the constitutional history of the Civil War through the lens of the growing
nation-state. There remains plentiful work to be done to understand the minority worldview
during the Civil War that was genuinely disturbed by the radical changes to the Constitution. As
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recent works of legal history show, the perspectives of lawyers and other legal thinkers helps
illuminate the process by which the Constitution changed during the war and how that change
was contested. This dissertation aims to describe how in 1863, conscription was understood to be
an unconstitutional action by constitutional conservatives in Congress, in the press, and in the
courts.
Constitutional conservatives lost most of the individual battles and the war, as they could
not prevent the growth of the federal government nor stop national conscription. Yet, the intense
struggle in 1863 shows that Lincoln and the Republicans did not easily win in the public
constitutional debate. Their claims of new power were contingent on winning the constitutional
battles over conscription and hinged on avoiding a Supreme Court decision they believed might
rule against the act. In 1917 and 1918, despite constitutional opposition by socialists and labor
groups, the judiciary no longer cared to strongly consider such arguments. Half a century later,
during the Vietnam War, plenty of lawyers, scholars, and draftees still believed that the draft was
unconstitutional, but the decisions of World War I courts controlled. It had become a key
political issue once more and only the war and conscription’s deep, growing unpopularity ended
it in late 1972.
The Vietnam War was the last time conscription was seriously objected to on
constitutional grounds. Despite the efforts of attorney Leon Friedman and the ACLU, who
produced a 185-page memorandum covering the constitutional history of conscription back to
the founding, the courts were unwillingly to revisit the draft’s constitutional pedigree.
Ultimately, the most serious public constitutional debates already occurred in 1863 and the best
chance of defeating the draft constitutionality. The draft, known as the Selective Service Act,
remains on the books, as on July 2, 1980, President Jimmy Carter reestablished registration
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following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.101 Since then, American males must
register at eighteen, as confirmed the Supreme Court’s last ruling on the draft, Rostker v.
Goldberg, which upheld the all-male draft against an Equal Protection challenge while noting
that the Court “has consistently recognized Congress' ‘broad constitutional power’ to raise and
regulate armies and navies.”102 In recent years, Congressmen have even considered requiring
women to register for the Selective Service and in January 2019, the National Commission on
Military, National, and Public Service released its interim report considering ways to change the
Selective Service System.103 And in February, a Texas Federal District Judge ruled that the allmale draft was unconstitutional because women are now included in the arms services, a result
likely to be appealed and perhaps to the Supreme Court.104 Even without an active draft, the
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Selective Services Act, those who fail to register by twenty-six face a myriad of consequences
including loss of student aid and even citizenship.105 The results of the constitutional battles of
1863, which ultimately exhausted the best arguments against the draft, still reverberate today.
Chapter One discusses all the relevant constitutional debates and battles over conscription
before 1863. This includes the founding-era debates over the militia power and standing armies,
the Federalist opposition to conscription during the War of 1812, and the constitutional battles
following the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 over state court habeas jurisdiction for suits enjoining
federal officials acting under federal law. This history is relevant precisely because the majority
of suits in 1863 concerning conscription occurred by writ of habeas corpus in state courts and
lower federal courts which first had to decide the jurisdictional question.
Chapter Two analyzes the Congressional debates over Senator Wilson’s Enrollment Actor the Conscription Act-in February 1863. Constitutional conservatives in Congress were the
first to develop constitutional arguments against conscription. These arguments were significant
both because many of the oppositional speeches were reprinted in pamphlets and newspapers and
they established the core constitutional objections which newspaper editors and lawyers would
follow over the course of the year. The debate in Congress centered on the need to preserve
antebellum federalism and separation of powers. Constitutional nationalists in Congress focused
their constitutional rhetoric on the necessities of war of the power of self-preservation inherent to
nation-states.
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Chapter Three focuses on the events in New York newspapers and courtrooms in 1863.
Two major episodes of public constitutional debate in the newspapers occurred, one coming in
March immediately following the passage of the Conscription Act and another in July and
August, following the New York City draft riots. The March debates broadly followed the
Congressional debates, while following the riots, constitutional conservatives sought to push
harder for a judicial decision on conscription and supporters of conscription blamed
constitutional opposition to conscription for the riots. While New York saw a case decide against
the constitutionality of conscription, it was limited to a city trial judge. When the question
reached the New York Supreme Court, it never reached the merits, as multiple cases were
decided solely on the question of state court habeas jurisdiction. At the end of 1863, there was a
split among New York Supreme Court judges on the question of jurisdiction that would go
unresolved until 1872.
Chapter Four addresses public constitutional debate in Pennsylvania and the major cases
addressing conscription in the lower federal courts. As in New York, the public constitutional
debate was most vigorous in March and July, following the draft riots. The two key actions
concerning conscription in federal court came before Judge John Cadwalader. Cadwalader,
although he ultimately upheld Congress’s power to conscript under Article I, took arguments of
constitutional conservatives seriously and ruled in their favor on the separation of powers
question, holding that federal judges had power to review the decisions of Boards of Enrollment.
In Chapter Five, the case of Kneedler v. Lane is discussed in full. First, the group of four
Philadelphia lawyers and their backgrounds in the Democratic Party is considered. It also
introduces the judges whom ruled on the Kneedler case, considering both their political
backgrounds and jurisprudential history. Next, this dissertation covers how the case was filed
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and the arguments put forth by the three plaintiffs, how the case ended up before the whole
Supreme Court in September, and the oral argument on September 23, which the government
refused to appear at. The decision, released on November 9th, is analyzed through the opinions
of all five judges who wrote separately. These five opinions give insight into the complexity of
the suit, which was filed in equity, and speaks to the way the public constitutional debate
influenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In particular, the three judges who decided the
Conscription Act was unconstitutional did not depart from the core arguments of constitutional
conservatives focused on preserving antebellum federalism and state militia power. In the
aftermath of their most significant victory, constitutional conservatives tried to ensure the
decision would bar enforcement of the Conscription Act throughout the state of Pennsylvania
and pushed to have the Supreme Court finally resolve the question.
In the final chapter, this dissertation discusses Kneedler II, the January 1864 reversal of
the November decision. With the reversal, Kneedler now stood as positive precedent in favor of
the constitutionality of conscription. Following the end of the Civil War, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court continue to fight over the meaning of Kneedler in a variety of conscriptionrelated cases. In New York, state supreme court judges continued to battle over state court
habeas jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Supreme Court resolved the question in Tarble’s Case in
1872, upholding the rule of Ableman v. Booth against state court habeas jurisdiction while
simultaneously asserting the right of Congress to conscript. Forty-five years later, in 1917, the
United States’ entrance into World War I brought about a second national conscription, one
much more demanding. Court challenges arose again, with lawyers now utilizing the Thirteenth
Amendment to argue conscription was unconstitutional, but justices resoundingly dismissed
these constitutional arguments throughout the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court followed
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suit in 1918 in Arver v. United States, unanimously upholding the power of Congress to
conscript. This dissertation concludes with the Vietnam War cases, in which lawyers attempted
to revisit the constitutionality of conscription to no avail. The die had already been cast long
before 1972.
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CHAPTER I: THE ROAD TO CONSCRIPTION
Constitutional battles over conscription began well before the American Civil War. As
far back as the ratifying conventions in 1788, opposition voices raised concerns over federal
power broad enough to allow for compulsory military service. In 1863, there were two principal
questions at the center of the constitutional battles: whether the federal government had the
power under Article I to directly call forth citizens into the regular army by conscription and
whether state courts could properly take challenges addressing the act’s constitutionality by writ
of habeas corpus for release from federal custody. State court habeas jurisdiction was contested
since the founding, but it was especially salient during the Fugitive Slave Act controversy in the
1850s. The Supreme Court’s 1859 decision in Ableman v. Booth aimed to settle the issue, but
state courts continued through the Civil War to resist federal judicial supremacy and assert the
concurrent power of state courts to review federal acts by writ of habeas corpus. As to
conscription itself, while the national draft was novel, the debates were largely familiar to
American history at the time. In 1863, both constitutional conservatives and supporters of
conscription invoked the founding tradition and the attempted conscription during the War of
1812 to buttress their position.
The two sides made serious and informed constitutional arguments, but they both failed
to grasp the ambivalence of the constitutional history of conscription. Standing armies, not
conscription as a method of raising armies, had been the chief concern of Anti-Federalists.
Nevertheless, constitutional conservatives asserted that conscription had always been
unconstitutional and rejected by the framers. Their rhetorical opponents claimed that
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conscription was well known and accepted at the time of the founding. The historic reality is
murkier—at the time of the founding, national conscription was not a policy familiar to
Americans or in the British experience outside of impressment for seamen, but state drafts were
widely used to fill militia ranks. Additionally, the conscription plan of Secretary of War James
Monroe failed principally because the War of 1812 ended before Congress held a final vote on
the bill, not because the constitutionality of conscription had been settled by the December 1814
debate. The stalling tactics of Federalists opposed to conscription as unconstitutional worked
more out of happenstance than certainty that there was insufficient support for a draft, yet
constitutional conservatives in 1863 focused solely on the constitutional objections assuming the
opposition had rightfully defeated Monroe’s bill. On the other hand, constitutional nationalists in
1863 entirely minimized those objections as irrelevant while assuming a final vote would have
passed the bill. The two sides fared no better in assessing the constitutional convention and
ratification debates of 1787-88. In the fog of war, neither constitutional conservatives nor
nationalists could articulate that while constitutional history informed the 1863 debates, it was
not decisive precisely because national conscription was a novel power. It is thus necessary to
review briefly both the founding debates over the militia power during the ratification debates
and the fight over conscription during the War of 1812 to understand how they were applied to
the constitutional battles of 1863.
Undoubtedly, during the ratification debates over the Constitution, the extent of federal
power over the militia and individual citizens was a significant issue. In particular, AntiFederalist rhetoric centered on the problem of standing armies and the threat of “military
despotism.” Although standing armies are not the same as conscription, constitutional
conservatives relayed Anti-Federalist concerns about military despotism and the destruction of
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state power toward their draft opposition. According to historian Max Edling, the right to
maintain a standing army in peacetime provoked the greatest opposition to the Constitution’s
militia clauses.106 Anti-Federalists accepted that the state had the power, like other sovereigns, to
raise and maintain regular troops, but objected to standing armies in peacetime. They feared
liberty under a strong central government and the standing army showed an area in which the
national government would have a greater reach into the lives of citizens. Anti-Federalists tried
to pass amendments to place limits on the power to raise armies and to command the militia. For
instance, the Virginia convention proposed that “standing armies in time of peace are dangerous
to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the
community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to
and governed by the civil power.”107 Similar proposals were seen from the North Carolina, New
York, and Pennsylvania conventions and included language that would eventually make up the
language of the Second Amendment.108
Federalists responded to Anti-Federalist rhetoric by arguing that the powers in the
Constitution would make for a stronger government and a respected nation. Federalists could
accept many proposed restrictions on Congress’s power over the militia, but not on the power to
raise and maintain armies. They believed the error of the Articles of Confederation was to
charge the national government with general defense but leave state governments with the
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effective means to provide for that defense, which in practice was a scheme of quotas and
requisitions “equally impracticable and unjust.” Experience proved that power needed to be
transferred from states to Congress for general defense.109
The Federalist defense of extensive federal power over the militia and to raise armies was
most powerfully argued by Alexander Hamilton in several essays in the Federalist Papers. In
1863, constitutional nationalists founded much of their argument in favor of conscription upon
the notion that the founding generation approved of conscription on Hamilton. For Hamilton, the
means deployed by Congress under the power to "raise armies" could not be limited.110 The
problem for Hamilton of relying on the states was made clear by the experience under the
Articles. In Federalist 22, he argued that the power of raising armies, “by the most obvious
construction of the Articles of the Confederation,” was “merely a power of making requisitions
upon the states for quotas of men.”111 Hamilton blithely dismissed the fears of Anti-Federalists
over the specter of a standing army. In Federalist 25, Hamilton questioned both what precisely a
standing army was and how much citizens were willing to let their fear of standing armies harm
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the nation’s ability to protect itself from invasions, both domestic and foreign. He believed the
national government must be able to judge both the duration and extent of danger or impending
danger to the peace and safety of the community. Strict prohibitions on the ability of the national
government to maintain a peacetime standing army were problematic because the militia was
insufficient protection against impending danger. As Hamilton wrote, “If, to obviate this
consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in time of
peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has
yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was
actually invaded.”112
Finally, Hamilton confronted the criticisms of Anti-Federalists concerning the power to
regulate the militias in Federalist 29. He sensed that Anti-Federalist critiques at their heart had
an obvious contradiction. Hamilton reasoned that, “If a well-regulated militia be the most natural
defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that
body which is constituted the guardian of the national security.”113 To Hamilton, if in fact
standing armies were dangerous to liberty, it followed that an “efficacious power over the militia,
in the body to whose care the protection of the state is committed, ought, as far as possible, to
take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions.”114 Hamilton’s robust
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interpretation of Congress’s Article I military powers as essential to national security and thus
liberty were continually evoked by constitutional nationalists in 1863.
Still, despite Hamilton’s theory of extensive national power and his push throughout the
1790s to adopt a national standing army, there was no national army conscription in the
eighteenth century. Neither the Militia Act of 1792 or 1795 attempted to do so, despite the early
efforts of President Washington’s Secretary of War, Henry Knox, to put conscription into
place.115 The well-known and accepted practice during the Revolution was the use of state militia
drafts to fill up the federal army ranks. Constitutional conservatives recognized this, as they
objected not to the power to conscript per se but argued states had always traditionally held the
power to draft, not the federal government. In the decades after the Revolution and ratification of
the Constitution, that tradition held firm but was challenged numerous times. The key challenge
came during the War of 1812, when Secretary of War James Monroe proposed national
conscription in late 1814, getting the bill nearly through both chambers of Congress before the
war ended. The extent to which the bill failed due to constitutional opposition became fuel for
the debate in 1863.
The First Conscription Debate: The Federalists and the War of 1812
During the War of 1812, Federalists were the principal constitutional opposition,
immediately resisting the federal build-up for the war and requisitions for militia troops. On
April 1, 1812 President James Madison requested a new sixty-day embargo against Britain. Nine
days later, Congress acted to call out 100,000 militiamen, requiring a quota for 20,000 from New
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England.116 By May 31, Madison sent a war message to Congress citing the issues of
impressment, the blockade, and support of America’s Native American enemies. Congress acted
in June to declare war, with the House decisively supporting it on June 4th and the Senate
narrowly affirming it on June 18th.117 Four days later, General Henry Dearborn, the ranking
officer in New England, requisitioned forty-one companies of militia from Massachusetts, five
from Connecticut, and four from Rhode Island.118 The Governors of these three New England
states all declined to meet Dearborn’s requisition request.
When Secretary of War William Eustis informed Connecticut Governor Roger Griswold
of the quota, Griswold asked the Council of Connecticut whether militia could be legally
demanded before one of the enumerated exigencies under Article I had arisen and whether a
requisition that placed any part of the militia under a federal officer was proper. In June 1812,
the Council found that General Dearborn’s requisition request was wanting because “none of the
exigencies recognized by the constitution and laws of the United States” were shown to exist and
thus, the militia could not be withdrawn from the governor’s authority.119 The acts of Congress
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of 1795 and 1812 were in strict pursuance of the Constitution and provided for calling forth the
militia into the actual service of the United States for the exigencies constitutionally required.
The Council perceived no warrant in the Constitution or laws of the United States for “taking
from the officers duly appointed by the state” and thus “eventually destroying the military force
of the state.”120
The Council’s opinion was that the powers of Congress over the militia were strictly
limited and not plenary. To “guard against any possible mischief that might arise” either to the
states or the individual citizens, the Constitution explicitly gave Congress the power to “provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia” while reserving to the states respectively the
powers over the appointment of officers and training.121 No proposition could be clearer than if
the draft had succeeded, that the rights of the militia would have been sacrificed. If the states had
allowed this with a “total disregard” for the Constitution, it would have proved “fatal to the
liberties” of the country.122 If the President had the constitutional right to call forth hundred
thousand militia under the act of Congress of April 10, 1812 through federal officers, then the
states were deprived of their natural and legitimate means of defense.123 The Council contended
that while war had been declared by Congress against Great Britain, no place in Connecticut or
throughout New England had been “particularly designated as in danger of being invaded.”124 If
Congress declared war before they carried execution the provision of the Constitution to “raise
and support armies,” it did not follow that the militia were bound to “enter their forts and
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garrisons to perform ordinary garrison duty, and wait for an invasion.125” The Council argued the
demands of the United States had to be strictly in obedience to the requirements of the
Constitution and the sovereignty of the states.
General Dearborn tried to appease the Connecticut Council, but on August 4, 1812, they
met again and continued to insist that Governor Griswold not send the requested militia until the
circumstances stipulated by the Constitution were met.126 The same day, in a message to the
General Assembly, Griswold pronounced a similar view of state reserved rights, which he
deemed “essential interests” that should not be neglected. General Dearborn’s request was
unconstitutional and could not be complied with in strict accordance with the Constitution’s
limitations on calling out the militia.127 The Constitution allowed that in time of war, “states may
organize and support a military force of their own, and which cannot, under any circumstances,
be controlled by the general government.”128 Griswold believed that the Constitution did not
allow for a declaration of war to be sufficient for the national government to control the militia.
Otherwise, they could be used in any type of war-including an offensive campaign. In response,
both Connecticut houses passed the resolution and the general assembly resolved that the United
States was delegated the power to call forth the militia for three stated purposes and the states
reserved “the entire control of the militia, except in the cases specified.”129
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Events unfolded similarly in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. In Massachusetts, the
unpopular Elbridge Gerry, a founding father and Republican who supported the national
administration and war effort, was replaced as governor by Federalist Caleb Strong.130 Strong,
another founder who had helped draft Massachusetts’ Constitution, was reluctant to let the state
militia fall under the command of the federal army. Governor Strong turned the constitutional
questions over to the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court. He asked for a
response on two questions. One, whether the Commanders in Chief of the militia of the several
states had a right to determine whether exigencies contemplated by the Constitution existed to
require them to place the militia in the service of the United States. Two, whether by the
existence of said exigencies, if the militia “thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any
officer but of the militia, except by the President.” The Supreme Judicial Court answered that
under the state constitution, command of the militia was vested exclusively in the governor and
with it, the right to determine whether any of the three Article I exigencies existed. The
Massachusetts justices wrote that if the power was given to Congress, it would “in effect” place
all the militia at the “will of the Congress and produce a military consolidation of the states,
without any constitutional remedy.” Further, to allow Congress to place the militia under the
command of an officer not of the militia would “render nugatory the provision that the militia are
to have officers appointed by the states.”131
Based on this advice, Governor Strong responded just as Governor Griswold had. On
August 5, he informed Secretary of War Eustis he would not comply with the requisition based
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on the advice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and state council.132 That October, Strong
gave a speech discussing the division between federal and state control over the militia and
elaborated on his reasons for denying Eustis’ request. Like Griswold, he believed there were no
indications that Massachusetts or other states were in imminent danger of invasion. Strong stated
the Article II language of “into the actual service of” meant that the President had no authority to
call the militia out except under the three exigencies given by the Constitution in Article I.
Otherwise, the President and Congress could act to declare war at any time and call out the
“whole militia” to “march them to such places as they may think fit” and retain them as long as
war continued. To Strong, the power to call the militia into service had always been understood
to be exercised only in emergencies, not to create standing armies or carry out offensive war.
Thus, the act of declaring war could not by itself grant the federal government the right to call
the militia into service. In Rhode Island, Governor William Jones followed suit, asking his
council of war the same questions Strong asked of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Jones’ council of war agreed that the state executive, not the President or Congress, decided
when the constitutional exigencies existed.133 Yet, outside of these three New England states,
only Maryland’s legislature responded supportively to their constitutional opposition.134
The events of 1812 showed that not only did some states withhold their militias based on
a constitutional interpretation of limited federal power, but showed the federal government that
they might not be able to rely on the militia and volunteers to fight wars. Even though the 1792
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Militia Act was two decades old, there was no uniform organization of the militias, who were
often poorly equipped and undisciplined.135 Although New England officials cooperated when
the enemy threatened their states, attempts to keep militia units under the command of state
officers proved unsatisfactory. Under the demands of war, the federal army searched for
manpower solutions. In June 1814, General Dearborn arrived in Boston with a new code of army
regulations, placing militia troops into companies of 90 to 100 men under regular army
officers.136 By October 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe had produced a bill to have all
free males between eighteen and forty-five be formed into classes of hundred and if any class
failed to provide the men required, they “shall be raised by draft on the whole class.”137 He saw
no “well-founded objection” to Congress’ right to “raise regular armies, and no restraint is
imposed in the exercise of it, except in the provisions which are intended to guard generally
against the abuse of power, with none of which does this plan interfere.”138 Monroe thought it
absurd to suppose that Congress could not carry that power into effect otherwise than by
accepting voluntary service of individuals since the power to raise armies was “made with a
knowledge of all these circumstances and with the intention that it should take effect.”139 Such
unqualified grants of power gave the means necessary to carry this power into effect.
Further, the power to organize the militia was an “act of public authority, not a voluntary
association.” Monroe claimed that his plan was not more compulsory than militia service itself.
He stated that though the “limited power” the United States had to organize the militia could be
135
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used to argue against the right to raise regular troops by draft, Monroe thought it suggested the
opposite-the power of the federal government over the militia had been limited while the power
for raising regular armies was granted without limitation.140 Monroe also did not believe drawing
men from the militia into the regular army under federal officers violated the Constitution’s
requirement that militia be commanded by state-appointed officers. He thought that because
drafted citizens would not be drawn from the militia, but from the population of the country,
conscription treated them as if they had enlisted voluntarily. If the United States could not form
regular armies from the whole population, they could raise no army.
Even before Madison’s call for conscription, the British occupation of Maine and
blockade of the coast under the December 1813 Embargo bill deepened New England dissent.141
In early 1814, at least forty towns called for a New England anti-war convention to seek
remedies for the unconstitutional abuses of the federal government.142 The attempts by the
federal government to raise new war loans in April and July hasted New England opposition,
especially once the British extended their blockade of the ports of New England in June.143
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During the fall of 1814, Bostonians expected an attack at any time and blamed the federal
government for failing to protect them.144 In October, the Massachusetts legislature convened a
special session to both pass measures for its protection and to call for a convention and Governor
Strong called for five thousand militia to protect the state.145
After Monroe’s plan was made public, the Connecticut Assembly passed a resolution
stating that the plan was “utterly subversive of the rights and liberties of the people of this state,
and the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the same, and inconsistent with the principles
of the Constitution.”146 By December, the New England states met for a convention in Hartford
as many talked openly of secession and a separate peace with the British. Historians are divided
as to whether the convention’s aim was disunion, defense of the region, or moderation of the
party’s anti-war rhetoric.147 The Hartford Convention issued a report of the December 15 to
January 5th proceedings largely authored by stalwart Federalist Harrison Gray Otis, nephew of
144
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Mercy Gray Otis and judge of the court of common pleas. As historian Sean Wilentz observes,
much of the document “recited New England’s familiar wartime grievances-the conscription of
state militiamen, the inequitable political power of the slaveholding states” and proposed seven
“essential” constitutional amendments as a nonnegotiable demand.148
The report of the Convention reflected the gravity of the threat of Monroe’s conscription
bill to New England Federalists.149 As the preliminary committee report on December 20th
states, the Conscription Bill in Congress was involved “still more alarming claims to infringe the
rights of states” than the attempts by the President to interfere with state power.150 Broadly, the
Convention felt the novel system of conscription was “odious” and “alarming” and clearly
worked against a government of enumerated, limited powers.151 Specifically, they focused on the
“into the actual service of” language in Article I and II as applied to federal power over the
militia. If the specified exigencies in Article I were ignored, the prospect of executive tyranny
arose, as the limitations on the power would be “nothing more than merely nominal” against
executive infallibility.152 Further, the report rejected the arranging the United States into military
districts under the Monroe Plan, seeing it as creating a standing army. To allow for such abuse of
power to change the Constitution would be to “perpetuate the evils of Revolution” by ignoring
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the explicit constitutional limitations on federal power over the militia.153 The Convention
argued that despite these “plain and precise limitations” in the Constitution, Congress now
claimed a power that would render “nugatory the rightful authority of the individual states over
that class of men” and put the lives and service of the people at the pleasure of the national
government, enabling the destruction of liberties while fermenting military despotism. The
Convention believed it was a duty of state governments to watch over the “rights reserved, as of
the United States to exercise the powers which are delegated.”154 Such language would become a
staple of the objections of constitutional conservatives in 1863.
Additionally, the Convention found no law or constitutional grant of power allowed for
the arranging of the United States into military districts under a standing army with the power to
call forth the militia transferred to the President. Congress could delegate to the President the
power to call forth the militia in cases within their jurisdiction, but the President could not
substitute military prefects throughout the Union under their own discretion. To do so was a
“manifest evasion” of the Constitution’s express reservation to the states of appointment of the
officers of the militia.155 The Convention also complained about the attempted conscription of
naval men and the enlistment of minors without the consent of parents, which worked against
state laws and local laws and was “repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution.” The effect was the
destruction of one of “most important relations in society” and the giving to the President and
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Congress “complete control of the rules in society.”156 The convention did not only attack
conscription, as they also questioned the federal defense of New England, charging that the
Madison administration desired to conquer Canada, while complaining that New England should
not continue to pay taxes to a bankrupt government that left them unprotected, calling for a
return from federal control in order to restore commercial and artistic prosperity. Once more,
usurpation of state power in favor of centralization seen as the road to despotism.
The convention, however, failed to achieve its mission. After adjourning on January 4,
the convention adopted its final report on January 12, 1815. A month later, Governor Strong sent
a three-man commission to present a summary of the convention’s grievances to President
Madison. By the time they reached Washington on February 14th, they realized the war was
over-the Treaty of Ghent had been signed weeks before unbeknownst to its commissioners on
Christmas Eve.157 As a result, the fiery New England anti-war movement now became such an
embarrassment for the Federalist Party it essentially ended the party. According to legal historian
Alison LaCroix, the Federalists were left with the “taint of treason,” as even though the
“ostensibly moderate report” had curbed the “most extremist Federalist rhetoric,” it also
advocated for regional autonomy.158 Still, the rhetoric of the Convention along with New
England’s political and judicial leadership would eventually be resurrected in 1863 during the
debates over conscription. In the public constitutional debate in 1863, the War of 1812 precedent
was notably divisive, as constitutional conservatives saw Federalists as the forebears of their
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constitutional opposition, while Republicans and other supporters of conscription equated the
Hartford Convention to nullification and even secession.
In the nearly five decades between the War of 1812 and Civil War, federal conscription
was seldom mentioned. The two major Supreme Court cases which touched on the militia
power-Houston v. Moore and Martin v. Mott-answered questions about the extent of federal
power but said nothing about conscription.159 The major military conflict of the period, the
Mexican-American War, was fought by a volunteer army. As noted earlier, historian Peter
Guardino observes that during the Mexican-American War, volunteer soldiers were preferred not
only due to the attachment to citizen soldiers, but because Americans lacked trust of the regular
army, which was seen as a last resort of desperate laborers.160 Thus, conscription was never
considered during a war mostly fought by volunteers. Instead, slavery was the area in which the
reach of the federal government greatly expanded in the antebellum period. Both the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Dred Scott, and
Ableman v. Booth nationalized the protection of property rights over slaves. Many northern
citizens actively resisted these changes and saw state courts as one of their best avenues for
159
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redress. In 1863, constitutional conservatives complained that conscription allowed the federal
government to improperly force citizens to act-to enroll in the army-while usurping the power of
the states. Part of their struggle was to maintain the power of state courts to take petitions for
writs of habeas corpus for release from federal detention under the Conscription Act. The seeds
of the battle over state habeas jurisdiction to protect individual citizens against an encroaching
federal government was sown in the 1850s.
The Fugitive Slave Act, Ableman v. Booth, and State Court Habeas Jurisdiction
The constitutional battles in the 1850s over the Fugitive Slave Act ultimately centered
around whether state courts could properly release fugitive slaves or their white rescuers on writs
of habeas corpus. The issue of state court jurisdiction was one of the constitutional issues that
arose in 1863 with the passage of conscription which felt familiar. The Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 was one of the pivotal events which ultimately led to the Civil War. As Eric Foner writes,
the “Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 embodied the most robust expansion of federal authority over
the states, and over individual Americans, of the antebellum era. It could hardly have been
designed to arouse greater opposition in the North. It overrode numerous state and local laws and
legal procedures and commanded individual citizens to assist, when called upon, in rendition. It
was retroactive, applying to all slaves who had run away in the past, including those who had
been law-abiding residents of the free states.”161 The act saw the white south, typically defenders
of local rights and antebellum federalism, favoring vigorous national action, while some northern
states engaged in the nullification of federal law.162 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 established
federal commissioners with the authority to require private citizens to pursue fugitives as well as
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granted the jurisdiction to commissioners to issue certificates of removal for fugitive slaves
while overriding local laws. Significantly, there was no allowance for jury trial and no defenses
permitted, such that the commissioners were limited to determining the identity of the person
being returned rather than whether they were in fact a fugitive.163 Thus for many Northerners, the
act was problematic because it preempted the personal liberty laws of their states.
After the passage of the act, abolitionist sentiment was strong enough in Wisconsin
during the events of Ableman that an antislavery convention urged defiance of the Fugitive Slave
Act up to state nullification of federal law.164 The case of Ableman v. Booth, as historian
Timothy Huebner asserts, placed antislavery public opinion in Wisconsin against the “proslavery
constitutional order.” Before Ableman reached the Supreme Court in 1859, the original case
would come before the Wisconsin Supreme Court more than once, as the Federal government
worked to successfully indict Sherman Booth for aiding a fugitive slave. In that time, the
Supreme Court issued its Dred Scott ruling on March 6, 1857 revoking the citizenship of
African-Americans and pushing the country closer to civil war. The combination of Dred Scott
and Ableman secured slavery’s foothold nationally, as Ableman not only denied state court
habeas jurisdiction to release fugitive slaves within their states whom had acquired freedom
under state law, but upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as constitutional.
The events leading to Ableman began on March 10, 1854, when a cadre of men stood
outside fugitive slave Joshua Glover’s cabin. Slaveowner Benammi Garland held a certificate of
removal, giving him authority to take hold of the fugitive Glover to present him before a federal
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judge or commissioner in Wisconsin.165 When the arrest party brought Glover through
Milwaukee, local abolitionists had already been alerted to their presence and set off for the
county jail where Glover was held. The crowd was particularly stirred up by the handbills of
Sherman Booth, who asserted that slave catchers had kidnapped Glover and planned a secret trial
to deny Glover his rights.166 Thousands turned out, including Milwaukee’s acting mayor and the
city marshal, and eventually, the crowd rushed the jail, freed Glover, and helped him escape to
Canada. With Glover in Canada, the federal government turned to the criminal penalties
available under the Fugitive Slave Act for interfering with its enforcement. Booth, the most vocal
abolitionist and printer, was the focus of the government’s prosecution.167 Multiple legal actions
followed, as Garland sued Booth for the value of his escaped slave and sued United States
Marshal Stephen Ableman. Meanwhile, the Racine County district attorney sought Garland’s
arrest for violating the peace, and the Milwaukee sheriff served Marshal Ableman with a writ of
habeas corpus commanding him to take Booth before a state judge to explain the reasons for his
detention.168
After federal commissioner Winfield Smith ordered Booth held on bail for suspicion of
violating federal law in March, Booth had his bailsman surrender him to federal authorities to
test the constitutionality of the underlying act. In order to do so, he petitioned Justice Abram D.
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Smith of Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Incredibly, Booth not only won
his freedom, but also a declaration from Judge Smith that the Fugitive Slave Act was
unconstitutional. Before Smith, Byron Paine argued that the Fugitive Slave Act was
unconstitutional because Congress had no power to legislate on the subject, that the statute
subverted due process by denying alleged fugitive slaves the right to a jury trial, and that court
commissioners under the act were unconstitutional judicial officers.169 Paine borrowed heavily
from the antislavery activists’ arguments circulating at the time, most prominently future Chief
Justice Salmon Chase. As legal historian H. Robert Baker notes, all three of Paine’s arguments
rested on the doctrine of state sovereignty–the notion that the national government was one of
limited powers which could not usurp state powers unless they were specifically delegated to it
under the Constitution.170 Significantly, Paine felt that the doctrine was “not denied in theory by
any one” and thus, broadly accepted. He cited both the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
alongside Madison’s “Report of 1800” to support the concurrent right of states to decide when
the federal government had encroached on a state’s sovereign authority.171 Finally, Paine
interpreted Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, Dartmouth
College, and Gibbons v. Ogden, all of which supported broad federal power, to not interfere with
the police powers of the states, including matters properly under the jurisdiction of state
courts.172 Smith granted the writ in a May 26th decision, accepting all three of Paine’s
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arguments. He agreed that no “one department of the government is constituted the final and
exclusive judge of its own delegated powers” and argued that if given such power, the Supreme
Court would render state courts and sovereignty nugatory, as such an “[i]increase of influence
and patronage on the part of the Federal Government [would] naturally lead to consolidation,
[and] despotism.”173
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld Judge Smith’s decision in Ableman v. Booth
to grant Booth’s writ of habeas corpus, Chief Justice Edward Whiton’s majority opinion
accepted Paine’s emphasis on state sovereignty doctrine, saying, “It will not be denied that the
citizens of the state naturally and properly look to their own state tribunals or relief from all
kinds of illegal restraint and imprisonment.”174 State courts could properly determine whether the
imprisonment was legal and inquire into whether they properly held jurisdiction over the matter.
Whiton followed Paine and Smith’s emphasis on a strict interpretation of the Constitution,
arguing that Article III prohibited Congress from investing judicial power in any department
outside the judiciary.175 However, Whiton circumvented Paine’s argument that Congress had no
right to legislate at all upon slavery, instead emphasizing that the Fugitive Slave Act violated due
process by infringing on the right to a jury trial. Still, at this stage, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
would not restrain the warrant issued by Judge Miller and the grand jury indictment.
The federal government was so astonished by Smith’s ruling that United States District
Attorney John Sharpstein was granted permission by Attorney General Caleb Cushing to hire

173

In Re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 23-25 (1854); Jeffrey Schmitt, “Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights
in Wisconsin,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93 (2007), 1332-33 (Schmitt argues that Paine and Smith were both
proponents of a “unique theory of federalism” closer to Calhoun’s nullification, going beyond Chief Justice Spencer
Roane’s co-equal sovereigns theory since they asserted state courts held superior power over the Supreme Court).
174
Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover, 119-120.
175
Ibid., 123.

69

special counsel at federal expense.176 Events returned to Federal District Judge Miller, who
empaneled a grand jury to investigate crimes against the federal government, indicting Booth
along with three others for aiding and abetting the escape of a fugitive slave in federal custody.
Once juries found Booth and fellow defendant John Ryecraft guilty in November 1854 and
January 1855, on February 3, 1855, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously released both
from imprisonment in U.S. v. Booth.177 All three judges-Smith, Whiton, and Crawford-wrote
separate opinions, but agreed the conviction rested on defective indictments and state courts
could constitutionally interpose themselves when federal courts illegally detained citizens of
their state.178 In his concurrence, Abram Smith suggested that the defective indictment made the
federal process illegitimate, meaning the prisoners were owed a discharge. He pointed to the
state’s fundamental law and constitution, arguing that the state government had a duty and the
power to protect its own citizens as part of the American federal system. Whatever powers not
delegated to a limited sovereignty remained with the original state sovereigns.179 Quickly
thereafter, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear both Ableman v. Booth and U.S. v.
Booth. They would not announce an opinion for another four years, when Chief Justice Taney
reversed both decisions on March 7, 1859.180
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Chief Justice Roger Taney’s unanimous opinion tersely denied that state courts possessed
any power to challenge the Supreme Court and asserted under the Supremacy Clause, federal
judicial supremacy “constituted an essential element of the supremacy of the national
government.”181 In the words of Timothy Huebner, it was one of the “most nationalistic rulings
in Supreme Court history” that came down “wholly on the side of federal judicial authority” and
the ruling effectively meant neither Booth or the Wisconsin Supreme Court could interfere with
enforcement of the fugitive slave law by writs of habeas corpus. According to Taney, state
courts lacked jurisdiction to proceed once the federal marshal apprised the state court that his
prisoner was held under the authority of the United States. He found that state and federal
governments operated in independent spheres of sovereignty, and “the sphere of action
appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a
state judge or a state court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments
visible to the eye.”182 If Wisconsin’s decisions were allowed to stand, Taney believed state courts
would hold the “same judicial authority in relation to any other law of the United States; and,
consequently, their supervising and controlling power would embrace the whole criminal code of
the United States, and extend to offences against our revenue laws, or any other law intended to
guard the different departments of the federal Government from fraud or violence.”183
Federal supremacy had to be supplemented by judicial power to enforce it and necessary
to the independence and supremacy of the federal sovereignty was uniformity of law in all states.

same day Taney released his Dred Scott opinion, he ordered the copy of the record filed by the Attorney General to
be received and entered on the docket of this court. The case was docketed but not reached for argument for two
years.
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As Taney concluded, “no power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising
under such Constitution and laws.”184 Generally, scholars have understood Taney’s opinion in
Ableman to reflect his acceptance of the “dual sovereignty” understanding of federalism, which
holds that both the state and federal governments derive their power directly from the sovereign
people and act within their respective spheres directly on the people by their own
instrumentalities.185 Thus, Taney made clear that his ruling did not question the authority of state
courts and judges authorized under state law to issue writs of habeas corpus in any case where
the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, “provided it does not appear, when the
application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United
States.”186 The error of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was to reverse and annul a decision of a
federal district court.
Before the Ableman decision, legal historian William Duker notes that commentators,
including Chancellor Kent and Rollin Hurd, considered it well-settled that state courts had
authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the imprisonment of a federal prisoner
held within its jurisdiction.187 At the dawn of the Civil War, Ableman ran counter to most state
court precedent which allowed state courts to issue writs of habeas corpus and discharge anyone
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underage.188 But the consensus was limited to the principle that state courts could issue writs for
federal prisoners unlawfully detained.189 Thus, Ableman was a significant departure and many
Northern state courts and judges reacted by either rejecting Ableman or minimizing its effects.
Just months after Ableman, Ohio’s Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus for federal
prisoners while inquiring into the constitutionality of Fugitive Slave Act. The case looked
strikingly familiar and although the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act, it
did so narrowly on a 3-2 vote with two dissenters prepared to agree with Wisconsin’s Booth
decision.190 Even after the Supreme Court’s decision, Ohio’s highest court nearly followed
Wisconsin’s lead in asserting state sovereignty and concurrent jurisdiction.
Throughout the Civil War and especially in 1863, the issue of state court jurisdiction
over writs of habeas corpus contesting arrest by federal officers acting under federal law
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remained contested. Federal and state courts struggled to discover the meaning of Ableman v.
Booth and the extent of Chief Justice Taney’s ruling. In a March 1863 case, In Re Spangler, the
Michigan Supreme Court supported the understanding that Ableman precluded state court
jurisdiction once they knew the petitioner was held by federal authority.191 Still, many state
courts read Ableman's holding narrowly, concluding that they continued to possess the power to
adjudicate habeas petitions filed by persons being held by federal officers without the backing of
federal judicial process.192 For these judges, Ableman merely restated Taney’s dual federalism.
They focused on the second Wisconsin case, U.S. v. Booth, and argued that all Ableman did was
to rule that state courts could not ignore a federal court order, since Sherman Booth had been
convicted and imprisoned under federal judicial authority. In the eyes of these courts, the
portions of Chief Justice Taney's opinion that extended beyond the facts of Booth's case were
merely dictum. Moreover, these courts believed that if the Supreme Court had intended to
denounce the longstanding practice of state court adjudication of habeas petitions filed by federal
extrajudicial detainees, the Court would at least have acknowledged that practice's existence.193
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Wisconsin itself outright rejected Ableman’s force. Following the decision, the state
legislature passed resolutions that they regarded the decision “as an arbitrary act of power...and
therefore without authority, void and of no force” and that the federal government under the
Constitution “was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to
itself; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each
party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well as infractions, as of the mode and measure of
redress.”194 Voters backed the legislature in the 1859 election, but the federal government soon
arrested Booth once more. This time, Booth’s appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus failed. Incredibly, before Justice Dixon’s decision was released, it was rumored
that the federal marshals had called on the Milwaukee military companies for assistance if the
court ordered Booth’s release. Governor Alexander W. Randall, who had, in his inaugural
address vowed to use the power of the state to enforce the Wisconsin court’s decisions,
telegraphed the state military companies with orders not to obey the federal authorities and to
await his personal orders. Although such force was never used, Randall even sought
authorization from the state legislature to use the state militia to protect the sovereignty of the
state from “usurpation or aggression” by the federal government.195 The Court’s rejection of
Booth’s application ended the growing tension, but Wisconsin nearly saw a confrontation
between state and federal military forces. The Civil War had not started, but the constitutional
battles were already erupting.
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Early Civil War Cases: Contesting the Militia Acts
Before the Conscription Act was passed in March 1863, state courts analyzed the power
to conscript in cases arising out of earlier militia acts.196 By July 1862, with the ejection of
General McClellan’s Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula by Confederate General Robert E.
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, the Union was struggling to raise sufficient volunteers. The
Militia Act of 1862, passed on July 17th, was intended to both respect the volunteer tradition
while forcing the states to provide Lincoln with the troops necessary to continue the war effort. It
represented the North’s first move toward national conscription and, as James Geary notes,
“provoked intense discussion” because it was designed to help guarantee blacks emancipation in
exchange for service in the army.197 States maintained power over raising troops, but if they did
not provide sufficient troops, the Lincoln administration now held coercive authority to intervene
if necessary.198 As historian Stephen Engle writes, the act was intended to “assist governors by
keeping the recruiting system within state power” and by inspiring volunteerism with the threat
of a draft, since Lincoln reserved the right to call into service all able-bodied militia men

196

The case is not discussed in this dissertation, but the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the Militia
Act of 1861 in Lanahan v. Birge in February 1862.
197 James W. Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1991), 22-23 Many of the same Senators and Congressmen who would be key to the 1863 conscription spoke
against the Militia Act, with Willard Saulsbury demanded an immediate roll call and John S. Carlile observing that
only states possessed the power to determine the character of their militias on July 9th, when James Grimes of Iowa
moved to enroll all men 18 to 45 and to authorize the President to organize black units. A week later, as the
opposition died down, Pennsylvania’s Charles Biddle proposed opening the measure to debate, while William S.
Holman of India tried to table the bill, which failed 77-30. Ibid, 27.
198
William C. Davis, Lincoln’s Men: How President Lincoln Became Father to An Army and a Nation
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 36 (Davis notes that the July 17, 1862 Militia Act was an “important
precedent” because it represented the Union’s first attempt at a draft. The weak response to the July call for
volunteers spurred by the act made Lincoln willing to use the mandated draft if necessary, even if he preferred not
to); Paul Quigley, “Civil War Conscription and the International Boundaries of Citizenship,” 3 Journal of the Civil
War Era, Vol. 4, 384 (2014).

76

between eighteen and forty-five for no more than nine months and the assign quotas to states.199
Thus, while the bill did not create a national draft, it hung the threat over its citizenry.
Within weeks, on August 4, Secretary of War Stanton authorized a draft of 300,000 ninemonth militiamen.200 Constitutional conservatives still saw the act as an illiberal measure counter
to the American tradition of volunteering which created a new threat posed by the federal
presence in local communities.201 It was only made worse that it appeared to be in favor of the
rich. Many Northerners feared the presence of provost marshals throughout the home-front. The
provost marshal was the institution charged with the enrollment of men under the draft, dealing
with desertion, and recruitment for state-based regiments.202 In each Congressional district, the
board of enrollment oversaw the work of the provost marshal in addition to arbitrating draft
exemptions. Democrats depicted provost marshals, notes Robert Sandow, as “incompetent
Republican lackeys” who abused their authority to “punish local political opponents.” Provost
marshals administered both an unpopular government policy and used force to subdue
resistance.203 Additionally, dissent was hastened by rising wartime inflation, as in areas like
Clearfield, Pennsylvania, commodity prices shot up in some cases, like corn, 70 percent from
1861 prices.204 According to William Blair, the militia draft awakened resistance on the Union
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home front,” as the “Democratic enclaves that manifested early expressions of partisanship
provided fertile ground for preaching against mobilization.”205
The War Department soon responded to this widespread opposition to the Militia Act. On
August 8, 1862, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton issued an order to federal officers designed to
enforce the Militia Act. Stanton’s order authorized civilian officials to arrest and imprison any
persons who engaged “by act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments” or
giving “aid and comfort to the enemy” or “any other disloyal practice against the United States.”
The same order also suspended habeas corpus for anyone arrested for disloyal practices and
produced rounds of arrests throughout the North.206 The disorder in the north ultimately led
President Lincoln to issue an order suspending habeas corpus on September 24, 1862.207
Notably, Lincoln’s September 1862 order suspending habeas argued that it had “become
necessary to call into service, not only volunteers, but also portions of the militia of the states by
draft, in order to suppress the insurrection.”
The Militia Act of 1862 did not bring the nearly same constitutional outcry in public or in
the courtroom as the Conscription Act would the following year precisely because it largely built
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on existing statutory and Supreme Court precedent.208 In that context, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, with Sherman Booth’s lawyer, Byron Paine, now among its justices, saw multiple
challenges to the Militia Act of 1862. In the first case, In Re Griner, the application for a writ of
habeas corpus of Frederick Griner and other citizens of Manitowoc County alleged that the state
draft authorized under the Militia Act was "without color of legal authority under any statute or
law of this state or of the United States, and altogether arbitrary and unlawful.”209 In Justice
Orasmus Cole’s opinion for the court, Griner’s application was denied because he believed
precedent had already granted the federal government the powers objected to by the petitioners.
For Justice Cole, Congress’s Article I powers to “raise and support armies,” call forth the
militia and provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia were “clear and
indisputable,” with language “so plain, precise, and comprehensive, as to leave no room for
doubt.”210 He recognized that the Militia Act of 1862 granted discretionary power in the
President to execute the draft, but was unconvinced by Griner’s separation of powers argument.
The act could not grant legislative power to the President, but Cole stipulated there was a
distinction between of "those important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provision to fill up the detail." He saw
the power given to the President to make all rules and regulations to carry into effect the law for
calling out the militia of the latter character.211 Any applicable state law on the subject would not
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be ignored or overridden, but the President was properly allowed by Congress to fill in any gaps
in state law.
To Cole, this was in keeping with constitutional tradition. Giving discretion to agencies
and departments to carry into effect the general provisions of federal law went back to the first
Congress. It was “undoubtedly in strict conformity to the views entertained by
the great statesmen of that day, of the genius and intent of the instrument which they had had
such a great share in framing.”212 Congress had its choice as to the means deployed and under
both the Militia Act of 1795 and 1862, the President was given wide latitude to call forth the
whole military force of the country. Citing Houston v. Moore, Cole observed that Justice
Washington must have considered the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia when
called out greater than the power to call out the militia since no draft existed during the War of
1812.213 Thus, the President already had power under the 1795 act to detach, draft, call out the
militia and the 1862 act did not confer any new or additional powers to object to.214 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court would not cause a collision with the Supreme Court again, at least not
on the question of the proper scope of the militia power. It would, however, affirms its power to
take writs of habeas corpus for federal prisoners.
In the same January term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard a case arising from the
anti-draft rioting which spread to the Midwest. On November 10, 1862, Nicholas Kemp was
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arrested for “violent interference with the draft of the militia at Port Washington” in Ozaukee
County, including the “destruction of the boxes containing the names of those subject to draft,
and personal violence to the commissioner duly appointed.”215 Kemp was arrested under the
authority of both Stanton’s August orders and Lincoln’s September suspension. On January 13,
Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon ruled in the case of In RE Kemp, appearing to withhold the ability
of federal officers from making arrests within the state of Wisconsin. Dixon began his opinion
with a rather incredible statement, noting that it was his regret that “which I have always felt and
which I feel now more than ever, that Congress has not, in the exercise of its undoubted power,
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state courts, and committed to the exclusive decision of
the federal courts, all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Dixon
never mentions the Ableman case explicitly-nor did Smith or Cole-but appeared to be wary of
repeating previous mistakes, noting that Congress’ failure to withdraw state court jurisdiction
had led to several “perplexities” in the clash of jurisdictions and would inevitably led to future
“mistakes and possible prejudices of the state tribunals” and “serious embarrassments and most
injurious delays in the exercise of proper federal authority.” Dixon was obliged to note that the
court’s decision was preliminary and not final, as he anticipated and hoped the Supreme Court
would provide the final answer on the questions before him.
Kemp asked both whether the President could suspend habeas corpus by order and
whether he had the power to make criminal acts not criminalized by Congress. Dixon referred
not only to knowledge of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex Parte Merriman, but to the
pamphlet by former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis on executive power and the opinion
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of Justice Hall in New York in In RE Benedict.216 Following Curtis, Dixon argued that “martial
law is restricted to those places which are the theatre of war, and to their immediate vicinity.” If
civil authority was sufficient to keep order and punish offenders, then military commanders had
no jurisdiction but if “through the disloyalty of the civil magistrates or the insurrectionary spirit
of the people, the laws cannot be enforced and order maintained, then martial law takes the place
of civil law, wherever there is a sufficient military force to execute it.”217 Ultimately, Dixon
found that General Elliot had not shown sufficient cause to hold the petitioner or to refuse to
produce his body upon the writ of habeas corpus, but Dixon also prayed for guidance from
higher courts as to how to proceed, hoping the case would reach the highest court.
The two other Wisconsin justices hearing the Kemp case did not share all of Dixon’s
concerns. Justice Cole understood that it was “impossible to overestimate the gravity and
importance of the questions involved” in the case, as the “gravest issues” were now before their
court.218 Cole interpreted the Militia Act of 1862 with an explicit limit on the power of the
federal government to conscript. Cole understood that the Militia Act did not “declare that the act
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of discouraging enlistments or resisting militia drafts shall subject a party to martial law and trial
by court martial.” As he argued in Griner, only when there were “any defects in existing laws or
in the execution of them in the several states” was the President authorized to make all necessary
rules and regulations for the enrollment of the militia and for making the draft.219 Under that
discretionary power, the President could not subject a citizen to trial and punishment by court
martial for resisting the draft.220 Cole’s argument implied that the President would be unable to
enforce the Conscription Act of 1863 by military arrest and court martial.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, led by Dixon, granted Kemp his writ while imploring the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue. In so doing, with an opinion that never directly mentioned
Ableman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court once again upheld its right to determine whether or not
its own citizens were held legally by writ of habeas corpus. The Lincoln Administration was
frustrated and deeply concerned. Bates starkly stated that if the question of habeas came before
the Supreme Court, he feared it would rule against the administration. Such a decision would
“paralyze the administration” and he discounted the chance the Supreme Court would rule
favorably to the administration. Attorney General Edward Bates argued that, “knowing as we
do, the antecedents and present proclivities of the majority of that Court (and I speak of them
with entire respect) I can anticipate no such results.”221 He believed Chief Justice Taney and
Justice Nathan Clifford would undoubtedly rule against the administration and the rest of the
Democrats would likely join them. Thus, Bates felt the administration was better off without a
ruling. Just as Congress was about to take up national conscription in February, state courts
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continued to interfere with federal officers much to the chagrin of the Lincoln Administration.
As Bates suggested, their policy became one of avoidance and using legislation to stay out of
state court whenever possible. As constitutional opposition to conscription grew over the next
year, the issue would come to a head again as challenges mainly came in state courts by writs of
habeas corpus. State courts, as the experience of New York and Pennsylvania showed over the
course of 1863, were more than willing to debate the meaning of Ableman v. Booth and many
judges were ready to follow Wisconsin’s lead in asserting the concurrent power to review the
constitutionality of federal acts.
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CHAPTER II: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES BATTLE CONSCRIPTION IN CONGRESS

In late January of 1863, in the wake of the Emancipation Proclamation and President
Lincoln’s September suspension of habeas corpus, Congressional Democrats reached a fever
pitch in their opposition to the administration’s war policies. On the 27th, Delaware Democratic
Senator William Saulsbury Sr., reportedly drinking heavily, unleashed a vocal fiery upon
Lincoln. He attacked the President for being a weak imbecile before Vice President Hannibal
Hamlin asked him to take his seat. Saulsbury was arrested after refused to take his seat upon
brandishing a pistol.222 New Hampshire Senator Daniel Clark felt the actions appalling enough
that he tried unsuccessfully to have Saulsbury expelled from the Senate. Such was the
atmosphere when Henry Wilson introduced the Senate Bill 511 for enrolling and calling out the
militia on February 14, 1863-what would soon be known as the “Conscription Act.” The 37th
Congress saw constant verbal jousting over the threats to the Constitution by Republican war
policies. By the end of the debate over the Conscription Act, Republican Jacob Howard
responded to Saulsbury’s constitutional criticism with a threat to “come on and we will meet you
in your civil war.”223 The constitutional battles in Congress in February 1863 over the
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Conscription Act sometimes became personal and literal amidst the desperation on the part of
constitutional conservatives to protect the Constitution—constitutional values were closely held
enough to provoke emotional and visceral responses.224
Constitutional conservatives in Congress focused their objections to the Conscription Act
on threats to federalism. Historians previously have viewed the debate over conscription in
Congress in February 1863 as centering on personal liberties with arguments about federalism
were treated as mostly a sideshow for constituents.225 This dissertation argues that federalismbased objections were the core of constitutional conservatives’ arguments against conscription.
Concerns over threats to separation of powers and civil liberties also animated constitutional
conservatives, but their principal objection was that the Conscription Act usurped the powers of
the states and granted the federal government unlimited power over military affairs. In so doing,
it created what an “irresponsible despotism” and left no options to the people except resistance or
“abject submission.”226 To support their federalism-based arguments, constitutional
conservatives looked to the shared American constitutional culture and the tradition of
volunteerism over conscription to meet the nation’s military needs. Constitutional conservatives
tended to blame the Republicans’ conversion of war for Union to abolition war for the lack of
volunteerism that made conscription necessarily, but this was not part of their constitutional
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critique but a broader objection to the move away from war for Union. Constitutional
conservative voices differed significantly from more radical voices like Clement Vallandigham,
who as Peace Democrats were more concerned with ending the war and any opposing all efforts
of the administration than making well-considered constitutional arguments. Radicals tended to
view arguments about personal liberties as being central, while constitutional conservatives
viewed the need to save the Constitution’s federalism structure as key.
Key constitutional conservative voices in Congress included Illinois Senator William
Richardson, West Virginia Senator John Carlile, Delaware Senator James Bayard, Kentucky
Unionists Robert Mallory and Charles Anderson Wickliffe, Ohio Congressmen Samuel S. Cox,
Pennsylvania Congressman Charles Biddle, and New York Congressman John Benedict Steele.
Each had a background as a lawyer and several-Steele, Mallory, and Powell-had extensive
experience in the law. They all shared a focus on federalism-based objections to the Conscription
Act while some, like Ohio representative George Hunt Pendleton, tended to be more radical
voices who focused on attacking the arbitrary power grant to the provost marshal under the act.
Even their attacks on arbitrary power were connected to the greater threat to federalism and the
original constitutional structure which protected individual rights. Radicals discussed civil
liberties more because they tended to have opposed Republican war policies from the beginning
of the war and thus remained attached to the earliest war issues—habeas, arbitrary arrests and
confiscation. More conservative representatives tended to think more systematically because
they wished to remain supportive of the war broadly, but worried about the long-term
constitutional effects of supporting conscription. As Kentucky Unionist Robert Mallory put it, he
had never been an “ultra-States’ rights man,” but rather an ardent defender of the Constitution
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and constitutional conservative who looked to uphold the limits of the federal government and
protect the constitutionally guaranteed reserved rights of states.227
Moderate voices, including War Democrat Hendrick Wright of Pennsylvania and
Michigan Republican Senator Jacob Howard, were concerned about the scope of federal power
under the act, especially the inclusion of foreigners among “all able-bodied men” and the power
granted to provost marshals to define treason arbitrarily. The notable politicians making
constitutional arguments in favor of conscription included Pennsylvania Representative William
Kelley, Massachusetts Senator Samuel Fessenden, and Massachusetts Unionist Representative
Benjamin Franklin Thomas. They focused on using constitutional tradition and history to support
national conscription by pointing to the experience of the War of 1812 and argued Congress’s
powers under Article I and the “necessary and proper” clause were more than sufficient to
support national conscription.
The first sustained public constitutional debate in the press began simultaneously with the
February Congressional debate, as newspaper editors began to discuss the constitutionality of the
bill they presumed would pass. The press actively watched and discuss the February debate,
reflecting the significance of the act. Thus, by the time the bill was signed into law on March 3,
1863, constitutional conservatives were ready to mount a popular campaign against the law’s
constitutionality. The March press debate that followed would draw from the ideas already
presented by constitutional conservatives in Congress.228 Senators and representatives
understood and expected their lengthy speeches on the floor of the Senate and House to be
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broadcast to their constituents through friendly newspapers, pamphlets, and other printed
mediums. As Senator James Bayard noted towards the end of the Senate debate, he felt it was his
duty to state his objections to the Conscription Act.229 Even public displays of insult, like those
between Saulsbury and Howard, were deemed critical for increasing support among constituents.
Such combative speeches were given the idiom, “buncombe,” because these regular occurrences
were the equivalent of “stumping for yourself in the House or Senate by making an
inconsequential speech solely to please your constituents.”230 Through these often-lengthy
speeches opposing the Conscription Act, constitutional conservative politicians choose to share
primarily constitutional arguments with their constituents.
The Initial Senate Debate, February 4th-5th
Since the passage of the Militia Act in July 1862, much had changed both military and
politically for the north. The military situation for the Union had worsened, as despite stopping
Robert E. Lee’s invasion of the north at Antietam on September 17, General George McClellan
was unable to secure a decisive victory. In December, General Ambrose Burnside, who replaced
McClellan on November 5, lost over 12,000 men at the Battle of Fredericksburg on December
13, a “debacle” which devasted morale in the north. Meanwhile, the Democratic party had found
electoral success in the fall, running on a platform opposing the Emancipation Proclamation and
the violations of civil liberty caused by the Lincoln administration’s suspension of habeas corpus
and use of martial law. In the wake of these failures, it was Secretary of Defense Edwin Stanton
who worked behind the scenes to work for a national conscription bill, believing the militia draft

229

Ibid., 1363. Notably, Bayard’s speeches were some of the most frequently reprinted in Democratic

newspapers.
230

Rachel A. Shelden, Washington Brotherhood: Politics, Social Life and the Coming of the Civil War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 36. Speaking to buncombe was as much personal politics as
it was party politics, if not more, and everyone did it, according to Shelden, as some congressmen even created bills
and resolutions purely to energize their constituent. Ibid., 37.

89

was problematic because of the frequent requests for postponement, the intransigence of state
governors to enforce the draft, the untrustworthiness of civilian provost marshals, and the lack of
uniformity of militia regulations among states.231 Stanton had the support of the army,
businessmen who resented the bounty system, and intellectuals like Francis Lieber, who thought
national conscription was the most efficient means of raising an army.
Initial debate over the Conscription Act began on February 4th. Senator Henry Wilson,
Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and abolitionist leader, introduced the first
version of the Conscription Act, Senate Bill 493, on January 27th. The initial bill authorized the
President to draft state militiamen for two years and impose penalties on individuals who
hindered enlistments or supported deserters. Immediately, constitutional conservatives took issue
with authorizing the President to enroll and draft state militiamen directly without state executive
authority and to place them under military law.232 Unionist Senator John Snyder Carlile of West
Virginia was first to object on constitutional grounds, emphasizing its threat to antebellum
federalism. Carlile’s loyalty was not in doubt, as he had been a member of the Virginia
Secessionist Convention who opposed secession as blatantly unconstitutional and defended the
rights of Unionists before leading the Wheeling Convention in May 1861 pushing for separate
West Virginia statehood.233 He argued that Wilson’s proposal was of “very doubtful propriety”
and “very doubtful constitutionality” because it proposed to put the entire militia of the states
under the control of the President. Numerous constitutional conservatives would invoke the same
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argument going forward. Carlile immediately moved to strike both sections.234 He saw the
proposed bill as a general conscription law which struck down the entire right of the states over
their militia and ignored Article I by bypassing the states to give the President control over the
entire military force of the states. Carlile was also first to invoke the image of despotism.
Despotism meant to constitutional conservatives the replacement of the careful federalism of the
Constitution with the absolute authority of the federal government under the President’s
command. This seemed more in line with the actions of the Confederate government. War
needed to be waged constitutionally and not at the expense of federalism, as they were just as
necessary as the federal government as parts of the “great whole.”235
Illinois Democratic Senator William Alexander Richardson was the embodiment of
constitutional conservatism as a staunch unionist who fiercely attacked Lincoln’s war policies.
At twenty-six, after a time as state attorney, he entered the Illinois House as a Jacksonian
Democrat in 1837 where he served with Stephen Douglas and very quickly he made advancing
Douglas’ program his political goal.236 Following Douglas’ loss in the 1860 election, Richardson
followed Douglas’ lead as a stalwart Unionist who opposed secession before replacing Douglas
in the Senate upon his mentor’s death in 1862. He concurred with Carlile that never had “fearful
import” been introduced by Congress, as the Conscription Act conferred upon the President
“absolute command” over the entire militia of the United States through sections two and four.
As soon as they were enrolled, citizens were under the control of the President and the articles of
war. Richardson introduced another key facet of constitutional conservative federalism-based
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arguments. Conscription worked against constitutional history and tradition. He asserted
Congress had always assumed the power to pass laws to call soldiers into the field and was now
granting the President more power “than belongs to any despot in Europe.” Richardson later
complained he could not understand how an army of 800,000 required conscription when no
European army had ever exceeded it. No necessity existed, he felt, for this “enormous power”
and “dangerous experiment” which threatened the Republic itself.237 Richardson felt he had been
challenged by his constituents to resist “these aggressions and assertions of power” against the
Constitution. It was thus his duty to resist by all means the passage of the Conscription Act and
his constituents made clear they expected opposition in the form of constitutional arguments.238
Delaware Senator James Asheton Bayard joined Carlile and Richardson in emphasizing
federalism-based arguments in his objection to Wilson’s bill. Like Richardson, his political
career began as a Jacksonian Democrat, having declined President Jackson’s appointment of
Bayard as Director of the Bank of United States to accept an appointment as United States
District Attorney before winning a Senate seat in 1851. He was seen by fellow Democrats as
receiving his “political education from the founders and framers of the Republic and
Constitution” who was unyielding in opposing Republican despotism.239 Bayard introduced two
significant federalism-based arguments going forward. One, the Constitution treated the army
and navy of the United States different from the militia. Congress had power to raise and support
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armies with limitations on appropriations, but militias were left to state unless called into service
under the exigencies specified in Article I. Two, Bayard argued Wilson’s proposed bill infringed
upon separation of powers by granting the president legislative power. Bayard argued Congress
could properly prescribe all able-bodied male citizens eighteen to forty-five to be enrolled, but
Section II erred by granting the President power to make all proper rules and regulations for
enrolling and drafting the militia.240 The power to “raise and support armies” left it to the states
to appoint officers and train soldiers, which Wilson’s bill now granted to the President.
To Bayard, the bill was a troubling precedent. If Congress could delegate its power to
organize and discipline the militia, then the “whole mass of your legislative functions” could be
delegated including power over appropriations and articles of war, allowing the President to
become the “absolute ruler of the people.” The section was thus both clearly unconstitutional and
“exceedingly dangerous.” The Constitution delegated specific authorities to Congress and thus
only Congress had to call forth militia separate from its right to raise armies. Section Four
exacerbated Bayard’s concerns, as he agreed with Carlile that it granted the government power to
govern individual citizens before they were in service of the United States. This allowed the
President to govern citizens once an order to the party to appear was given under military law.
Congress could organize the militia and provide for its enrollment, but it could not govern the
militia. Bayard cited his knowledge of the 1840 proposal by Secretary of War Joel Roberts
Pointsett to create a standing army and the ensuing popular reaction in favor of protecting the
“venerable militia system.”241 The people opposed past attempts to destroy the antebellum militia
system and Bayard imagined they would treat Wilson’s bill no different.
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Richardson, Carlile, and Bayard won a partial victory in the initial Senate debate-a minor
victory in the constitutional battle over conscription. Collectively, they emphasized concerns
about antebellum federalism and constitutional tradition over threats to personal liberty.
Although the Senate voted along party lines as to whether to eliminate sections two and four, the
military committee still agreed to subject them to alteration.242 In order to push the Conscription
Act through the Senate with only weeks left in the session, Wilson conceded the objections in
exchange for a promise that the Democrats would not mount a filibuster or withdraw in tandem
from voting. Under the revised bill, men would be conscripted for three years and would not be
subject to military regulations unless they failed to report by entering the service or claiming an
exemption. Wilson claimed only delinquents classified as deserters would be subject to military
law, rather than all conscripts. Secondly, the bill now referred to the “enrollment and drafting of
the national forces,” rather than the “militia of the United States.” The implication was that state
militias would be left to the states free from Presidential control in order to maintain their
independence.243 Yet, for Congressional Democrats, Wilson’s new language only convinced
them further of the unconstitutionality of the act, as it bypassed the militias to directly enroll
male citizens in the national forces.
Constitutional Conservative Arguments in Both Chambers
Congressional debate began in earnest on February 16th in the Senate.244 Debate would
move from the Senate to the House on the 23rd before moving back to the Senate on the 28th. In
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the time between the Senate and House debates, Congressmen had come under constituent
pressure, with Republicans urged to pass all laws necessary to prosecute the war and Democrats
pushed to show their dissatisfaction with any questionable measures including the Conscription
Act.245 In both chambers, constitutional conservatives voiced strong constitutional objections to
Wilson’s bill in an effort to get their arguments on the record. Their core federalism critique was
that the bill went against the volunteer tradition, ignored the textual distinction between the
militia and national forces, relied on dangerous implied powers that would erode federalism and
destroy state power, took away traditional state control of the militia protected by the
Constitution, and placed the nation on the road to despotism as a result. The separation of powers
concerns of constitutional conservatives was that the act granted the President legislative powers
to decide on the timing and amount of calls for the draft, an improper delegation of authority,
and that it granted provost marshals power to define crimes themselves improperly when they
were not Article III officers. Thus, constitutional conservatives also voiced concerns over the
act’s grant of arbitrary power, a threat to both antebellum federalism and individual rights.
Core Federalism Arguments
I.

The Volunteer Tradition

Constitutional conservatives saw the volunteer tradition as a significant part of
Republican citizenship that separated Americans from the rest of the world. Adopting
conscription removed an important constitutional tradition. Conservative Republican Senator
Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania was a moderate constitutional conservative, primarily worried
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about the nationalization of the militia rather than conscription itself. If the bill was not about the
militia as Senator Wilson claimed, “it is nothing” since if Congress was not providing for
organizing the militia, it could not be done for the regular army.246 Cowan agreed with
constitutional conservative arguments about constitutional tradition. The act punished those
failing to report who were given notice of draft status with court martial. Considering the
volunteer tradition, Cowan remarked that to his mind, “no greater anomaly could be introduced
into our administration of this form of government than a proposition to compel any man under
any circumstances to serve in its armies” since “our whole theory has gone upon a different
hypothesis heretofore,” which relied upon the “perfect freedom of the soldier” to enter service.247
Cowan pleaded that those drafted who did not answer be given the chance first to pay a $250 fine
without any court-martial to avoid repressing the people. Cowan felt that republics could not be
saved by men who are “utterly incapacitated” and who have been “dragged by a provost marshal
into the camp” and compelled by force to do unwilling service after taking an oath with no
binding validity.248 Republics had to be saved by loyal citizens who were willing in their hearts
to serve it, the citizen soldiers of the volunteer tradition. The Union should only look to
European examples if they wished by permanent law to establish a standing army, something
that constitutional tradition also strongly reasoned against.249
Cowan also objected to the “extraordinary proceeding upon any such fiction” that men
who did not respond to being drafted were to be treated as deserters. Under the law, citizens
could not be deserters if they had never been in the army and not held in service. Cowan’s
argument set the benchmark for many constitutional conservative arguments that would follow
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with his emphasis upon the constitutional tradition of volunteerism and the clear division
between the federal forces and the state militias. Rather, male citizens would be “exceeding
unwilling” soldiers if they were “dragged away” from their homes to camp and compelled to
enter service against their will and given no option to pay a fine, or commute his service, or
furnish a substitute.”250 The means of drafting was significant. Under all preceding Militia Acts,
if a man did not want to go into the service, he paid a fine and stayed home. Changing the law
and ignoring this constitutional tradition made for law which was “tyrannical, harsh, arbitrary,
and oppressive.”251
Minnesota Democrat Senator Henry Mower Rice agreed with Cowan’s emphasis on
constitutional tradition. He objected that the national government first refused volunteers before
resorting to state drafts and then conscription, a bill “violating the constitutions of the States.”252
Chilton Allen White noted that if there was any danger the founding fathers were concerned
with, it was the power of a standing army. The federal government held clear power to raise and
support armies, but it was to be done by voluntary enlistments and beyond that, to resort to the
militia and call them into service of the United States.253 The specter of a peacetime standing
army was a fear that permeated many of the constitutional conservatives’ arguments against
conscription. They saw the volunteer tradition as a bulwark against despotism in the form of
standing armies and omnibus federal power.
II.

Separation of Powers Concerns
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Delaware Senator James Bayard argued that the act also ignored the Constitution’s strict
separation of powers by the extent to which the policy of conscription was left to the will of the
President. With such prerogative power in the hands of the President, Bayard saw little check left
upon the danger of centralized and arbitrary power. Bayard’s concern with separation of powers
led him to also object to the delegation of legislative powers to the President under the act. Only
ministerial duties that were executive in their nature could be delegated. The enrollment and the
draft were both ministerial but granting the President the right to conscript and to fix the number
of men to be called was “simply yielding to him” the strictly legislative power to raise armies.
By this power, the President could both raise soldiers to fight the Confederate forces and to
“subvert the institutions of the country.”254 Even if Bayard accepted that Congress had the power
to conscript, the delegation to the President to raise armies by conscription without limitation
was concerning.
III.

Distinction Between the Militia and the Army

Constitutional conservatives saw the textual distinction between the militia and the army
in the Constitution as evidence that national conscription was clearly unconstitutional. The
power to raise a regular army may have been unlimited in number and quality, but there were
qualifications to keep the army and militia separate. Charles Anderson Wickliffe, the Unionist
former Governor of Kentucky, observed the Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795 proved Congress had
never previously left it to the President to determine the size of the army.255 Wickliffe felt
Congress should not delegate all such relevant power. The President was also given too much
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discretion to call on all citizens “at his will or pleasure” for two or three years or “during the
war” without restriction to place citizens under military law. Like other constitutional
conservatives, Wickliffe felt Congress had sacrificed state sovereignty and civil liberties to the
President’s direct control.256 Even Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull stated state
governors would have no command after the bill passed since it went “into a state and takes
every man in it” and the militia systems of states would “be pretty much ended” by the bill.257
Indiana Democratic Senator David Turpie, a temporary appointment who served in the
Senate for a mere month and a half after replacing Jesse Bright, the only Northern Senator to be
expelled from the Senate for disloyalty. In the midst of the Congressional debates over
conscription, Turpie was admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court with Chief Justice Taney
presiding whom he saw as a worthy successor to John Marshall.258 During the debates, Turpie
stated that the “strides towards despotism always jump the rights of the states and the people.”
Armies had always been raised by requisitions of the executive upon the authorities of the states
and the state militias were called into the field by that means and “no other.”259 He pointed to the
1787 Constitutional Convention, where the framers rejected the power to directly call forth the
militia under the Article I power to enroll and organize the militia. Turpie would give no vote to
support granting the President the power to violate the Constitution or take any steps not
contemplated by the framers. Such enhanced power would be an unconstitutional “nullity” and a
usurpation of state power.
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Ohio’s Samuel Sullivan “Sunset” Cox, a key constitutional conservative in the House,
was the son of a leading Ohio state senate Jacksonian Democrat, Ezekiel Cox who first made a
name for himself by opposing the Lecompton Constitution alongside Stephen Douglas in
1857.260 He quoted Justice Story’s Commentaries that there was a “clear distinction” between
calling forth the militia and their being in actual service. The President was only Commander-inChief of the militia when they were in actual service and not when they were “merely ordered
into service.”261 By Story’s logic, if the federal government intended to take men as the militia of
the country and nothing else, Congress could not do so except by the intervention of the states
themselves. Unionist Lazarus Whitehead Powell, another former Kentucky governor, likewise
cited Justice Story’s Commentaries that the authority to call forth the militia and the authority to
govern them were “quite distinct” and authority of Congress over the militia depended on
whether the militia was deemed in the actual service of the United States.262
Powell was the sole constitutional conservative to evaluate the dual Supreme Court
precedents of Martin v. Mott and Houston v. Moore. He observed that in those cases, the
Supreme Court decided against the opinion of Story, who dissented to both majority opinions.263
Powell again stated that there had to be mustering into the actual service to establish federal
exclusive jurisdiction and to override the local laws of states to punish individual parties. Powell
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argued that because Houston came under a state law, even if a call had been made by the
President to bring the militia into service, it was not a federal act. He interpreted Houston to
mean the militia could only be called forth through the instrumentality of the state governments.
Constitutional conservative arguments about the distinction between the militia and army
showed the commitment to strict construction of the Constitution’s text. Relatedly, constitutional
conservatives used the Constitution and history to observe the importance of traditional state
power over the militia. Tradition and the Constitution’s text like the volunteer tradition showed
that federalism acted to protect the states and people against federal overreach.
IV.

Removed Traditional State Power over their Militia

For constitutional conservatives, the Constitution’s text not only distinguished between
the militia and army, but protected state power over their militias in a variety of other ways.
Further, not only did the text protect traditional state power, but constitutional history supported
their interpretation of state militia power. Constitutional conservatives argued the Constitution
gave the President power as the chief executive with power to call out the military resources of
the Government to repel invasion and suppress insurrection, but the mode and manner was
prescribed and defined by the Constitution. There was no power to force soldiers into service of
the United States outside of the means established by the states over their militias. Significantly,
Charles Biddle did not object to the power to compel service per se, but rather the source of the
power, evidence that protecting antebellum federalism was emphasized over individual rights by
constitutional conservatives. Biddle argued that experience proved that states and not the federal
government should do the drafting. As proof, he claimed that Pennsylvania drafted with “greater
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success than anywhere in the United States” under the Militia Act of 1862 by putting more men
in the field than any other state.264
As Robert Mallory noted, the reserved rights of the states included the right to organize
and officer the militia of the states when called into service of the United States under Article
I.265 Kentucky’s Charles Wickliffe argued supporters of the act had the “strange idea” that the
bill did not call the militia of the states into the service of the United States because the law
encompassed every “white male inhabitant” between eighteen and forty-five as “constitutional
the militia of the states.”266 Calling them “conscript soldiers” and taking them directly from their
homes did not alter their status as militiamen. Chilton Allen White maintained that the militia
was meant to be a bulwark against the encroachment of military authority upon the rights and
liberty of the people by the federal government. The founding fathers felt they were “sufficient
guarantees against any dangers” from a standing army.267 Charles Wickliffe agreed the
distinction between the militia and army mattered precisely because volunteer soldiers were
militia and the volunteer army was made up of militia, as opposed to the regular army.268 He
argued that the question of Congressional power over the militia was a “subject of violent
denunciation” during the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates. Anti-Federalists
urged that it was dangerous to give the national government the “slightest control over the
militia” because it might led to the destruction of state governments.269 Wickliffe pointed to
Alexander Hamilton’s warning in Federalist 23 that no danger of a standing army could be
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realized since “no ambitious leader could wield it to the prejudice and destruction of popular
rights” when the force was raised from the body of the people and officered by the states.270
New York Representative John Benedict Steele noted the language of Washington’s
Farewell Address and imaging the “horde of Federal officers” that would take citizens and march
them out of the state for three years or the end of the war and then march others “off to the
government prisons” because “some people fellow has been taken whom we thought ought not to
go.”271 The Constitution and its framers had clearly contemplated that when the army was drawn
from the states for temporary service, it should be raised, officered, and drilled by state officers
and governments. The federal government was one of delegated and restricted powers and
constitutional conservatives like Steele were opposed to the doctrine of a “latitudinarian
construction of the Constitution.”272 The “immense scheme of unlimited conscription” begged
the question of whether a “shadow” of state rights would remain. Samuel Cox agreed, arguing
that if constitutional nationalist arguments were right, the Constitution would grant unlimited
power over the power to create or increase the regular army, eliminating the militia. The act was
against the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution by taking from states’ rights over their militias,
a right “never to be yielded by a free people without dishonor and danger.” Unless called into the
service of the United States, the militia was under command of the state executive and state laws
fully controlled.
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Cox saw the Second Amendment as an additional bulwark against federal usurpation of
the states’ right to control of their own militia. No emergency could alter this constitutional
structural protection unless the militia was called into federal service. He looked to James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton. While both supported strong national government at the
Constitutional Convention, Cox understood them to support his understanding of federalism.
Madison foresaw and feared the “awful consequences” of disputes between the state and federal
powers, including insurrection. By passing the Conscription Act, Congress would “hazard the
fearful consequences of a further disruption of the federal ties, by entrenching upon” state rights
before embarking “this troubled people upon new seas of blood, amidst other and worse storms
of conflicting power.”273 To Cox, the fact that the “great apostle of consolidation,” Alexander
Hamilton agreed with Jefferson and Madison showed the strength of the constitutional tradition
regarding state militia power.274
When debate returned to the Senate a second time on February 28, James Bayard
reiterated concerns over the erosion of traditional state militia power. Bayard saw the act as
dangerous to the security of the states and civil liberties. He agreed with Cox that the bill did not
comport with the demands of the Second Amendment, which was meant to restrict federal
power. Instead, he felt it was rendered “nugatory” by the Conscription Act. Bayard felt that
without the Second Amendment’s restrictions on federal power, the Constitution would not have
been ratified. Further, neither Congress’ Article I power nor the President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief allowed for the federal government to conscript the entire male able-
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bodied population. Wilson’s altered language did not alleviate Bayard’s concerns. The proposed
bill was not under the constitutional power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia or for
“calling forth” the militia, but for the first time, placed all able-bodied citizens in a standing army
at the “will and discretion of the President” under the power to “raise and support” armies.275
Bayard did not believe there was any limiting principle to stop Congress from expanding the age
range further and encompassing the whole male population. Thus, the militia system was
obliterated, and the states left powerful to “resist any aggression” of the national government, an
argument echoed in both chambers by constitutional conservatives.276
For constitutional conservatives, the Conscription Act threatened the entire, careful
structure of federalism in the Constitution. It ignored both the Constitution’s text and tradition
which protected the power of states over their militias unless called into the service of the United
States under the proscribed constitutional modes. This interpretation once again reflected the
commitment to strict construction of the text that did not allow for other modes, like
conscription, to be used by the federal government or President to command and call out the
militia. Constitutional conservatives, as strict constructionists and historic originalists, argued
that implied powers were dangerous and particularly the power to conscript could destroy both
antebellum federalism and the constitutional republic generally.
V.

Danger of Implied Powers and Reliance on Strict Construction

Constitutional conservatives like Ohio Democrat Chilton Allen White argued that as a
rule of construction, every other power and mode not defined by the Constitution was
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excluded.277 The Constitution’s text made clear what powers the respective governments in a
federalist system held over the militia. For White, the Constitution clearly outlined the limited
and defined powers of Congress over the militia, limited to “calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasions.” No other conceivable
purpose could be used other than what was enumerated. Congress’ power to organize, arm, and
discipline the militia for “plain” and “practical” purposes to establish uniformity over the state
militias when brought together in service of the United States.278 The Constitution gave no
additional power to enact national conscription, as every other mode and power was excluded
from Congress given the well-understood dangers of a standing army.
Robert Mallory agreed that the act granted “absolute and unlimited power” and harmed
the liberty of the people by conferring on the President the power over the entire militia force of
the United States.279 Bayard, following strict construction principles, only read the words of the
Constitution according to a “rational construction.” He thus believed the text “must be
understood, having relation to the form of Government and the other provisions of the
Constitution” and only the powers intended were conveyed. He believed the only way to
correctly interpret the general language of the Constitution was to look to the country’s history.
Constitutional tradition was the guiding principle and the only fair construction of the power to
“raise and support armies” was by previous, known modes.280 Bayard listed the appropriate
methods as voluntary enlistment, recruiting, or volunteering, but not conscription, as even during
the War of 1812, conscription was avoided despite the armed forces being “miserably deficient
in soldiers.” Because the government was one of “specially delegated powers,” the power to
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raise and support armies could not be used to “obliterate” the state militias and to centralize
power in the presidency. Bayard asserted that there were “necessary powers needful to carry into
effect granted powers,” but the issue was whether “new and extraordinary powers” could be
implied. He felt that if the broad implied claimed by Congress under the Conscription Act were
accepted, then there should be similar implied limitations on the general worlds of power granted
to Congress and the President.281 The power to conscript had never been attempted by any
Congress. It had always been previously understood that the reserved force of the nation was the
state militia called into service by the President not as individual citizens, but as an organized
body commanded by state appointed officers. Otherwise, the other constitutional provisions
referring to the organization of the militia would be unnecessary. The difference was “very
wide” between the original understanding of federalism and the proclaimed power over all
eligible male citizens to be placed in a regular standing army.282
The cantankerous Willard Saulsbury Sr. agreed that the framing generation understood
that large standing armies were dangerous to liberty. Thus, the proposed power to “call out the
militia” was contested with the “most serious objection” in many state ratifying conventions as
depriving the states of the power of protection by their own militia. Even Federalists claimed that
Congress would never presume to call out the whole militia of the states and no delegates in the
conventions proposed to grant under the power to raise armies such an “unlimited, absolute, and
despotic power” over the whole people precisely because the mode of raising armies compatible
with republican liberty was only voluntary enlistment.283 If the “necessary and proper” clause
gave Congress any means to employ to carry out the power to raise armies the Constitution
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would be a “self-destroying instrument” because it would work to erase states’ rights. Under
strict constructionism, conferred powers must be “reasonably interpreted” and without express
limitation was still limited by other co-delegated powers or rights inconsistent with such
unlimited power.
Thus, constitutional conservatives saw a clear nexus between implied powers and the
potential to destroy the Constitution’s federalist structure in favor of despotism. To bend the
Constitution to support national conscription in their eyes necessarily meant the creation of an
omnibus, unlimited federal government. As constitutional conservatives argued, such arguments
essentially supported dictatorship, not democracy.
VI.

Conscription as Despotism

Constitutional conservative arguments against conscription were broadly part of an effort
to resist the expansion of federal power and the creation in their eyes of a centralized despotism.
Charles Biddle argued the Conscription Act, along with the other March war measures, changed
the whole framework of government and replaced the “constitutional government which was
originally so carefully devised” with European despotism.284 David Turpie agreed that
conscription harkened back to the days of “Danton and Robespierre” and the “rights and
privileges of royalty which disgraced England in an age prior to Runnymede.”285 The bill not
only was an affront to American constitutional tradition, but to Anglo-Saxon liberty and the
“liberty in all ages of the world.” Lazarus Powell similarly complained the bill was dangerous to
the people’s liberties and was created to strike down states’ rights by making the Union of
independent states a “grand, consolidated despotism.”286 America should look to British
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precedent, where since “throwing off the bounds of the feudal system,” they had avoided
conscription.287 Further, the risk was not just destroying the rights of states, but destroying
private enterprise and interrupting families, merchants, and impeding upon free people in all
capacities. The irascible William Saulsbury Sr. forbiddingly warned the chamber that they were
following the example of Augustus, establishing despotism over the runes of a great republic
through a standing army. As he foretold, “you are but repeating history and as the history of
Rome told the fearful, dreadful tale of ruin and destruction.”288
Chilton Allen White thought that among the many threats to the Constitution and civil
liberties, there was “no more dangerous and fatal blow” than the Conscription Act. The President
would now have one of the largest standing armies in history at his power to accomplish any
purpose. White condemned the “whole scope, spirit, and intent” of the bill as one that invested
the President with “military power over every citizen” from twenty to forty-five and converted
the whole country into “one vast military camp” by converting citizens to soldiers and the
President to “supreme arbiter of power.”289 Leaning on hyperbole, White stated the bill might as
well have been entitled “a bill to declare and establish a dictator” since it absorbed the “whole of
the militia of every state” by putting all its citizens “at the will of one man.”290 Again, concerns
with arbitrary power and threats to individual liberties were connected to the greater assault upon
antebellum federalism. As White stated, conscription “unmistakably” represented the grander
scheme for the “overthrow of the Union” in order to build a new government on the idea of
territorial unity and consolidated power.291 It was, he thought, an “incongruity” with the idea of
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free government that the federal government could enforce its laws and authority over a large
portion of its people by an “army compelled by force, by conscription, to undertake the duty.”292
Representatives like White saw the Republican act an assault on the whole Constitution because
it granted arbitrary power to an expanded federal government at the expense of the states.
As a constitutional conservative, James Bayard linked the latitudinarian construction of
the Constitution behind conscription to the encouragement of despotism. The Constitution was
built on the theory of limited power and checks and balance.293 The precedent of national
conscription allowed for a future “ambitious man” to “override the liberties of his country by
means of the entire military force” under his control. Only through a “stern and rigid adherence”
to the Constitution’s textual limitations could free government be maintained and “centralized
despotism averted.”294 Bayard relied on a battlefield metaphor, warning that the Conscription Act
was at “war with the very existence of a republican government” based on world history in
which republics were always destroyed by arbitrary, military power.295
Constitutional conservatives did not merely believe the Conscription Act was
unconstitutional because it went beyond the federal government’s explicit powers. It was such an
egregious enlargement of power that it raised the possibility of destroying the constitutional
republic itself. It was a hyperbolic and apocalyptic image that reflected the genuine, emotional
attachment of constitutional conservatives to the Constitution’s text and tradition.
VII.

Arbitrary Power and Individual Rights
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Outside of the core federalism arguments made by constitutional conservatives, they also
criticized the Conscription Act for its grants of arbitrary power to federal officials which would
harm civil liberties. Such arbitrary power was linked to federalism, as constitutional
conservatives believed that grants of arbitrary power to federal officials would necessarily
further erode state power, especially from local officials and courts. Charles Biddle found it
troubling that the bill transferred to the President “without limitation of time or place” and the
protection of the state courts the power over the writ of habeas while Congress also granted
federal officers’ full immunity if under Presidential orders. The provost marshal’s power
threatened not just individual rights, but antebellum federalism by its grant of arbitrary power.
Biddle noted that the act placed a provost marshal in every congressional district to investigate
and report treasonable practices, which Biddle read as granting federal officers summary power
to arrest anyone who “may be obnoxious to him or his superiors.”296 Biddle was equally
concerned with the new, extensive federal bureaucracy created by the Conscription Act. The
country would be under a “network of military authority” and for the first time, this “new
character in civil society” would be recognized by law without limitations on the authority of
provost marshals necessary to protect citizens from extraordinary abuses of power.297
Biddle looked to not only the Constitution, but ancient English common law, referencing
both Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale to argue that the provost marshal, “this little military
despot,” could exercise no power over free-born citizens. Hale and Blackstone showed when
civil courts remained open, military courts or martial law should be rejected.298 Biddle looked to
the decision of Pennsylvania Chief Justice Lowrie in Hodgson v. Millward for support. In a jury
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charge, Lowrie argued the acts of the President and his administration were “without right,
unless they are authorized by some article of the Constitution, or of the laws made under it and
consistent with it.” Biddle called the truths of Lowrie’s charge self-evident and ones reasserted
“with firmness and precision” by Judge Ludlow in the highest criminal court of Philadelphia.299
Biddle wished to amend the act to never authorize the arrest or trial by military authority any
person not in the military service of the United States or drafted into the service under the
provisions of the Conscription Act.
Armed with the protection of the Indemnity Act, the Conscription Act ensured political
violence against Democrats by individual provost marshals. Pendleton agreed that the bill gave
the “whole power of the government” to the executive through the creation of the provost
marshal touching every congressional district in the country.300 He too feared it would be a
political tool for oppressing Democrats and their supporters. Chilton Allen White expected these
officers would be “violent political partisans” who held the “personal liberty and the personal
security” of every citizen in their hands armed with the power to arrest for “treasonable
practices.”301 He wondered why provost marshals, often untrained in the law, should be trusted
to construe the statute and judge the loyalty of every citizen. Worse, not only did the bill impair
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, but injured citizens could no longer
appeal to the local state judicial tribunals for redress of injuries.302 White was clear about the
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connection between arbitrary power and the threat to antebellum federalism. The bill was a
“monstrous” provision which was an “open and flagrant violation of the Constitution” and “in
derogation of the rights and established institutions of the states.”303
Robert Mallory agreed that the provost marshal was the “most odious and oppressive”
part of the act. The Provost Marshal were regarded throughout the country as
“infamous….tyrants” who were “enemies of free government” and endemic to national
corruption.304 Mallory was concerned that the provost marshal violated separation of powers, as
provost marshals were well-known and recognized by martial law but only under the laws of
war. They belonged to the Army, not under the powers of Congress. Mallory feared that as a
result, the “odious” doctrine of constructive treason would be resurrected.305 Like Mallory,
Pendleton agreed that these powers were crafted to be political weapons “hidden in the breasts of
these” provost marshals until “partisan malice or personal hatred” caused them to procure arrests.
This was the “very essence of tyranny.” 306
Ohio’s Samuel Cox likewise suspected that these federal officers would act as spies and
partisan denizens acting against Democrats while eroding state power.307 Democrats and
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constitutional conservatives would be singled out not for disloyalty, but for differing in opinion
over the Republican war policies.308 Cox noted the now familiar separation of powers concerns
that Congress could provide for the organization of the militia or their enrollment, but that could
not be done by the President. He also argued the Conscription Act violated the Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee of a right to jury trial by subjecting drafted men to martial law.309 Cox
suggested that it not only subverted state government but was oppressive to the people and broke
down the “barrier which the people erected against consolidated power.”310
Indiana’s David Turpie agreed with Cox that the arbitrary power granted under the
Conscription Act both subverted federalism and clashed with the Seventh Amendment. The
section which allowed punishment by military commission subject to the articles of war had to
be regarded as a “broadside to obliterating the great fact of state jurisdiction and state
authority.”311 This was a clear violation of the Seventh Amendment which proposed to
unconstitutionally “revolutionize the whole system” of criminal procedure by placing any soldier
liable to the civil authority under military authority. This was a “radical” and “extreme”
departure from the principles of civil liberty which would remove the jurisdiction for criminal
offenses from state authorities entirely into the hands of the military authority.312
Constitutional conservatives who interpreted the Conscription Act to grant arbitrary
power to federal officials and erode civil liberties linked those concerns to the larger federalismbased arguments. This included violating the Seventh Amendment by taking cases from civil
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tribunals—particularly state courts—and placing civilians under military justice. This threat only
exacerbated the threat of despotism brought upon by conscription in the eyes of constitutional
conservatives.
Constitutional Conservatives’ Victories and Failures
Democrats had made effective use of their opposition, forcing New York’s Abram Olin,
the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, to recommend modifications to the
bill to eliminate the “treasonable practices” clause and to change Section XXV to require provost
marshals to deliver any nonmilitary prisoners to civil courts and limit commissions to trying
spies only.313 Beyond changes to the language, constitutional conservatives also got their
constitutional objections to the general bill on the record for their constituents to see. Still, most
Democratic amendments attempting to limit the power of the Provost Marshal or to reserve state
powers were broadly rejected.314 The only amendment of any consolation to the Democrats that
was agreed to was that of Indiana Republican Schuyler Colfax, who amended the act to limit
terms of enlistment to two years instead of three or the duration of the war. Ultimately, the vote
in the House on the Conscription Act was 115 to 49, with the vote almost entirely along party
lines with 36 of 40 Democrats opposed, 13 of 24 Unionists opposed, and 98 of 100 Republicans
in favor. Only a single Republican, Martin Conway of Kansas, voted against the Conscription
Act. Notably, Hendrick Wright, who could not fully support the act nor the rhetoric of fellow
Democrats, abstained from the vote. But for a single vote, all border state representatives voted
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against the law or abstained. Constitutional conservatives were mostly united in both the debate
and their votes, but were unable to stop the bill from getting through the House. However, this
was never their goal because it was clear from the beginning that Republicans would prevail in
passing the act. Instead, the constitutional battles over conscription started in Congress in
February centered around the effort to get constitutional conservative arguments on the record to
be shared with their constituents. As historian James Geary rightly states, Democrats had
effectively wielded minority power by eliminating the “treasonable practices” clause and altering
section twenty-five while preventing the Republican leadership from rushing through a
conscription law.315
Constitutional Nationalist Responses
Crafting constitutional rhetoric by legislative debate to be shared with the public was not
limited to constitutional conservatives. Both War Democrats and Republicans voiced their
support for the Conscription Act as constitutional nationalists, responding to constitutional
conservatives with their own constitutional arguments. Broadly, they were certain that Article I
combined with constitutional tradition and history gave Congress the means to pass the
Conscription. Further, the necessity of the act to protect the nation and the Constitution itself
were clear.
Not all constitutional nationalists believed the national government assumed plenary
powers under the necessities of war. Some supporters of the Conscription Act were moderate
constitutional conservatives who thought it was right to criticize particular sections of the act but
were not opposed to the principle of national conscription. More moderate voices like Michigan
Senator Jacob Howard and Wisconsin Senator James Doolittle split with most Republicans and
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War Democrats on the question of including persons of foreign birth under “all abled bodied
males,” while constitutional conservative moderates like Hendrick Wright were more concerned
with limiting the powers of the Provost Marshal. Howard and Doolittle felt that it would be
unconstitutional to allow the President to unilaterally decide who would be subject to the draft
including aliens. Congress held constitutional power to establish uniform rules of naturalization.
For Howard, conscription was a limited power only applicable to citizens and Congress could
not compel foreigners to enter military service because only citizenship itself gave rise to the
obligations of coerced military service. Some War Democrats went beyond the narrow
complaints of moderates and were willing to embrace some constitutional conservative
criticisms.
Hendrick B. Wright of Pennsylvania joined fellow Pennsylvanian Charles Biddle’s
objection to the proposed powers of the provost marshal. Wright considered himself a
constitutional conservative, spending a debate recess “indulging in a train of marks as to a strict
observance of constitutional construction in the enforcement of the laws.”316 Wright argued that
the Provost Marshal was given power to dispose of cases without trial by jury, violating the
Seventh Amendment, along with power to decide what constitutes “treasonable practices” when
the Constitution explicitly defined treason.317 Wright agreed with constitutional conservatives
like Robert Mallory and Chilton Allen White that the Provost Marshal held both the power to
arrest and to imprison, depriving the citizen of his “personal liberty without a trial by jury” or
“ordinary forms of law.”318 Rhode Island Republican William Sheffield was similarly concerned
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with arbitrary power and the power of Provost Marshal officers to define “treasonable
practices.”319 Congress could not have intended to give individual provost marshals the power to
create or define such offenses defined by the Constitution’s text. Wright was also unimpressed
by the Republican defense that local officers could normally make arrests without warrants.
Wright understood that such local officers were peace officers under civil regulations of state
governments. Thus, Wright again found common ground with other constitutional conservatives
linking concerns about arbitrary power with interference with traditional state power. This
common cause proved to be a small victory for constitutional conservatives. The support of
Sheffield and Wright to helped push Abram Olin to recommended modifying the bill to remove
the “treasonable practices” clause.
However, Wright and Sheffield did not agree with Democratic constitutional
conservatives about the power to conscript. Wright otherwise supported the bill, as he would
send “every man in the loyal states into the field if necessary” and “every drop of blood to put
down the rebellion.” For War Democrats like Wright and Sheffield, threats to civil liberties were
their only constitutional quibble with the bill. As Wright put it, he wanted to support anything
and everything that could be done to crush the rebellion within the bounds of the Constitution.
Rebellion could only be put down under “strict adherence” to the laws-otherwise, anarchy and
“irretrievable ruin” would fall the republic.320 For Wright, constitutional conservatism meant
adherence to the rule of law and strict constructionism but did not inevitably lead to opposition to
robust war policies like conscription seen as necessary to saving the constitutional republic. Not
all constitutional conservatives opposed to conscription found it unconstitutional.
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Unionist Benjamin Franklin Thomas was even blunter in his mixed support for the act,
calling the bill constitutional and necessary, but also “terrible” both in its powers conferred on
the executive and in the duty and burdens placed upon citizens.321 He referred to the “simple and
clear provision” which granted the power to “raise and support armies” without limits or
restrictions. In this area, Congress’s power was supreme and independent. Thomas thought there
was not a human being “within the United States “whom this government is not capable of
taking for military service. Yet, he did understand the clause to not be designed for permanent
service, but only to meet “special exigencies” for brief periods of time.322 The United States
faced a question of “life or death” and Congress had no choice but to employ conscription.
Outside of concerns over the extent of the provost marshal’s powers and meaning of “all
able-bodied males,” constitutional nationalists were certain about the constitutionality of the
power to conscript. Senator Henry Wilson, as the author of the bill, constructed many of the core
Republican responses to constitutional conservative criticism. Wilson emphasized the broad
powers of Congress under Article I and the support of constitutional history and tradition for
national conscription. When introducing the debate on the 16th, Wilson looked to sweep aside
the federalism-based concerns of constitutional conservatives. Wilson argued that the
conscription was an enrollment of the population of the country, not the militia, and that it had
“nothing to do with the militia laws” and only enrolled “the people fit to do duty.”323 The
purpose of the act was to make male citizens not currently enrolled available to the national
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forces of the United States—that they may be called into service.324 Wilson further contended his
bill only allowed the President the power to make the necessary rules and regulations for
enrollment and drafting of the militia and did not take away the reserved powers of the states to
appoint officers and train their militias. The change was necessary precisely because of
experience of militia drafts, in which “not one fifth of those men were ever mustered into the
service of the United States.”325 Persons drafted into the service of the United States needed to be
under the rules and articles of war as if they were mustered into the service. Republican Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan agreed and added that the act did not actually call any one person
into service, but “simply provides for the enrollment of a certain portion of the people of the
United States for military service.”326 Constitutional nationalists felt there was a meaningful
distinction between the enrollment and the calling of enrolled men into service when the
President makes the call.
Constitutional nationalist arguments generally followed from Wilson’s arguments.
Abram Olin admitted the Conscription Act exercised the power to “raise and support armies” for
the first time under the “true and proper sense of the grant.” He understood the “plain” language
of the Constitution granted the power to conscript and that Madison and Monroe sanctioned this
power during the War of 1812, along with “every commentator upon the Constitution.”327 Olin
was forthright that constitutional conservatives were right that the country previously relied upon
volunteers and had been constrained by state law, but observed that this system failed the
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pressures of civil war.328 Further, the power to “raise and support armies” was expressly given to
Congress and only the “accursed doctrine of state rights” and state sovereignty supported the
idea of calling upon state governors to furnish troops.329 William Sheffield argued that both the
Constitution and the law of war supported conscription. The constitutionality of conscription,
like other war measures, would be settled by the war itself.330 He noted that the bill was a “strong
measure” which took “able-bodied men from their homes by force, and put them into the service
of the country” to defend the country against its enemies.331 Conscription was necessary to
conduct war “according to the rules of civilized warfare.” Sheffield cited the same “ample”
powers under Article I as Wilson and Olin, but also argued the Constitution provided several
means of seizing property for the public good. Sheffield pointed to the powers to levy and collect
taxes, to take every dollar of treasure for the support of government, and the right of eminent
domain. These all showed that the government, when necessary, was entitled to press property
into service of the government.332
California Republican Aaron Augustus Sargent also felt that constitutional traditional
clearly supported the bill. To him, the experience of the Civil War exposed the “inherent
weakness” of the volunteer system. Volunteer troops were efficient but only for short terms of
services and eventually requires relying on new, undisciplined troops. Sargent tersely reminded
his colleagues that the United States was the only “power on earth that depends upon volunteer
forces to conduct a protracted war” and that the Confederacy had already resorted to conscription
328
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the previously April.333 He also sardonically addressed the federalism-based arguments of
constitutional conservatives, arguing that they acted as “if the founders” had “erected this
beautiful fabric of liberty and national glory, and provided no means to secure its safety.”334
Sargent had no qualms in stating that the Constitution gave the right to summon every man in
order to crush the rebellion.335 Certainly, the Constitution meant to reserve certain powers to the
state and local governments, but also gave the federal government the power to maintain the
nation.336
For former Jacksonian Democrat and Judge William Darrah Kelley of Pennsylvania, the
majority of the debate had been granted to opponents of the bill to “engender discontent” and not
to enlighten the people.337 He felt the lack of precedent for the federal power to conscript was
due only to the sheer lack of necessity in earlier wars.338 Like Sargant, Kelley utilized
constitutional tradition to rebut constitutional conservative arguments. Kelley stated that during
the Revolutionary War in Pennsylvania, the Executive Council sent men into Virginia who
“talked as gentlemen have talked on this floor” where they were seized and denied the right to
habeas corpus.339 He noted the transaction was approved by Washington himself and the
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Continental Congress passed a bill of indemnity to cover all concerned parties.340 For Kelley,
the deaths of two hundred thousand men and the stakes of the war itself had changed the
circumstances significantly. He uniquely believed conscription made America a stronger nation
in the eyes of European powers, acting like the Monroe Doctrine by announcing to European
governments not to meddle in American affairs.341 If the Constitution was to have global
influence, a strong national government was required. Under the residual powers of nation-states,
the federal government could call every able-bodied man forth to do strengthen the nation.
While Wilson, Kelley, and others focused on constitutional responses to constitutional
conservatives, some Republican focused their attacks on loyalty and partisanship. California
Senator James McDougall agreed that Henry Rice’s were comparable to those of South Carolina
during the Nullification Crisis in arguing against federal supremacy.342 Republicans often treated
the constitutional rhetoric of the opposition as a sign of disloyalty. California Representative
Sargent called all those opposing the Conscription Act were “demagogues” who sought to “ruin”
the Republic by preventing enlistments and did not acquiesce in measures “necessary to preserve
their liberties.” Constitutional Democrats, cautioned Sargent, were the party of men who created
the rebellion and the only politicians in the loyal North who sympathized with rebellion. The real
reason that Democrats opposed the bill was to “embarrass” the government and prevent
legislation “calculated to injure the rebels.”343 Others, like Maine Republican Samuel Fessenden,
were excited to see “Copperheads” drafted.
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Still, some congressional Republicans appeared to avoid constitutional arguments when
possible. In the House, Abram Olin reasoned that whatever imperfect details existed, they were
of “minor consequence when compared with great importance of the measure itself.” He claimed
that everyone was aware of the variety of modes often employed to avoid direct vote upon any
measure brought before the House.344 Olin was blunt about his distaste for the ongoing
constitutional debate over the Conscription Act. Claims of unconstitutionality were the last
bastion of those without substantive objections. It was the “feeble device of still more feeble
minds” used to assert that some proposed measure is unconstitutional when they can find no
other objections. Unconstitutionality would be a “very grave objection,” but no argument in
opposition to the bill had yet to be argued that Olin deemed “worthy of a moment’s
consideration” and were “mere twaddle.”345 Attacking or voting against the measure because of
the problem of “minor details” would be “unbecoming and unpatriotic” to Olin, since the
government needed to be immediately clothed with power necessary for self-defense and
preservation.
Through their responses to constitutional conservatives during the February
congressional debate over conscription, constitutional nationalists set the template going forward
as the debate moved to the press. For constitutional nationalists, it was apparent under Article I
that Congress had enough power to conscript all able-bodied male citizens. The exigencies of the
war and the needs of a strong, global nation made it necessary. They also continued to treat
constitutional opposition to war measures like conscription as a sign of disloyalty. Thus,
constitutional nationalists aimed to discredit constitutional conservatives as unserious, prosecession Copperheads.
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The Final Tally
In a last-ditch effort on March 2, Senator Bayard to indefinitely postpone the
Conscription Act. The motion would be the final vote on the bill. Only Bayard, John Carlile,
Garrett Davis of Kentucky, Kennedy, Powell, Rice, Richardson, Saulsbury, Trumbell, James
Wall and Unionist Robert Wilson of Missouri supported it, with the motion failing by vote of 35
to 11. Lyman Trumbell was the only Republican to support Bayard’s motion. Likewise, Powell’s
proposed amendment to cover conscious objectors fail 32 to 8.346 Still, one House amendment
succeeded in altering the language of Section XI to read “during the present rebellion, not,
however, exceeding the term of three years” instead of “during the war.” Bayard used his time
presenting an amendment to limit the extent of martial law to army encampments while
reiterating that the Conscription Act’s purpose was to extend military jurisdiction over all
citizens.347 Saulsbury spoke again briefly, warning that including foreign citizens who had
declared their intentions to become United States citizens as able-bodied persons under the act
would “sow the seed of more difficulty than we are aware of.” He urged that there was no need
for the Senate to rush a bill that clearly had the support of much of the Senate.348 With that,
weeks of intense Congressional debate over the Conscription Act ended. Even once the Senate
passed the bill the night of the 28th, two days later, Senator Richardson was already demanding a
repeal, given how many amendments to it were already being proposed.349 The bill was officially
passed by the Senate on March 2nd and President Lincoln signed the bill into law the next day.350
Although constitutional conservatives had lost the first battle over the constitutionality of
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conscription, they had not failed to get their constitutional on the record and they had managed to
curtail some of features of the bill offensive to Republican and moderate constitutional
conservatives. The fight had not been futile, however. The war over the constitutionality of the
Conscription Act had only just begun.
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CHAPTER III: CONTESTING THE CONSCRIPTION ACT IN NEW YORK

The summer of 1863 in New York City tends to bring to mind one lasting, violent imagethe New York City Draft Riots. Starting on July 14th primarily Irish immigrants rampaged
against the draft and made targets of the city’s African-American population for days. Troops
had to stagger back from the killing fields of Gettysburg to quell the violence which, once over,
left over a hundred dead. Democratic and Republican newspapers were quick to blame the other
for the riots. For Republicans, they believed the cause of the riots lay with constitutional
opposition to conscription. As James R. Gilmore claimed, the universal discontent in the city was
“systematically fomented” by “pot-house politicians” especially in New York City who
“haranguing in barrooms and on street corners, declared that the draft was unconstitutional.”351
The partisan blame for the riots was linked to the ongoing press debate over the
constitutionality of the conscription. Throughout 1863, New York’s Democratic and Republican
newspapers frequently presented their readers with constitutional arguments about the
Conscription Act. Public constitutional debate occurred in New York in two phases: first, after
the Conscription Act’s passage in March and second, after the New York City Draft Riots in July
and August. Similar debate occurred throughout the North from Chicago to Indiana to
Connecticut, but the constitutional debate was amplified in New York’s newspapers. For both
Democrats and Republicans, New York newspapers dominated Northern readership through the
popularity of the Herald, the Times and the World. New York papers carried influence
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throughout the North as they were frequently reprinted in other states’ partisan press. Included in
the press debate were two prominent pamphlets addressing the core constitutional arguments
against conscription. Both Dennis Mahoney and John J. Freedman’s pamphlets highlighted the
emphasis of constitutional conservatives on both federalism arguments and constitutional
tradition and precedent. In addition to newspapers and pamphlets, constitutional conservatives in
New York and beyond had public leadership in the statehouse. Governor Horatio Seymour
embodied the strategy of constitutional conservatives that emphasized the need for a direct
judicial challenge to establish the constitutionality of the Conscription Act. Seymour’s strategy
was to publicly argue that constitutional arguments were the best and proper source of opposition
to the Conscription Act as opposed to any popular or violent actions.
In the midst of these public constitutional battles, New York courts saw their own legal
skirmishes over the constitutionality of the Conscription Act in the summer and fall of 1863.
Constitutional conservatives in New York ultimately lost the battle but the struggle over the
constitutionality of the Conscription Act was close and contingent. In July and August,
constitutional conservatives had a brief opportunity to defeat the Conscription Act in New York,
as it was challenged directly in the State Supreme Court and struck down by a city judge. Some
New York judges looked to preserve federalism by arguing state and federal judges were both
competent to remedy unlawful detentions by federal enrollment officers acted outside their
authority. City Judge John McCunn and State Supreme Court Judge William Leonard, both
Democrats, sided against the government, while Judges Erasmus Darwin Smith and William
Bacon argued that the rule of Ableman disallowed state courts from entertaining actions
contesting the validity of the Conscription Act or other federal acts.352 Although the key New
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York state court cases rested upon jurisdiction questions, they still hinged on federalism and the
expansion of federal dominion through the Conscription Act. Constitutional conservatives
needed to keep the state courts open to challenges to the Conscription Act’s constitutionality,
while the government wished to protect itself from the ability of state courts to interfere in the
process of carrying out conscription. For both constitutional conservatives and Republicans,
denying state court jurisdiction in these cases challenging the Conscription Act was tantamount
to upholding the Conscription Act itself. Ultimately, the battles inside New York courtrooms in
1863 were a loss for constitutional opponents of conscription but were protracted and hardfought enough to reflect the stakes at hand.
First Press Debate: Public constitutional debate in March 1863
Before the constitutional battles reached the courts, engagement with the Conscription
Act began with the public constitutional debates in the partisan press by Democratic and
Republican newspaper editors. As Congress debated the act in February 1863, constitutional
conservative voices were active. Consistent with the debate in Congress and later judicial action,
the focus of constitutional conservatives was on federalism-based criticism of the act. On
February 20, the Democratic Albany Atlas & Argus responded to the “new mode of raising
troops” being brought about by Senator Wilson’s bill. In past wars, whenever the federal
government required troops, it appealed to states to fill its quota, leaving states to choose their
mode of filing those quotas. The Atlas warned that Wilson’s Conscription Bill entirely ignored
state governments and repudiated their services. It provided that federal officers were to enroll
the militia and to process the draft, with no role for the states. The measure was “suicidal,”
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“odious” and “unnecessary,” conservatives argued, since states themselves could draft to fill the
quotas when necessary.353
Once the bill was passed on March 3, the partisan press reacted swiftly. Emblematic of
the constitutional criticism levied at the Conscription Act were two pamphlets published in
March by Democratic attorneys Dennis Mahoney and John Joseph Freedman. Mahoney’s
pamphlet-the “Four Acts of Despotism”-attacked the Conscription Act, along with the Indemnity
Bill, the Legal Tender Act, and the Tax Bill.354 Following the objections of constitutional
conservatives in Congress, his pamphlet focused on federalism-based arguments. First, he denied
the notion of implied powers. That an insurrection or rebellion existed did not vest the federal
Government with any new authority or power that they did not previously possess.355 The
Conscription Act “disregarded and violated” the reserved rights of the states by taking no notice
upon states in acting directly upon individuals and subjecting them to the “immediate domination
of Federal powers.” Both the Congress and the President through the Conscription Act reduced
state governments to “subjection” and ignored state authority by usurping it. Additionally, like
congressional constitutional conservatives, he believed the Second Amendment protected state
militia power. According to Mahoney, the Conscription Act violated the Second Amendment by
putting the state militias “out of existence” and turning American citizens into conscripts instead
of subjects of the militia. The federal government only had the right to call out the state militias
in accordance with state laws but had no right to call people out “against their will” to perform
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military service in any manner outside of what conformed to the Constitution.356 It was as
“monstrous an act of despotism” as ever attempted by the Government.357
While not the focus of the public constitutional debate, the unconstitutionality of the
Indemnity Act was impossible to divorce from the Conscription Act’s defects. The Indemnity
Act also destroyed the original structure of federalism by taking all state court jurisdiction and
authority and transferring it to the federal courts. Mahoney’s complaints about the Indemnity Act
largely followed those of Chilton Allen White, arguing that Congress could not freely divest all
legislative authority and make the President a dictator.358 Significantly, he argued that if the
Indemnity Bill could invest power in federal courts over traditional subjects of state jurisdiction
like property suits, then Congress had “virtual authority to abolish or abrogate the state courts
altogether.”359 Mahoney believed that the Indemnity Act hastened the affront to federalism
created by the Conscription Act by ensuring citizens could not seek redress in state courts.
Mahoney’s pamphlet, however, only scratched the surface in comparison to John J.
Freedman’s lengthy pamphlet. Like Mahoney, Freedman also emphasized arguments about
federalism, but Freedman spent significantly more time on examining constitutional history. His
thorough examination led him to believe there was no basis in the Constitution or the country’s
history for national conscription. Freedman began by defining state sovereignty as sovereign
states permanently united under a federal compact either formed a system of confederate states
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or a supreme federal government.360 The powers granted to the federal government by the
Constitution were limited and not intend to be construed with other powers before vested in
states, as states retained the right to make all ordinarily proper laws not inconsistent with the
powers of the federal government.361
Freedman also carefully defined his interpretive approach as clearly in line with other
constitutional conservatives and strict constructionists in his application of historic originalism.
He noted that the “first and fundamental rule” in interpreting all instruments was to construe
them according “to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties.”362 Freedman took the
Blackstonian approach that the intent behind laws was found by its word, context, subject-matter,
effects and consequences, or the “reason and spirit” of the law. As a general rule of construction,
Freedman believed courts should not regard the consequences of a particular construction except
when intent was doubtful or when fundamental principles were “overthrown” and the “general
system of the law as previously practiced is departed from.363”Applied to the Constitution, its
nature and objects and scope and design were apparent from its structure and only ambiguous
text required interpretation. Any explicitly granted powers should not be enlarged beyond the
“fair scope of its terms.”364
Applying strict constructionism, Freedman looked to Congress’ Article I powers first.
Congress’s power to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia” reserved to
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states the power to appoint officers and train the militia. Only when in the actual service of the
United States was the power exclusive. For, him, the obvious meaning was Congress had power
to arrange the militia into companies, regiments, brigades and divisions when employed in the
service of the United States.365 States were limited under the precedent of Houston v. Moore, as
state courts-martial could not add to or diminish the punishment applied by acts of Congress
upon military delinquents.366 Once Congress acted, its laws for organization the militia were
supreme. Freedman also understood McCulloch v. Maryland meant the “necessary and proper”
clause made Congress the sole and ultimate judge of the necessity of certain means to carry out
any expressly granted powers. In the case of conscription, Congress held implied powers for the
purpose of “replenishing or increasing the regular army.” Yet, if every power was to be regarded
as necessary because Congress deemed it so, they would have seemingly unlimited power and
might pass laws for raising by conscription peacetime standing armies. This was not the case,
Freedman said, because Congress was not the ultimate judge of its powers-the courts were.
To fully examine the scope of Congress’s powers over the militia, Freedman employed
historic originalism and focused extensively upon its constitutional history. For Freedman, many
of the framers made clear the limits of the federal government over the militia. He thought that
the entire control over the militia was left to the states under the Articles of Confederation and
any control not delegated to the federal government under the Constitution remained. This
suggestion seemed to ignore much of the impetus behind the Constitutional convention to
replace the Articles, but Freedman also stated that the founders learned the mistakes of the
Articles which granted Congress no power to raise armies but only to make requisitions upon
states for quotas. The intent of the framers, he argued, was to grant the power to raise a regular
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standing army for such emergencies under exclusive federal control and should be raised “in a
manner and by means consistent with the great principles of civil liberty.”367 Thus, given the
universal opposition to a large standing army, the framers choose the option of putting the militia
under the command of the national government in times of emergency.
Freedman believed that conscription was not an acceptable practiced during ratification,
as the broad understanding was that the regular army would always be raised by voluntary
enlistment. He saw the power to “raise and support” armies as a distinct, independent power that
did not apply to the militia. If it did, the Constitution would have a general authority making the
subsequent provisions relating to the militia “worse than useless” and would only “tend to
perplex and bewilder.”368 The “far sighted framers” foresaw that the regular army might not be
sufficient for some cases and thus granted power to call out the militia in three specific
exigencies. Freedman felt one should avoid assuming that the restrictions too were “superfluous,
irrelevant, and immaterial,” as sovereign states were universally understood by the framers to
maintain power over their militias.369 He felt that the Second Amendment only confirmed this
understanding. It was added for the purpose of further restricting Congress’s powers over the
militia. Finally, Freedman contended that because conscription was unknown at the time of the
adoption and prior to 1787, the meaning of the words “to raise and support armies” did not
include the power of conscription without the consent of state authorities.370 Press gangs existed
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in England by 1756, but conscription, Freedman argued, was not used to raise a regular standing
army until the French Revolution.371 Thus, the only accepted modes were voluntary enlistment or
requisitions upon the states.372
Freedman did not see the history of the War of 1812 as supportive either, as the war
witnessed a “collision of opinion” between the states and federal government, the outcome of
which he felt supported limitations on federal power. He noted the actions of New England states
to claim the militia could not be called out by the federal government outside of the specified
exigencies in Article I and that state governors could judge whether those exigencies existed.
Freedman saw Connecticut Chief Justice Daggett’s objections to conscription as particularly
convincing. Daggett argued that if the power to “raise and support armies” was unlimited, it
followed that citizens subject to militia duty could be converted into soldiers of the United States
Army during war indefinitely. Daggett thought the power to “raise and support armies” only
authorized Congress to do so in a manner and by means “consistent with the great principles of
civil liberty” and it was “utterly inconsistent” to compel any man to become a soldier for life.373
Among politicians, Freedman saw New Hampshire Senator and jurist Jeremiah Mason as the key
leader of constitutional resistance to conscription. In Mason’s November 1814 Senate speech, he
argued no arbitrary power was more alarming than the danger of conscription, as “revolutionary
measures can never, with safety, be resorted to by a regular Government.” He argued that the
Congressional authority to “raise and support armies” was very limited and comprised their
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whole power over the subject.374 Following Jeffersonian strict construction, the powers had to be
construed according to the intentions and understandings of the people who made the
Constitution consistent with the established rights of states.375 Thus, Freedman’s account viewed
the actions of New England Federalists objecting to conscription as laudable because their
understandings of the constitutional limitations of federal power were authoritative.
Like most constitutional conservatives, Freedman believed that not only did the framers
understand the federal power over the militia to be limited, the Supreme Court agreed. The 1820
case of Houston v. Moore was the key precedent, arising out of the War of 1812. Houston v.
Moore settled questions about the national authority over the militia, as the Court decided that
the militia when called into service of the United States were not considered in service until
mustered in at “the place of rendezvous.” Once the militia was called forth and entered into
service of the United States, their character changed entirely from state to national and was
exclusive.376 Applied to the Conscription Act, Freedman was certain that the act ignored
Houston’s rule. It did not “purport” to be passed under the purpose of calling forth the state
militias, as it denied the rights of states to appoint officers and ignored all state authority by
granting the President “full and arbitrary power” to assign drafted men to any corps, regiment or
company as he saw fit.377 Instead, the federal government aimed to raise its own army on a “vast
scale” without consulting the states by conscripting every male person and “consolidate them
into one immense United States Army.”
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Freedman made clear through his approach to constitutional interpretation that he
adhered to strict constructionism and historical originalism. Because he felt all clauses in the
Constitution should be construed with reference to the whole and each other, he argued one must
ensure different sections were understood so as to not be repugnant to each other. The clause to
“raise and support armies” contained two unlimited grants of power that were distinct-the power
to support armies and the power to raise. Yet, no one would argue that Congress had the power
to “extort forced loans” as they could conscript individual citizens to “raise” an army and take
men by force without state consent.378 The plea of necessity was the same in both cases and
upholding this power would put it beyond the “fair scope” and “true import” of its terms by
accepting implied powers. Freedman felt the framers would not grant the power with restrictions
attached to it “but unfettered by any money-limitation, if the entire authority without any
restriction whatever, not over the militia only, but over every abled-bodied man.” Otherwise, the
provisions relating to the militia were made “worse than useless” and converted into “mere
surplusage.”379 Freedman believed so deeply in the wisdom of the framers that it was not
possible that these “practical and far-sighted men” deliberately inserted two clauses with the
intent that they be freely disregarded should they become inconvenient to another clause with
similar, more ample powers.
Freedman’s detailed consideration of constitutional history and the text led him to
conclude that courts were bound to pronounce the act as unconstitutional and void because it was
such a “palpable violation” of the Constitution’s founding principles. It was a settled principle to
Freedman that every court as a matter of right and duty must declare every legislative act in
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violation of the Constitution null and void.380 Arguably, no other constitutional conservative so
fully covered all the constitutional arguments against the Conscription Act. Reflecting the
growing consensus among constitutional conservatives, his arguments concentrated almost
exclusively on federalism and constitutional history.
Throughout March 1863, editorials and columns in Democratic newspapers shared
similar sentiments to those in Freedman and Mahoney’s pamphlets in emphasizing federalismbased objections. The New York World wrote of the “complete overthrow of the public liberties”
and the “darkest hour” since the beginning of the war.381 The New York World focused primarily
on the threat to individual liberties by arbitrary power. They complained that the Conscription
Act, along with the Habeas Corpus Act, allowed the President the “immense power” to
command every able-bodied man while Congress removed any check on the abuse of the
“enormous monetary and military power” granted the President. The threat of such arbitrary
power was downright apocalyptic. The World hollowed that the President could send one of his
“countless” provost marshals to any citizen’s home in the “dead of night, drag him from his bed,
hustle him away under the cover of darkness, plunge him in a distant and unknown dungeon, and
allow his friends to know no more.”382 Other papers focused mostly on the threats to federalism.
They focused on the unprecedented nature of the “fearful” Conscription Act that was “surely
wholly unprecedented” in the country’s history.383 The Batsvia Times claimed conscription was
unprecedented because during the War of 1812, the New England states at the time declared
themselves independent of the general government by refusing all aid of men, money or arms.
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The paper warned that the power now granted to the President under the Conscription Act to
control a “vast army” called the “national forces” to “enforce his executive proclamations and
decrees” issued illegally erected “in fact an imperial government upon the ruins of the Republic
and the Constitution.”384
Publishing in Democratic newspapers, the anonymous “Old Democrat” argued the power
to “raise and support armies” either granted Congress control over individual citizens to compel
them to serve in the federal army or was a mere authority to raise and keep up an army.385 The
language of the clause manifestly did not confer a grant of power over individual citizens
because the same words of “raising” were constantly used elsewhere where it was clear no such
grant was intended. The argument came down to different approaches to constitutional
construction. The “Old Democrat” favored a “fair construction” which did not suggest that the
power to “borrow money” allowed the government to compel citizens to procure loans or to
enlist the labor of citizens to build roads under the power to “establish post roads.” The
“necessary and proper” clause did not override this rule of construction and the Tenth
Amendment explicitly left no room for the implied power to compel citizens to serve in the
army. Such power, he reasoned, must have been affirmatively given to Congress or fairly
implied from the language used. The “Old Democrat” understood the Revolutionary generation
would not have granted the general government a right to raise armies denied to the Crown and
even to the “omnipotent Parliament.” Daniel Webster’s 1814 speech against James Monroe’s
Conscription bill was further evidence conscription was “utterly repugnant” to the Constitution.
Like the Batsvia Times, the “Old Democrat” cryptically foretold his readers that the threat was
dire and ominous. The “obliteration” of Constitution had to be stopped or despotism would reign
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over the country with personal liberties at the pleasure of the President without the constitutional
safeguard of federalism.
New York Republican and pro-administration newspapers responded in kind,
constructing their own constitutional responses. James Gordon Bennett Sr.’s Herald, a politically
independent newspaper, saw the Conscription Act as a dramatic expansion of federal power
which endowed Lincoln with “extraordinary powers.” They admitted these powers effectively
made him a temporary dictator by placing the militia of all the States, the finances of the whole
country and the liberties of all the people all under his control.386 But the Herald felt the Union
was worth the price of a temporary dictatorship and the Constitution gave Congress the right to
grant the President supreme authority in cases of war or invasion. Even though Jefferson Davis
was granted similar powers under Confederate conscription, Lincoln possessed “his powers
constitutionally and by consent of Congress, while Jeff. Davis is a usurper.” Even if the
Democratic charge that conscription entailed a novel expansion of federal power, the act
remained both constitutional and necessary.
Like the Republicans in Congress, editors of New York Republican newspapers argued
both that the Constitution gave Congress ample powers over the militia and that the
constitutional conservative arguments against conscription were tantamount to disloyalty. The
New York Observer looked to address the “systematic and persistent efforts” being made by
“disloyal presses and politicians” against the act making it the duty of all loyal newspapers to
“use every effort to uphold constitutional law.”387 The Observer argued the five Article I powers
over the armed forces when combined with the “necessary and proper” clause gave the national
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government the “entire and exclusive control in raising, supporting, governing and regulating the
army and navy.”388 It was, the editors said, “difficult to conceive” of more clear language giving
Congress the exclusive power to judge and determine what means were “necessary and proper”
to raise an army. Choosing between the old, traditional method of volunteer enlistment or a draft
was a matter of choice for Congress, as the power to “raise and support” armies could was not
intended to create dependence on state governments for execution of this “most vital power.389
This, the Observer felt, hit “the nail on the very head” against arguments which held state
authority paramount-the “true South Carolina theory” and the “parent of nullification and
rebellion.”390 Republican newspapers both agreed with the notion that conscription was
unconstitutional and aimed to render such notions obsolete by tarnishing them as nullification.391
Thus, other Republican papers felt that not only were constitutional conservative
arguments against the act disloyal, but part of a strategy to “embarrass and weaken the
government.” They accused “Copperheads” of making “wild tirades against” and “incessantly”
denouncing Lincoln’s unconstitutional acts because they saw state court judges as the “precious
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champions of law” before which Democrats could “cripple” government.392 Therefore,
Republican papers thought Democrats aimed to use state courts to bring about a “violent
collision” between the martial authorities of the government and the people.393 Still, the Times
were optimistic that the Supreme Court would endorse the constitutional validity of every key
war measure and doubted that the “Copperheads” wanted an actual test of the constitutionality of
these acts, since they were aware it would “take the wind out of all their empty clamor about
usurpation and tyranny.” Republican papers like the Times thus both believe Democrats wished
to cripple the federal government but doubted they could ever do more than succeed before state
courts.
Republican newspaper editors questioned the sincerity of the judicial strategy of
constitutional conservatives while being confident conscription was amply supported by both the
Constitution and the necessities of war. By the end of July, constitutional positions had been
staked out by both Republicans and constitutional conservatives before any major courtroom
battles occurred. By the time courtroom activity grew in the summer, the New York City Draft
Riots brought about a second press debate, with both sides reminding their readers of the
constitutional arguments they initial brought forth in March.
First Round of Court Challenges to the Conscription Act
New York’s courts would see a flurry of activity in the summer of 1863 involving both
the constitutionality of conscription and state court habeas jurisdiction over challenges to the
constitutionality of federal acts. The outcome of this first round was a minor victory for
constitutional conservatives who convinced City Judge John McCunn the act was
unconstitutional. In the months before McCunn’s decision, the first significant judicial actions
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came not from cases directly challenging the Conscription Act, but from judges using their
positions to rebut constitutional conservative arguments against the act. First, in April, War
Democrat Judge Erasmus Darwin Smith used an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the
1862 Legal Tender Act to declare national conscription constitutional. In Hague v. Powers,
Smith argued that the Constitution imbued the federal government with sovereignty and
supremacy, including the powers of imposing taxes for the national defense and general welfare
and "appropriate" powers for common defense and general welfare.394 He felt the proper rule of
construction to apply to further the "great objects of the grant."395 Because the Constitution
conferred powers in general terms, consequently every grant held incidental and implied powers.
Like the absolute and unqualified authority to tax, Congress' power to "raise and support
armies" allowed them to provide for "calling upon, impressing and compelling every citizen
personally to aid in carrying on the war it has declared." The power included "any and every
means adapted to the end of war, in the opinion and discretion of Congress." Therefore, Smith
argued Congress could take "every ship of our citizens and appropriate it to the public use to
constitute a navy."396 He went so far as to argue the Government could even lawfully seize and
appropriate the property of any citizen for public use or seize and appropriate property without
limit to carry on the war, including forced loans.397 Smith was certain that the federal
government’s power under the Constitution were more than sufficient to meet the necessities of
war. With the war ever-present in his mind, he wrote that it would be “exceedingly unfortunate"
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if New York's judiciary or any branch of the Superior Courts "should have felt constrained to
declare an Act of such great public importance to be in conflict with the fundamental law."398
Smith was not the only judge to use best available opportunity on the bench to defend the
Conscription Act.
In late May, Federal District Judge Nathan K. Hall gave a grand jury charge supporting
the constitutionality of the Conscription Act.399 Hall’s charge was notable both for its strong
support of conscription and his political opposition to the Lincoln Administration. Hall
admonished the Grand Jury that he was “aware that partisan newspapers had urged that the law
was unconstitutional” but that he saw “no reason to doubt that Congress had the constitutional
authority” to pass the law such as the safety of the country required.400 The Constitution, with
certain limitations, gave Congress the power to “raise and support armies” and Hall argued this
meant that whenever Congress exercised that authority, those laws were to be “administered and
enforced by courts and juries.” That the law was unwise did not make it unconstitutional. Hall
preached deference, believing constitutional questions regarding the Conscription Act were best
left to the legislature, not the judiciary, and that it was necessary for judges to enforce all
constitutional laws without “attempting to modify such laws.”401 Like Smith, he argued for
judicial restraint from overturning reasonable legislative action needed to fight the Civil War.
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By the end of May, constitutional conservatives had seen their arguments against
conscription twice summarily dismissed by judges. They would lose again in early June, when
Fifth District Judge William Johnson Bacon denied the John Beswick’s appeal for a writ of
habeas corpus.402 Beswick enrolled in August, 1861, claiming to be 18 and did so without the
written or verbal consent of his parents, who sued for a writ in Beswick’s name for release from
military custody. For Bacon, the federal government’s power in the area was clear. Had Beswick
been in fact eighteen at the time of his enlistment, the enlistment would have been “perfectly
valid, without any consent whatever of his parents” since the federal government had a right
“whenever it thinks the exigencies of the country require it, to command the services of any of its
citizens, and it is the sole judge of that necessity.”403 State courts, in this instance, were not to
“interpose to shield a soldier who owes a duty to the government from his just responsibility to
the law to which he is subject, and which has jurisdiction of the offence and the offender.”404
Beswick, though a brisk opinion which did not directly address conscription, suggested very
broad powers of the federal government over its citizens to compel them into military service
while counseling state courts against releasing soldiers from the army. Like Smith and Hall,
Bacon made clear he was unwilling to accept the arguments of constitutional conservatives
against conscription.
Despite the early losing streak, constitutional conservatives finally scored a victory in
July. The victory would come while the city was in disarray, as judicial battles over conscription
continued throughout the chaotic violence of the draft riots. On Tuesday, July 14th, just as the
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riots were breaking out, Henry Biesel contested his arrest by two enrolling officers before Judge
John H. McCunn of the New York City Court of General Sessions.405 McCunn had a reputation
as a “vociferous and extreme Democrat.”406 During the riots, one newspaper correspondent
claimed that McCunn was held up at Governor Seymour’s headquarters at the St. Nicholas Hotel,
giving advice along the radical former mayor Fernando Wood and “other political and judicial
luminaries of that caliber.”407 Another report suggested McCunn tried to interfere with Colonel
Mayer’s attempt to disperse a lynch mob on the West Side attacking black residents.408 His
reputation was such that the Pittsburgh Inquirer openly called for the abolishing of the Superior
Court altogether in order to “lawfully dispense” of McCunn, an “indelible disgrace” to the
city.409
McCunn therefore surprised none of his voracious critics when he found that not only had
the arrest of Biesel was a violated New York criminal law, but that the underlying Conscription
Act empowering the two enrolling officers was unconstitutional.410 His opinion paralleled
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constitutional conservatives arguments made in the public constitutional debates by emphasizing
federalism-based arguments and constitutional history. The entire act was “clearly
unconstitutional” because it both violated the rights of the citizens by creating arbitrary
distinctions among them but also contravened the Article I power to “raise and support armies”
and to “provide for calling forth the militia.” McCunn argued that those powers only provided
for the standing army of the country and not for volunteer or temporary forces demanded by
emergencies. The Conscription Act incorporated the militia into the standing armies of the
United States instead of merely increasing the size of the regular army. Further, the Second
Amendment and Article II, which made the President Commander-in-Chief of the army and the
militia, suggested to McCunn a strong distinction between those forces. Thus, the President
could only call upon the regular army and navy and the militia separately. McCunn ended his
decision by agreeing with Governor Seymour as to the necessity of a judicial solution. The
people needed to show “patience and patriotism” so the courts could fully determine the question
of conscription, for the courts were “able and equal to the duty of sustaining the rights of the
citizens” and it was through the courts alone that rights were fully and properly protected.
Constitutional conservatives had scored a victory, but it was quickly curtailed by both the actions
of higher New York Courts and the federal government’s emerging legal strategy of avoidance.
The federal government learned the same lesson from McCunn’s decision they would in
Pennsylvania later in the year-Democratic judges, especially state judges, were to be avoided if
possible. In a case heard days after Biesel’s Case, another constitutional challenge to the
Conscription Law was brought before Democratic Judge George G. Barnard of the New York
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Supreme Court.411 To the disappointment of constitutional conservatives, the proceedings ended
quickly when Dr. McCaulay was returned by the United States Marshal. The New York Herald
reported that federal authorities were “determined to give no excuse, if possible, to the state
courts to investigate the question of constitutionality” and thus they “resorted to the short method
of releasing the prisoner charged with resisting the draft.”412 Under Provost Marshal General
James Barnett Fry, United States commissioners were to dismiss the complaints of any other
persons under arrest on similar charges without waiting for the state courts to act. Indeed, days
later in Kings County, Colonel Burke, the commander of Fort Lafayette, refused obedience to the
writs of New York state courts and repulsed the sheriff of Kings County by military force.
Newspapers printed instructions from Washington to Provost Marshal Nugent to “not make
returns hereafter to writs of habeas corpus issued by state judges, further than to state in a
respectful manner that such writs must be obtained from judges of the United States Courts,
when the United States is a part to the proceedings.”413 By this juncture, the federal government
had officially adopted a strategy of avoidance for constitutional challenges in state courts.
The federal government may have avoided another test of the Conscription Act before a
Democratic judge, but McCunn continued to release prisoners by habeas corpus throughout
July.414 McCunn’s actions would be short-lived. At the turn of the month, the New York
Supreme Court decided in People v. Louis Nash that McCunn, as a city judge, had no right to
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issue a writ of habeas corpus.415 McCunn apparently gave notice that he would carry the
decision before the Court of Appeals in order to defend his determination that the Conscription
Bill was unconstitutional and to grant “habeas corpus (to) every man drafted if applied to do
so.”416 McCunn never got the opportunity. More judicial challenges would come at the close of
the year, but constitutional conservatives’ best chance to successfully challenge the Conscription
Act ended when higher New York judges agreed that the city courts did not have jurisdiction
over such cases. Meanwhile, the events of the draft riots had renewed the public constitutional
debate over conscription in the partisan press. Republicans blamed the riots upon constitutional
opposition to conscripted, which stoked the flames of constitutional conservative commitment to
winning the public constitutional debate even as their luck began to turn in the courts.
The Draft Riots and the Second Press Debate
Amidst the visceral physical violence and death caused by the draft riots, many
Republicans and War Democrats had little doubt that the fight over the constitutionality of the
Conscription Act was the primary cause of the riots. As historian Melinda Lawson notes, their
worst fears were realized by the violence in New York City’s streets and they blamed Democrats
and the Democratic press for the rights.417 Thus, the constitutional values of constitutional
conservatives were directly at fault. Republicans blamed Governor Seymour for having
“purposely denuded the city of militia so as to give an opportunity for the riot” and decided to
haggle over constitutional rights at a “most inopportune time.”418 Although the riot was not a
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form of popular constitutional action, Republicans believed constitutional arguments were a
primary cause of the riots even in actuality.
Seymour’s actions to send thousands of state militia members to aid Pennsylvania against
General Lee’s invasion was evidence of the Democratic conspiracy, not principled conservatism.
Similarly, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles commented in his diary that the riots were the
“fruit of the seed sown by (Governor Seymour) and others.” Philadelphian Robert A. Maxwell
wrote to President Lincoln that the whole country was “observing with interest the course of the
Administration in dealing with the New York Conscription” and “if not preceded,” the Union
“goes up in a blaze of state rights.”419 New York lawyer John Clarkson Jay, abolitionist
grandchild of founding father John Jay, wrote Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that he was
convinced the “secession leaders of the north have for two years hoped for an opportunity of
resisting the national authority under colors on pretense of state authority.”420 Stanton likewise
complained to New York attorney and War Democrat James T. Brady that Seymour stood on the
“platform of Slidell, Davis, and Benjamin; and if he is to be judged whether the Conscription Act
is constitutional and may be enforced or resisted as he or other state authorities may decide, then
the rebellion is consummated, and that national government abolished.” In the wake of the draft
riots, constitutional nationalists viscerally recoiled at constitutional objections to conscription,
which now appeared to be a literal assault on the government.
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A resurgent debate over the Conscription Act followed as constitutional nationalists
reiterated their constitutional support for the Conscription Act and attacked constitutional
conservatives as hypocrites. Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune imagined the riots as resulting
from a Democratic conspiracy agreed to with “considerable unanimity” to array the state against
the national government through use of the writ of habeas corpus in the state courts to nullify the
Conscription Act.421 Likely referring to the judicial actions of McCunn, the apparent plan called
for any draftees to sue for a writ of habeas corpus from a state court presided over by a “disloyal
judge” who would pronounce the Conscription Act unconstitutional and discharge the
conscript.422 The Tribune suggested this was why Provost Marshal General Fry directed his
subordinates not to produce the deserter or conscript before a state court in response to a writ of
habeas corpus. The Tribune argued that Ableman v. Booth had already decided state courts could
not decide the constitutionality of federal law like the Conscription Act by writ of habeas
corpus.423 Democratic papers and politicians were chided as hypocrites who exalted over
Taney’s opinion in Ableman when it affected citizens whose crime was refusal to be an
accomplice to slave hunting, but showed their politics when they refused the same process to
enforce a law “vital to the safety of the Republic.”
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Whether state courts had jurisdiction over such challenges, constitutional nationalist
remained confident that conscription was constitutional. As congressional constitutional
nationalists argued, Republican and pro-administration newspapers looked to the combined
Article I powers over the armed forces combined with the “necessary and proper” as granting
Congress “bold and naked power.” The Constitution put all military power in the hands of the
national government and only returned power to the states under the Second Amendment, which
did not deny Congress the power to “raise and maintain armies in any manner” but only secured
to states the right to a “well-regulated militia.”424 Conscription would only be unconstitutional if
the Constitution provided for only a militia force to be called on by Congress. Thus, they
believed that no lawyer in good standing was willing to present arguments against the act as his
own and no court would accept them-even the “extremely conservative” Judge Cadwalader of
Philadelphia found the act constitutional.425 Republicans remained convinced that Congress’
power to conscript was so clearly granted in Article I that constitutional conservatives’ claims
were obviously erroneous.
Democratic newspapers were no less apocryphal in their language, blaming the riots on
the odious, oppressive Conscription Act. The Philadelphia Age claimed that there was “deepseated opposition” to the Conscription Act throughout the city and the ballot-box would be the
place to record “their verdict against a party that draws a line of division between the rich and
poor.”426 A few voices argued that the riots were in support of constitutional arguments against

424

Ibid.
“The Draft Constitutional,” New York Daily Tribune, July 25, 1863, 4 (quoting Cadwalader from
McCall’s Case that under the power to “raise armies,” Congress could use conscription to raise both regular national
armies and the militia from the several states during a crisis of “extreme exigency”). McCall’s Case, which in fact
dealt with the Militia Act of 1862, is discussed in chapter four.
426
“The Draft in the Stewes,” Philadelphia Weekly Age, August 1, 1863. The Age both upheld the
righteousness of opposition to the Conscription Act while opposing violent resistance in favor of the lawful
solutions of regular politics and the courts.
425

152

conscription, but these were the exception. A German writer wrote that opposition to the
Conscription Act was based on the conviction that it was unconstitutional and “at war with state
rights,” a universal belief “deep seated” among law-abiding Democratic Germans. German
conscription, if it could be “so termed,” had no features in common with “our odious and
oppressive statute” because the Prussian system had no exemptions with regard to wealth or
station and no substitutes or commutations.427
Most Democratic and constitutional conservatives did not claim the riot was a form of
popular constitutional action, instead focusing on defending their constitutional arguments
against Republican attacks. The Sunday Mercury proclaimed the truth was that the federal
government was essentially a “very weak and dependent affair” with “no population, no money,
no soldiers, no powers, no anything of its own” and was a “mere creature of the states, and
without the states it is nothing!”428 Thus, it was “absurd” to broach the idea of “wiping out the
states” as the two governments were meant to be “kept strictly within their respective
spheres.”429 For some Democrats, the federal government’s response to the draft riots was proof
that the Conscription Act resulted from the rise of a tyrannical, consolidated federal government.
The most widely read Democratic paper, New York World, argued no Democrat denied
the federal government’s “ample authority” to compel all military service necessary to maintain
the Constitution, enforce the laws and repel invasion, yet it could not enact conscription.430 The
World turned to the key constitutional conservative argument that Article I used two terms”armies” and “militia”-under the power to “raise and support armies,” while the power to
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provide for “calling forth the militia” and the Second Amendment referred to a “well-regulated
militia.” The army belonged exclusively to the United States, whereas the militia was a creature
of the states which existed prior to the Constitution. Militia duty was created by state citizenship
and was an obligation of civic duty, whereas regular army soldiers were under contractual duties.
Thus, constitutional conservatives again did not doubt that states could force all its citizens into
the militia by draft. After the draft riots, they reiterated federalism-based arguments to prove the
unconstitutionality of conscription. Soon after, constitutional conservative leader Governor
Seymour engaged in a public debate with President Lincoln and his administration over the
constitutionality of conscription. Seymour reiterated core federalism arguments while pressing
for a judicial solution. His campaign was, like the court challenges to conscription, ultimately
unsuccessful, but it also spurred other like-minded politicians and citizens to support his
position.431
Horatio Seymour: Constitutional Conservative Leader, Debates the Lincoln
Administration
Democratic New York Governor Horatio Seymour was a key constitutional conservative
who emphasized the importance of getting a judicial resolution as to the constitutionality of the
Conscription Act. Even before the act passed in March, Seymour, citing his strict
constructionism, publicly spoke out against conscription as unconstitutional.432 He frequently not
only welcomed the use of courts, but championed them as the proper venues and an alternative to
civil unrest and violence. The events of the summer only heightened Seymour’s commitment to a
431 There was dissent on this position. For instance, Chauncy C. Burr's Old Guard, criticizing the New
Jersey legislature's resolutions passed in March in response to the Conscription Act, which called for treating
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judicial solution. His August 18 proclamation, just over a month after the New York City draft
riots, argued against “disorderly and riotous attacks” upon those engaged in executing a law of
Congress. Seymour argued that the “liberties of our country and the rights of our citizens can
only be preserved by a just regard for legal obligations and an acquiescence in the decisions of
judicial tribunals.” Thus, he reasoned the “wise and humane policy” would have already
procured a judicial decision with regards to the constitutionality of the Conscription Act, the lack
of such a decision did not justify violent opposition.433 Disregard for the sacredness of the
Constitution, the law, and the decision of judicial proceedings was the greatest danger to liberty.
Seymour ended by repeating his warnings and arguing that the “only opposition to the
Constitution which can be allowed is an appeal to the Courts.”434 Seymour emphasized these
same arguments in his correspondence with Lincoln and his administration in August.
The correspondence between Seymour and Lincoln was shared in the New York City
press as part of the public constitutional debate. Seymour mainly reiterated what he had already
argued in other venues-a judicial resolution was required on the question of conscription. His
letter to Lincoln expressed this desire, as well as his certainty that conscription was
unconstitutional.435 Seymour believed that at least half the people believed the Conscription Act
to be unconstitutional, a view he suggested “profoundly excites the public mind.” Clearly
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alluding to the riots, he wrote that the act was a “violation of the supreme Constitutional law”
and “the refusal of Governments to give protection excites citizens to disobedience— the
successful [sic] execution of the conscription act depends upon the settlement, by judicial
tribunals, of its constitutionality.”436 Seymour believed opponents and supporters should be
invested in a judicial decision. For proponents, “with such decisions in its favor, it will have a
hold upon the public respect and deference which it now lacks.” On the other hand, Seymour
argued refusing to test the constitutionality of the act would be regarded as evidence by the
people “that it wants legality and binding force.” Because the act was “so unusual in the history
of this country” and jarred “so harshly with those ideas of voluntary action,” he urged that it
needed sanction from all branches of government.437 Final judicial resolution would, Seymour
believed, grant legitimacy in the eyes of the public no matter what the court decided.
Seymour felt that there was nothing to fear if a court deemed the act unconstitutional. He
thought following the normal judicial process would “add new vigor” to the government by
showing respect for the people's rights and denying the “spirit of lawlessness” embodied by the
riots. Additionally, such a decision would not substantially impair Congress’ power to raise
armies. If the bill fell, there was “still left the undisputed authority to call forth the armed power
of the nation in the manner distinctly set forth in the Constitution of our country." Seymour
remained confident that the constitutional tradition of volunteerism remained sufficient to
judiciously fight the war. Not only did constitutional conservatives generally backed Seymour’s
strategy, but War Democrats supportive of conscription joined as well. In the aftermath of the
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riots, War Democrat lawyer David Dudley Field wrote to President Lincoln that there was a
“very prevalent impression among the persons liable to the draft, that the act is unconstitutional”
and that because constitutional conservatives would abide by the decision of the courts, the
question should be brought before the courts “at the earliest practicable moment.”438 Field
specifically thought the act should be brought before the Circuit Court of New York, believing it
would be upheld. New York Mayor George Updyke, joined by New York Tribune editor Horace
Greeley, New York Evening Post editor William Cullen Bryant and ex-Lieutenant Governor
Henry Jarvis Raymond, wrote to Lincoln two days later to urge his adoption of the policy
recommended by Field to both indicate the authority of the government and to lesson if “not
entirely abate the opposition to the conscription.”439 The next day, Republican Massachusetts
Governor John Albion Andrew wrote to Edwin Stanton, agreeing that it was “of the highest
importance that the principal legal questions which arise under the Conscription act should be
brought to a judicial test at the earliest day.”440
Some even pressured Seymour to pledge that no man leave the state until the law was
tested in the courts.441 And others appeared to think a test in the courts was imminent, with
Democratic Alderman John Hardy claiming he had it on reliable authority that an arrangement
existed between federal and state authorities “by which an early decision could be had as to the
constitutionality of the Conscription Act.”442 Hardy argued the constitutionality of the act could
be finally determined easily within a reasonable time by issuing nine writs of habeas corpus to
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the nine justices of the Supreme Court to obtain a decision within two weeks. He blamed federal
authorities, who did not seem “inclined to expedite a decision of this important question,” and
claimed this was the reason the city’s Common Council needed to raise funds for volunteers.443
Hardy was not far off. Lincoln and his administration took constitutional arguments
seriously but were also unwilling to delay the state drafts in order to seek a judicial resolution at
the Supreme Court. Lincoln would not suspend the draft in New York, as Seymour had
requested. He wrote that while he did not object to “abide a decision of the United States
Supreme Court” or the judges thereof on the constitutionality of the Conscription Act and would
be “willing to facilitate” obtaining a decision, he could not “consent to lose the time while it is
being obtained.”444 Congress had already determined the volunteer system to be inadequate and
waiting for a court decision required part of those citizens not in service to “go to the aid of those
who are already in it.” Lincoln was pragmatic, aiming to act in “just and constitutional, and yet
practical” ways in following his duty to maintain the free principles of the country. Privately
sometime after his exchange with Seymour, Lincoln wrote his own opinion upholding the
constitution of conscription.445
Lincoln answered constitutional conservative critics that the power of Congress to
conscript was expressly given and this was the first time a power of Congress was questioned in
a case “when the power is given by the Constitution in express terms.” He thought this was the
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first-time powers “plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution” were denied, as the
Constitution clearly gave the power to “raise and support” armies and Congress had exercised
that power. This was the “whole of it.”446 Like most Republicans, Lincoln felt that the act was
clearly constitutional and was only nominally open to Seymour’s judicial solution. In reality, his
administration had already shown their strategy of avoiding contrary court decisions, especially
in unfriendly state courts. It was a sound, pragmatic strategy, but one that reflected the status of
constitutional arguments for Lincoln and his administration. They were to be taken seriously,
responded to publicly when necessary, but they were always secondary to supporting the war
effort at all costs. This was the crucial difference between constitutional nationalists and
constitutional conservatives-the former felt war necessities subsumed constitutional concerns,
while the latter were resolute that the war was worth fighting but not at the cost of the
Constitution. Despite the administration’s insistence that the act was clearly constitutional and
the needs of the war effort were paramount, judicial activity in New York would continue
through August and September. Seymour would continue to push for the judicial solution, both
with his August 18th proclamation and other public appearances.447 It would predominantly
focus on the question of whether or not state courts could take challenges to the Conscription Act
by writ of habeas corpus.
Jordan, Barrett, and Hopson: Second Round of Judicial Battles in New York
In August and September, New York Courts saw three major cases involving the
Conscription Act which centered on the question of state court jurisdiction. Despite the push of
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constitutional conservatives to get a judicial resolution over conscription in New York, they
would be bogged down in New York by the jurisdictional battle. Constitutional conservatives
lost two out of the three cases and the question remained unresolved at the close of the year, as
New York judges continued to clash on the question throughout the 1860s. In the first case In Re
Jordan, constitutional conservatives lost once again before Judge Smith in Rochester, who
declined state court jurisdiction under the rule of Ableman.448 Three habeas corpus petitions
were presented to Smith of similar facts complaining that the prisoners were minors under the
age of eighteen and that they were being “unlawfully restrained of their liberty by military
officers on pretense that they were duly enlisted as soldiers” in service of the United States.449
All three petitions and writs were granted but the officers declined to obey the writs and made an
amended return claiming to be excused from obeying the writ. Smith’s opinion found that the
imprisonment of the minors was prima facie lawful. The government argued that Ableman meant
that once it was established a prisoner was in the custody of the United States under an officer of
the United States, state court jurisdiction was at an end.
Smith agreed with the government and denied state court jurisdiction. First, the New
York Habeas Corpus Act stated that judges of the Supreme Court and other state judges were
authorized to entertain proceedings and inquire into the cause of imprisonment of any person
restrained of liberty within the state, but had no discretion in respect to the allowance of such
writs if presented in proper form.450 New York’s own precedent was mixed on the question of
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jurisdiction for this class of cases for soldiers held under the authority of the United States.451
Smith understood it was the duty of state courts to citizens of their state to see to it “when their
judicial powers are invoked for that purpose,” that no citizen was unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty. State judges could not be judicially apprised that a party was in custody
under the authority of the United States without a proper return with facts stated or presented to
show a case of “apparent lawful detention or imprisonment under the authority of the United
States.”452 Any person claiming a right to exercise restraint over another must show lawful
ground or authority to do so, but Smith believed the government easily met this burden on the
basis of enlistment papers and Jordan’s declarations of enlistment at age twenty-one.453
Smith recognized Ableman’s binding force, as the doctrine was “essential to the
maintenance of the national authority, certainly in a time of war” as no government could
“sustain and exercise its power” to their full extent if they could be controlled by the judiciary of
another sovereignty or government. Otherwise, every act of the general government which
affected the personal liberty of citizens could be overruled upon habeas corpus petitions to state
courts.454 Still, Smith understood that Taney conceded in Ableman state judges could issue the
writ of habeas corpus upon proper application showing illegal restraint and inquire into what
authority and cause any party was imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within the state in
question. Once the state judge was judicially apprized the party was in the custody of the United
States, no state process, including the writ of habeas corpus, could “pass over the line of division
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between the two sovereignties.”455 Courts of the national and state governments could not
authorize its courts to exercise judicial power within the jurisdiction of the other sovereignty
unless the Constitution granted concurrent jurisdiction.
Smith looked to other state precedent to support his interpretation of Ableman. He cited
the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in the Spangler case, which also dismissed a writ of
habeas requested toward a draft commissioner upon the rule of Ableman v. Booth. Smith cited
Spangler’s language arguing that if officers of the general government had prisoners in custody
and refused to produce them in obedience to a writ due to orders of United States authorities,
state jurisdiction was ousted. Smith agreed and argued that language applied when a New York
citizen appealed to a New York court against the authority of the United States under the
Conscription Act.456 Significantly, Smith also cited Pennsylvania Chief Justice Walter Lowrie on
the question of state jurisdiction over habeas petitions in his “able opinion” in Passmore
Williamson.457 Smith quotes Lowrie for stating that, “Any man arrested or imprisoned by such
warrant, or execution, or sentence from District, Circuit, or Supreme Courts” or from Congress
might have relief from “any friendly county Judge wielding the power of habeas corpus” and
even judges impeached and convicted as traitors might “still have hope from the habeas corpus,
if a Judge can be found ignorant or insubordinate or degraded enough to declare that his
superiors acted without jurisdiction.”458 Smith concluded that all federal acts affecting the
personal liberty of citizens were thus threatened by writs of habeas corpus issued by state courts
and this was why Ableman was essential to maintaining national authority during the war.
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Otherwise, in localities in which there was notoriety from “some evil-disposed persons in
sympathy with the enemies of the country” resisting “by force their arrest and return to the army”
and opposed the draft would use state courts to defeat the government’s war effort.459
Smith recognized some inconvenience would result from the inability of state courts to
grant relief to cases challenging the constitutionality of federal acts through habeas writs,
especially since there were more state judges and officers to issue writs than United States
judges.460 However, even if state judges were likely to follow their duty and maintain the
Constitution as the supreme law, there was no other course than to dismiss the proceedings.
Otherwise, the functionality of the federal government might be impaired. Attacking what he
saw as partisanship of those making arguments against the constitutionality of the Conscription
Act, Smith imagined some state court judges would issue writs of habeas corpus to discharge all
persons brought before him on the ground that laws of Congress authorizing the enrollment and
“perhaps the war itself” were unconstitutional, thereby giving “color of law to their disloyal acts
and proceedings.”461 As Smith made clear in April, he was unwilling to judicially sanction such
action. Like the Lincoln administration, he believed constitutional challenges to conscription
threatened the army with depletion by habeas writs. Proceedings to reverse any such decisions
would be “quite idle and useless” since in the “ordinary course of judicial proceedings several
years would elapse” before the case could reach the Supreme Court. Smith’s opinion treated the
jurisdictional questions as requiring due consideration, while he quickly dismissed any
constitutional arguments against conscription as he had in April.
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Despite Smith’s lengthy, passionate consideration of the question, another state supreme
court justice disagreed with his conclusion. Just over a week later, First District Judge William
H. Leonard on special term before the Supreme Court ruled that state courts could properly issue
writs of habeas corpus against federal officers.462 The case was In RE Barrett, involving an
alleged deserter whom Colonel Nugent refused to return upon a writ of habeas corpus. He felt
that the case was not about whether Barrett was a deserter, but whether he ever lawfully became
a soldier and whether he was lawfully in the custody of an officer of the federal government.
Leonard regarded the jurisdictional question as well-settled by state authority.463 Referring to
Smith, he did not “feel the least disposition to criticize the opinion of the learned justice in the
fifth district, who seemed anxious to surrender the rights and liberties of our citizens to the
exclusive care and protection of the federal judiciary.”464 Judicial independence was one of the
“essential elements far superior to ours.” and a judge had “no more right to disclaim a duty
which the law devolves upon him than he has to assume a power which is beyond his
jurisdiction.” Leonard’s reading of Ableman was that authority of state court to require the
production of a prisoner ceases when the commitment has been made by the direction of a judge
of the United States courts.465 Ableman was restricted to the facts of the particular case and did
not sweep aside existing state court precedent. Leonard concluded that “every citizen of the state
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is under the protection of the shield of this writ by the constitution of the United States as well as
that of the state of New York” since no conflict of jurisdiction “between civil courts of the state
and general government arises or can arise on habeas corpus, unless a prisoner has been
committed by the direction of a federal judge.”466 No process, decree, or judgment had been
issued by a federal court to remove the state court’s jurisdiction.
Critics felt Leonard had misunderstand the precedent of Ableman and ignored the fact
that the Provost Marshal Nugent could not produce the deserter unless he directly disobeyed
orders.467 The New York Evening Express smeared Leonard for issuing an order he knew was
“ineffectual” and a mandate he knew could not and would not be obeyed since the “only
remaining recourse for the insurrectionary leaders” was a contest in court over jurisdiction to
give “disloyal journals” an opportunity for “senseless clamor” over unimportant disputes.468
Leonard’s decision could only have been made, according to these critics, in order to embarrass
the government as a pretext for a contest between the states and federal government. Leonard,
they chastised, had ignored the plain ruling of Ableman removing his jurisdiction.469 His ruling
was also connected to judicial challenges in Pennsylvania, again suggesting he may have opened
the door to challenging the Conscription Act’s constitutionality successfully.
Newspaper reports frequently connected the challenge in Barrett to the seminal case of
Kneedler v. Lane in Pennsylvania, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was awaiting
argument. Correspondence was reported between Barrett’s lawyer, Edwin James, and the “ablest
lawyer of the Philadelphia Bar” regarding the Kneedler case now before the Supreme Court of
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Pennsylvania on the question of the Conscription Act’s constitutionality.470 James, in fact,
followed the complaint of Kneedler to the same effect, filing a complaint and affidavit alleging
various grounds of the illegality and unconstitutionality of the act “very specifically and at much
length.”471 In the case of Verren v. Nugent and Manierre, Edwin James applied to the New York
Supreme Court and Justice Leonard for an order upon the Provost Marshal of the Eighth District
to show cause why an injunction should not issue restraining them from arresting the plaintiff as
a deserter under the Conscription Act. Like the injunction before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, James’ bill was intended to raise the question of the constitutionality of the Conscription
Act and ask for a grant of injunctive relief. The Times reported that the papers prepared by James
contained “various allegations” against the Conscription Act: that it violated the Constitution;
that there was no authority in Congress to pass such a law and set forth “at length” the various
grounds upon which it would be contended that no citizen could be subjected to compulsory
military service, particularly that it deprived the states of their militia force. After argument,
Judge Leonard granted an order in Verren requiring defendants to appear and show cause why an
injunction should not be issued yet refused to stay the proceedings upon the ground that the
plaintiff, should he be arrested, could apply for a writ of habeas corpus. Leonard again appeared
to open the door to a successful constitutional challenge to conscription, but ultimately, nothing
further happened.472
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Between the positions of Smith and Leonard sat Judge William J. Bacon, who found
himself flopping between positions on state court jurisdiction. The case of Charles B. Hopson
reflects the close battles in New York’s courts over conscription, as Bacon initially upheld
jurisdiction before changing his mind.473 Bacon was dismissive of constitutional conservative
arguments against the constitutionality of national conscription, but receptive to the notion that
state courts had a role in habeas challenges against federal officers and to the underlying federal
acts. Bacon’s decision ultimately followed Judge Smith upon rehearing by affirming the
applicability of Ableman v. Booth and therefore denying the jurisdiction of the state court over
habeas cases arising under the Conscription Act. The case involved a conscript Hopson held as a
deserter under the act by the Provost Marshal whom made a general return. Again, following the
war department’s orders, the officer declined to produce the prisoner. Bacon presented the case
as wholly hinging on the question of whether the state courts could entertain or continue
jurisdiction of a case where a person is held under the authority of the United States.474 Bacon
was aware of the split among state courts concerning the power of state judges to discharge upon
a writ of habeas corpus persons held by federal officers under the authority of the Conscription
Act. Like Smith, Bacon pointed to the Spangler case as having denied that power in Michigan,
but noted that “very strong and emphatic opinions” had been issued in Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and New Hampshire and he presumed “other of the Northern states, upholding the power of the
state courts to inquire into detention claimed to be made by the authority of the United States.”475

473

Mark Neely called this a “self-conscious conflict between judicial duty and national sentiment.” Bacon
sat in the 5th district and the decision came on September 6th.
474
“Law Reports: Habeas Corpus. An Important Decision by Judge Bacon, of Utica,” New York Times,
September 6, 1863. 3.
475
In Re Hopson, 40 Barb. 34, 46 (N.Y. 1863). Bacon recognized that New Jersey’s courts had
disagreement over the issue as well, but suggested that the most recent case of State v. Zucker showed a “clear and
precise authority” for the grounds maintained in Bacon’s opinion.

167

In September 1863, state court jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus against federal officer
and challenge underlying federal acts like the Conscription Act remained an open question.
Referencing the antebellum jurisprudence surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law, Bacon
noted that in some of the “extreme southern states the power to interfere with the action of the
United States” had been repeatedly disclaimed while in northern States, like Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts, it had been “strongly maintained.”476 The New York Supreme Court could look
to their own precedent. Chief Justice James Kent made an “elaborate and able argument” in the
Matter of Ferguson which wholly denied the jurisdiction of the state court to entertain the
habeas application. The case came out of enlistment “under color of authority of the United
States” and by an officer thereof, such that federal courts had complete and “perfect”
jurisdiction. Kent wrote there was no need for the state courts to hold concurrent jurisdiction, as
the federal judicial power was “commensurate with every case arising under the laws of the
union.”477 Combined with Ableman, Bacon felt state courts lacked concurrent jurisdiction.
Ableman was “entirely decisive” on the question.478 Strikingly, Bacon admitted to having his
mind over the course of the case and misunderstanding the meaning of Ableman upon the initial
hearing in the case because most precedent favored state court jurisdiction.479 Initially, Bacon
believed an application for a writ of habeas corpus and the directing the provost marshal to the
court to justify depriving a citizen of liberty was merely ministerial, in standing with long-held
New York precedent. By Ableman’s rule, Hopson’s arrest was “under and by virtue of the
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authority of the United States” for an alleged offense against the government and thus any state
tribunals were ousted.
Like Smith, Bacon also used the case as an opportunity to disclaim arguments against the
Conscription Act. He argued questions of the constitutionality of federal law should belong
specially and exclusively to the federal courts. State courts, when presented with such questions,
should remit them to federal courts. Bacon knew it was “inevitable that such questions” would at
least collaterally and incidentally arise in state courts and in some cases, “the constitutional
question” was “paramount.” However, outside of “Justinians” with no authority, “no respectable
counsel” would argue that under a Constitution granting power to “raise and support armies” to
Congress would not give the “necessary and incidental power” to maintain discipline by dealing
with desertion in the most “effective and summary way.”480 While no question was before him
regarding the validity of the Conscription Act, Bacon was aware of the “argument most in vogue
in these days is that which professes to deal with the constitutional power to enact laws
unwelcome in certain quarters” for being “offensive to the sensibilities” or in contrast with the
“supposed interest or convenience of individuals.” Bacon’s denial of constitutional conservative
arguments was an indirect assault, but it was clear he thought the act constitutional.
In concluding his opinion, Bacon noted that he changed his mind upon return of the writ
and the second argument on the question of jurisdiction. The discussion, “protracted” and
“tedious,” had persuaded him to reach a conclusion the opposition of his first impression as the
result of “sober second thought” and “full and elaborate argument.” Bacon anticipated the
responses of constitutional conservative critics that he was “too ready to sacrifice state dignity
and judicial independence at the shrine of a grasping national supremacy that sought to override
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the authority of state tribunals” and break down all protection of individual freedom upon the
“shattered fragments of state sovereignty” by founding a “great central despotism” with the
cherished rights and liberties of Americans in “imminent jeopardy” from the growing and
continually encroaching national power.481 The constitutional arguments of constitutional
conservatives were the views of many sincere, honest, patriotic and loyal men, but Bacon could
not adopt their fears or apprehensions. Bacon claimed he was sensitive to the importance of
maintaining the just authority of the state and its tribunals, but he did not see the same danger in
upholding the general government's power. The perils of the war arose from “unduly magnifying
state authority” and “countenancing, if not directly permitting, state interposition in matters
committed by the constitution to the sovereign power.”482 It was understood that Bacon’s opinion
both sustained Ableman’s rule and the constitutionality of the Conscription Act.483 It was thus a
major loss for constitutional conservatives. Although the battle over state jurisdiction continued,
challenges to conscription in New York were at an end.
Combined, the three decisions of Smith, Leonard, and Bacon show how New York courts
remained split on the question. The courtroom battles in New York in 1863 resulted in stalemate.
The reporter for the New York Supreme Court seemed to suggest that Bacon’s ultimate refusal
of state jurisdiction was supported by his colleagues and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York even though Judge Mullen, of the same judicial district, had
issued a decision “taking contrary grounds.”484 Around the same time, Judge White of the
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Superior Court also found state court jurisdiction lacking in In Re Michael Cox. The Times
reported that White went against the usurpation of McCunn on the same court and cleared the
fog around Judge Leonard’s incorrect statement of law. White too found state courts had no right
to control the actions of federal officers in the exercise of the functions of his office, as the
military power of the Union was vested exclusively in the United States and questions as to the
alleged violation by the prisoner of the rules provided by Congress for the government of the
military are questions arising under the laws of the United States. Thus, there could not be a
concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal tribunals over them.485 Additionally, a certiorari
was issued out asking for a reversal of Bacon’s decision in Hopson. On October 6, Roscoe
Conkling, counsel for the provost marshal, argued against a reversal based on President
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Conkling argued this made it improper for the
court to entertain the case further. After hearing arguments, a majority of judges “could not agree
that the proclamation did not prevent any further action in the case,” and thus declined to hear
arguments on the merits.486 Challenges to conscription by constitutional conservatives ultimately
ended once the New York Supreme Court affirmed state courts could not entertain such cases.
Unlike Pennsylvania, New York did not have a single case at its highest court which
decided the constitutionality of the Conscription Act for the whole state. Still, New York courts
saw important activity throughout 1863, speaking to the role of state courts in answering core
constitutional questions. Several New York judges upheld state court jurisdiction to grant writs
of habeas corpus to inquire into the constitutionality of federal law used to hold citizens. This
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allowed city Judge McGunn in July 1863 to declare the Conscription Act unconstitutional and to
act under writs of habeas corpus to release prisoners until the state supreme court overruled his
jurisdiction. Even for judges like Bacon who ultimately found state court jurisdiction lacking, the
internal constitutional debate was vigorous. As the Daily Tribune wrote, Bacon’s opinion
deciding against state jurisdiction was of “special value” precisely because it was arrived at in
“opposition to his first impressions, upon argument and examination.”487 State court judges were
left to balance between the role of state courts in a federalist system to protect their citizens and
sovereignty against the needs of the national government to protect its existence in the face of
insurrection. Questions of jurisdiction were ultimately related to the greater concerns of
constitutional conservatives over the threat of conscription to federalism.
New York judges engaged in constitutional battles alongside the ongoing public
constitutional debate. Both Governor Seymour and President Lincoln signaled the importance of
court decisions. Seymour wished to see conscription peacefully struck down as unconstitutional
by state tribunals and to see the result upheld by a friendly Supreme Court, while Lincoln wished
to continue to operate the draft and avoid any problematic judicial results. The stakes were
ultimately higher in Pennsylvania, where the constitutional battles answered the constitutionality
of conscription and largely bypassed the jurisdictional issue. This happened both because
Pennsylvania saw action at the federal district court level where jurisdiction was no issue and
because the Philadelphia lawyers behind the Kneedler case found a way around the jurisdictional
problem—filing their case in equity. Constitutional conservatives won some minor victories in
New York but lost the battle over the constitutionality of conscription even if the question of
jurisdiction ended in stalemate. In Pennsylvania, they would win the greatest victory and for a
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brief moment, it would appear possible the question would finally reach the Supreme Court and
the act might well be deemed unconstitutional.
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CHAPTER IV: CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE KEYSTONE STATE

On September 14, 1863, Attorney General Edward Bates wrote in his diary that President
Lincoln had called a special cabinet meeting and was “more angry than [he had] ever [seen]
him.”488 What had so raised the furor of the President? Pennsylvania courts were apparently
discharging “drafted men rapidly under habeas corpus” to defeat the draft.489 Days earlier,
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton remarked to Lincoln that there was “evident design” on the part
of some judges in various states, including Pennsylvania, to exercise their “powers in hostility to
the general government” in its war effort and “especially with the view to prevent the operation of
the draft and encouraging desertion.”490 Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles noted that Lincoln was
“determined to put a stop” to these “factious and mischievous proceedings” if possible.491 Various
opinions were given at the beginning of the meeting, but Lincoln felt the Pennsylvania courts were
enacting a plan “of the democratic copperheads, deliberately acted out to defeat the government,
and aid the enemy.”492 “[N]o honest man” could or did believe that state judges had any such
power to release men under habeas corpus.493
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Some cabinet members, including Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, desired a
judicial solution and felt that a case could be made before a federal judge so that they would have
legal judgment on their side.494 Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase was the dissenting voice,
calling the writ of habeas corpus the “most important safeguard of liberty” and noting that it was
generally conceded state courts could issue writs for persons detained as enlisted soldiers and
discharge them.495 Blair and Secretary of the Interior John Palmer Usher concurred, with Blair
stating he had often granting such writs as a judge in Missouri. Still, Chase conceded that the writ
could be abused for the criminal purpose of breaking up the army. Bates objected that no judicial
officer could take from presidential control any prisoner by habeas corpus and suggested the
administration act defensively by refusing to present the body to state judges and federal judges
who issued writs of habeas corpus.496 Stanton encouraged Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus given
the interference of state courts and judges which felt “called upon to determine the constitutionality
of the war measures of the general government.”497 Because Pennsylvania’s federal courts had
released more prisoners than the state courts, Lincoln edited the order to address all courts. The
next day, Lincoln decided both to issue a proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus and
an order to refuse obedience to any writs issue by state or federal courts with indemnification for
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the officers involved.498 In the middle of the bloody Civil War, Lincoln and his administration
had picked a fight with the Pennsylvania judiciary.
Generally, the Lincoln Administration’s strategy was one of avoidance. The Lincoln
administration desperately wished to dodge cases that might threaten their war policies. State court
or lower federal court cases decided against them could be appealed to an unfriendly Supreme
Court. In their eyes, both Pennsylvania state and federal courts gave them legal setbacks that might
impinge on the war effort. In Pennsylvania’s federal courts, the ire was directed at both the
succession of writs of habeas corpus granted to release soldiers, as at least 40 soldiers were
released by Judge John Cadwalader of the Eastern District and Judge McCandless of the Western
District, and the federal district court cases of Antrim and Stingle. In those two cases, Judge
Cadwalader addressed the constitutionality of both the Conscription Act and decisions of the
Boards of Enrollment, deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the underlying act but upholding
judicial review for federal courts over decisions of the boards.499 Still, when Lincoln issued his
order, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court had yet to issue its most monumental ruling that could do
far more to inhibit Lincoln’s war measures.
In November 1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave constitutional conservatives
their most important victory by finding conscription unconstitutional in Kneedler v. Lane.500 In
so doing, three judges on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court paralleled the core argument of
constitutional conservatives that the Conscription Act violated the Constitution’s structure of
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federalism. In the months between the passage of the Conscription Act in March and November,
Pennsylvania courts litigated and confronted both procedural questions regarding state court
habeas jurisdiction as well as the ultimate question of the constitutionality of conscription. In
that time, federal district court Judge John Cadwalader played the most significant role in
deciding two key cases which granted the government limited, narrow victories.
The Debate in the Pennsylvania Press
After the passage of the Conscription Act in March, public debate over the act began
immediately both in the press and political speeches and actions. In Pennsylvania newspapers,
constitutional conservative editors sparked a public constitutional debate focused on attacking
the Conscription Act for unconstitutionally destroying the structure of antebellum federalism.
The public constitutional debates occurred in three phases in 1863, with the first occurring
during and just after the passage of the Conscription Act, the second coming in the wake of the
New York City draft riots, and third following the Kneedler decision. Constitutional
conservatives did not wait for debate in Congress to end to mount their critical attacks. During
the Congressional debate in February, the Reading Gazette and Democrat noted that the bill
conferred “new and extraordinary powers” upon the President, established martial law over the
whole union, and overrode constitutional and statutory authority of state governments over their
citizens with respect to military service.501 Days before the passage of the Conscription Act,
A.V. Larramir warned that the Conscription Act ignored the framers of the Constitution who had
“wisely provided against such despotism” through separation of powers and constructed a
government that did not accept centralization of power without any limits.502 Similarly, the
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Harrisburg Patriot & Union argued the exclusively federal act would place the “whole control”
of male citizens twenty to forty-five in the hands of the President.503 Before the act was passed,
constitutional conservatives in Pennsylvania were echoing the same concerns of their
congressional representatives over the threat to antebellum federalism.
The passage of the Conscription Act only intensified the public constitutional debate. The
day after the act’s passage, the Clearfield Democratic Banner gave its readers the “range of
arguments” against it, with the foremost argument being that it set a “dangerous precedent of
overarching federal authority” and as “unconstitutional and revolutionary” as an act of Congress
could be.504 Hence, the Democratic Banner argued that the draft amounted to the “annihilation of
state sovereignty” by treating the country as one consolidated nation under a single, centralized
government and military jurisdiction like the dictatorships of Europe.505 The Reading Gazette
and Democrat similarly complained that the Conscription Act imperiled federalism by placing
the militia force under the “complete control” of the President without “any intervention
whatever” on the part of state authorities. Combined with the Indemnity Bill and the Banking
Bill, Congress had given the President and the executive branch “absolute and unlimited power”
over the purse and sword of the nation.506 James F. Campbell’s Johnstown Democrat agreed that
the act gave the President power to conscript “whenever, wherever, and almost whoever he may
please.” They blamed abolitionist lawmakers for bringing European despotism to America with
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the “odious and serf-like term ‘conscript’ and the “pressgang” of the “enrolling board” forcing
citizens to serve.”507
Given the extent of the threat to antebellum federalism, constitutional conservatives, as
they did in New York, looked to the judiciary for redress. Levi Tate, editor of the Columbia
Democrat, foresaw three options to deal with the law: to submit, to resist by force, or to appeal to
the courts of law.508 The best option was appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, who
would not hesitate to “vindicate the Constitution,” with a decision the legislature, people, and
President would have to abide by. Thus, some Democratic newspapers in Pennsylvania agreed
with Horatio Seymour’s emphasis on a judicial solution to the constitutionality of conscription.
Although they were primarily concerned with threats to antebellum federalism,
constitutional conservatives also attacked the Conscription Act for infringing upon civil liberties.
As they argued in Congress, threats to civil liberties were treated as secondary, stemming from
the greater risk to antebellum federalism. Consolidated government under a strengthened
President necessarily took power from the states who could no longer protect their citizens from
the harm of arbitrary actions by federal officers. One Philadelphia reader wrote into the Inquirer
that the Conscription Act declared that “our liberties are gone,” as the unconstitutional legislation
established a dictatorship with an “amplitude of powers in the hands of the so-called
President.”509 Likewise, the Indiana Democrat declared that the “Rich Man’s Law” worked to
create a “radical change in the military system” and was a “long stride towards a consolidated
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government” in which the states were no longer “permitted to settle the manner, terms and extent
of a conscription.”510 Like constitutional conservatives in Congress and New York, complaints
about inequality and arbitrary power in the law were still linked to the larger peril facing
antebellum federalism.
Pro-administration and constitutional nationalist editors in Pennsylvania entered this
public constitutional debate over conscription with their own certainty that the act was
constitutional and necessary. Robert G. Harper’s Adams Sentinel saw the speech of New York
War Democrat John Van Buren as emblematic of constitutional nationalist responses.511 Van
Buren saw constitutional conservatives as against “further prosecution of the war” and wrong
about their interpretation of constitutional traditions.512 Van Buren noted the state of New York
had precedent for conscription, a law passed during the War of 1812 he deemed “more stringent”
than the Conscription Act. The Philadelphia Inquirer agreed that since 1792, it had always been
the law that “a drafted man who would not perform military service in time of war” could escape
by payment of money. They asked if the lawyers who “so vehemently denounce the authorities”
would say the same things of Jackson, Madison, Jefferson and Washington.513 Republicans also
countered class arguments, as the Village Record commented the “tory” allegations that the army
would only draft poor mean was false since the draft was most beneficial to the poor because the
price of a substitute was only $300.514 Republican papers were thus willing to suggest that
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denying the constitutional authority for conscription was tantamount to disloyalty. Thus, the
Pennsylvania Republican connected Pennsylvania Democrats to radical New York Democrats
like Fernando Wood. In late March 1863, the Inquirer wrote that the “crafty and unscrupulous”
Wood along with the “well read and well bred” William B. Reed were taking the city down to
the “shallowest and noisiest” with their fierce condemnation of the Conscription Act.
After April, the press debate briefly died down, but was soon resurrected by two eventsthe beginning of the draft operations within individual states in July and the subsequent New
York City draft riots. In the aftermath of the draft riots, Republican newspapers blamed
constitutional opposition as having fanned the flames of violence resistance. As the Harrisburg
Evening Telegraph wrote on July 15, Democrats like Judge Woodward and Fernando Wood had
urged the people to resist the Conscription Act and in New York, the people had obeyed their
suggestions and resisted the laws.515 Democrats felt that the cause of the riots was readily
apparent-it was the act itself. One Pennsylvania Democratic paper reacted to the “terrible and
sanguinary riots” by arguing that the immediate cause was “the enforcement of the infamous
Conscription Act, which aside from its unconstitutionality, contains many obnoxious
features.”516 It was clear from the beginning to Democrats that the Conscription Bill would
provoke civil disorder. Pointing to the decision of Judge McCunn, the Johnstown Democrat
stated that the Conscription Act had already been pronounced unconstitutional in the city and it
was questionable whether the act could be enforced, “at least in that state.” They recommended
to the people of Pennsylvania to avoid this “baleful example” of violence by looking to the
courts as the legitimate means to set aside this unconstitutional law.517 Meanwhile, the
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Republican press starkly opposed the testing of the act in the wake of the draft riots. Hearing that
New York Democrats proposed to act upon the suggestion of War Democrat James T. Brady to
test the constitutionality of the Conscription Act, the Philadelphia Press wrote that no court of
law “at a time like this” should permit such a question to be raised since “no loyal and lawmaintaining judge” could sanction it.518
In the weeks following the riots, the Johnstown Democrat revisited the primary
constitutional arguments against conscription, keeping the focus on protecting antebellum
federalism.519 They maintained that the Constitution never gave Congress power to interfere with
the right of states to organize, arm, and discipline their own militias, as protected by the Tenth
Amendment. Article I only granted Congress the “right to provide how they should be organized,
armed, and disciplined.” Further, Congress and the President only held constitutional power over
the militia when in actual service of the United States. The act was unconstitutional in that it took
away the power of states to appoint its own officers over its own militia and granting it to the
President. As constitutional conservatives consistently argued, the reserved powers of the states
included the appointment of officers in their own militias and to have each militia unit
commanded by a state officer. The framers foresaw that Presidents might be tempted to exceed
their authority and therefore limited the powers of the President to his duties as set forth in the
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Constitution. The Johnstown Democrat continued with other familiar complaints over the act’s
division of the country into military districts and appoint provost marshals with unlimited power
over citizens. The Johnstown Democrat did not believe that any “sane man” could understand
the framers of the Constitution as having granted the President such unlimited and “despotic
power.”520 That power would override state authorities including the state courts and threaten the
states with martial law, thus further impairing federalism.
Republican newspaper responses remained short and pointed. The Philadelphia Press
looked to counter the claims that the English never resorted to conscription, pointing to the
English history of impressment. Impressment was the arbitrary and capricious seizure of
individuals from the general body of citizens, while conscription was more like a general tax, a
service required of every subject.521 The Press also quoted the London Journal for saying that it
would be the “very imbecility of weakness to pretend” the exemption from forced service would
extend to emergencies like the Civil War, as the English had frequently relied on the “severest
conscription” on the sea while avoiding the need to use conscription for the army.
Other constitutional nationalist commentators continued to suggest that constitutional
arguments against conscription were signs of disloyalty that were absurd and factious. One War
Democrat pamphlet argued Democrats should not hear the “disloyal lips” of those like Governor
Seymour and Vallandigham.522 The pamphlet reminded readers that during the War of 1812,
Federalists lobbied against conscription, impairing every attempt to carry the power into
operation, with men of high standing objecting on the “absurd, untenable ground of the measure
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being ‘unconstitutional.’”523 He decried too the “hideous outcry” and “miserable rants” raised in
and outside of Congress in February 1863 which used the “odious name” conscription in order to
attach it to the tyrannical French system. Thus, constitutional nationalists saw opponents of
conscription as cynically playing upon the public’s gullibility by claiming the Conscription Act
was “wholly unprecedented” and “utterly unconstitutional.”
The second press debate in July and August was an opportunity for constitutional
conservative editors to remind their readers of the strongest arguments against the
constitutionality of conscription. They again focused on the threats to federalism and the lack of
fidelity to constitutional tradition. This set the stage for what would come at the end of July, as
Philadelphia lawyers filed their strongest challenge to the Conscription Act in Kneedler v. Lane.
One final round of constitutional debate would come in November after Kneedler, as both sides
remained convinced of the veracity of their constitutional arguments.
The June Democratic Convention
The public constitutional debate included not just newspaper columns, but political
speeches and actions of elite citizens closely followed in the partisan press. The most widely
covered event at which constitutional conservatives could reach a statewide audience outside of
Congress was the June Democratic State Convention in Harrisburg. When the convention
assembled to nominate their candidates for the 1863 state elections, they endorsed resolutions
speaking to their constitutional commitments. The resolutions spoke to renewing the “fidelity to
the Constitution,” which provided “to every citizen that of being secured in his life, liberty, and
property, so that he cannot be deprived of either without a due form of law.”524 Another key
resolution, sounding close to endorsing nullification, spoke to the “plain duty” of state
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magistrates to “use whatever power of the law” to “protect the state and the people from lawless
outrages” so that the people would not hold their liberties at the “mere will of the federal
executive.” The duty of the state courts was to protect its citizenry from any unconstitutional
federal actions. Once the convention passed resolutions, they moved onto the central business at
hand--finding a candidate for governor who would repel “all aggressions of federal authority”
upon reserved state rights in order to be in “strict harmony” with the Constitution.525 It was only
after a spirited contest between several prominent candidates that Judge George Woodward won
the nomination.
In the ensuing struggle over the nominee, War Democrats favored former Congressman
William H. Witte and the Peace Democrats favored State Senator Heister Clymer. Woodward
was the compromise candidate as a constitutional conservative and the platform put forth
supported the war but denounced conscription.526 Indeed, a total of nine ballots were counted,
which Woodward consistently trailing Witte, Clymer and others before the final ballot gave
Woodward 75 votes to Clymer’s 53.527 Speaking after the nomination, Witte praised
Woodward’s character as being so high it was “scarcely be just to praise him, since that might
imply that commendation was necessary” and that as governor, “no kidnapping” would occur
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under his nose.528 Loud cheers and applause were reported when Woodward and Lowrie were
nominated and a resolution was adopted requesting Woodward not resign his seat on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court until he won the gubernatorial election.529 Committee Chairman
Francis W. Hughes finished the June 17th proceedings by speaking in support of the Woodward
motion. He remarked that due to the “alarming crisis” of the moment, with the state “stripped of
her sovereignty” and an “Austrian system of provost marshals” imposed, Woodward was needed
on the bench as the “last entrenchment behind which the people can take refuge” in order to
avoid abandoning all state sovereignty.530 With the close of the convention, constitutional
conservatives had their candidates in Woodward and Lowrie alongside renewing their
commitment to the constitutional arguments against conscription they had made in the public
constitutional debates.
The convention was also an opportunity to publicly assault Lincoln war measures as
unconstitutional, especially the Conscription Act. Charles Biddle, who had returned from
Congress in March to win the chairmanship of the Democratic State Central Committee, gave a
speech reiterating the objections he made in Congress to conscription. Biddle focused on
arbitrary power and constitutional tradition, arguing that the “time-honored American system of
calling on the states for drafts from their militia” had been replaced by a national conscription
based on “European despotisms.”531 Like Governor Seymour, Biddle believed a judicial
resolution was the best avenue for redress. Biddle informed his audience not to worry, as the
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act’s constitutionality would be tested before the courts and if it was decided to be within the
power of Congress, the people would ultimately decide the question through the polls.532 Before
the next Democratic State Central Committee meeting in September, Biddle would revisit these
same themes of “military despotism,” attacking the Conscription Act’s conversion of all male
citizens into soldiers while taking away the protection of civil justice.533
Through the newspaper debates and political action, Pennsylvania constitutional
conservatives engaged in months of intense public constitutional debate over the Conscription
Act focusing on its federalism defects which prepared the likes of Woodward and Lowrie to
challenge the constitutionality of the act in September. However, constitutional conservatives
would start their challenges to the Conscription Act first in federal court, bringing their
complaints before Federal District Court Judge John Cadwalader.
Challenging the Conscription Act in Federal Court
In 1863, constitutional challenges to the Conscription Act in Pennsylvania first came
before Judge John Cadwalader and the Eastern District. In two major cases, Cadwalader
ultimately upheld the Act, but also showed a level of skepticism about the act which frustrated
the Lincoln administration.534 Before Cadwalader, constitutional conservatives scored no major
victories, but the battle was close and they inflicted some setbacks for the government. Most
importantly, the decision in Antrim maintained a role for the federal courts in reviewing the
decisions of the Boards of Enrollment, keeping one avenue for redress open.
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After the Conscription Act passed on March 3rd, it took just over three weeks for a
federal court to consider its constitutionality. On March 27th, Judge Cadwalader issued his
opinion in McCall’s Case deciding militia members became drafted soldiers of the United States
army from the date of the draft order and thus subject to court-martial for an offense against the
military laws of the United States. The case came out of an arrest by military officers of the
United States of Cornelius McCall, a deserter who was alleged to have been drafted under the
1862 Militia Act-not the act of 1863. However, United States military officers made the arrest
pursuant to Section XIII of the Conscription Act, which stated that any person drafted who failed
to report at the “place of rendezvous without furnishing a substitute, or paying the authorized
equivalent” would be deemed a deserter and arrested unless he could prove, by the Board of
Enrollment’s decision, that he was not liable to do military duty.
Judge Cadwalader started by defining what he believed to be the difference between
conscription and the historic volunteer-based military organization:
“When the inhabitants of a country who are liable to be called into military
service have been enrolled, and such of them as are to render the service have been
ascertained by draft, and the persons thus drafted have been lawfully required to attend at
an appointed time and place of muster, those who disobey are amenable to military
discipline and military organization, unless the subject has been otherwise legislatively
regulated. Where the government whose authority they have set at naught may by
military force compel their subjection to such discipline and organization, - the system is
a conscription. But where, though their offence is cognizable by a military tribunal, their
disobedience is punishable only by a certain pecuniary or other penalty, and they cannot
be further subjected to military discipline or detention, the system is not a conscription, as
the word is now ordinarily understood. Judge Washington said, that under a system of the
latter kind, a fine to be paid by the delinquent is deemed an equivalent for his service, and
an atonement for his disobedience.”535
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Act were liable to military arrest, compulsion or punishment, and detention.536 Indeed, regular
armies had been always raised by voluntary enlistment and past congressional acts which
authorized calls by the President for the services of the militia were for limited periods. Yet,
Judge Cadwalader found constitutional history did not show conscription to be clearly
unconstitutional. Instead, the crisis necessary to make it constitutional had not yet occurred until
the Civil War. He cited the Supreme Court’s precedent in Houston v. Moore and suggested that
the power to raise armies by conscription “may, at a crisis of extreme exigency, be indispensable
to national security.”537 The Civil War was such a crisis.
Cadwalader neither denied the volunteer tradition constitutional conservatives valued so
highly nor did he ignore the limitations of previous militia acts. He understood the militia acts of
1792 and 1795 along with the first militia act of 1861 included the same significant limitationmilitary subjection of a drafted militia man only began once he was mustered into the national
military service and, further, that no department or officer of the United States could compel a
drafted militia man to be mustered into service.538 The 1792 act continued in force up to the Civil
War. It enrolled every free able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five years in the militia of the several states while leaving the drafting and procuring the
attendance of drafted men to the states. Under this system, drafted men could not be coerced into
service and that states and localities necessarily lacked uniform policies for carrying out a
draft.539 Judge Cadwalader admitted that this was precisely because the 1792 and 1795 acts had
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been “framed by men averse to the system of conscription, who never anticipated such a
necessity for its adoption as has unfortunately occurred.”540
The 1862 Militia Act altered the system of seven decades out of necessity. The Militia
Act of July 1862 indicated to Judge Cadwalader that Congress felt the former system was
inadequate to meet the crisis of the Civil War.541 He argued that the Militia Act enabled the
President when states were deficient to make regulations for enrolling the militia and executing
the act. The purposes of the Militia Act of 1862 remained in effect under the Conscription Act
went beyond “mere enrollment” by aiming to provide for a effectual draft.542 To Cadwalader, the
precise purpose of the act of 1862 was to make the system enforceable by giving a power to
compel attendance of draftees, as the term “shall be mustered in” departed from the language of
the militia acts of 1792 and 1795.543 Thus, before the March 1863 Conscription Act, Cadwalader
believed the 1862 Militia Act already established conscription with a right of compelling the
attendance of the men drafted.
Nonetheless, Cadwalader noted that the Conscription Act differed from the Militia Act of
1862 with regards to the relationship between the federal government and state militias. The
Conscription Act created a new and separate system from the militia acts, one run
“independently of the states, a regular national army by conscription.” The Militia Act of 1862
tried to operate alongside the existing militia systems, the Conscription Act was more detailed
than any system which “could have been organized for the militia under the executive
regulations organized by the former act.”544 Given, these two separate and complex systems,
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Cadwalader was asked to address the constitutionality of the new administrative systems set up
under the act. Plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that Congress could not constitutionally delegate to the
President the authority to make regulations on the subjects of the Militia Act of 1862 and even if
he could, the President exceeded it by sub-delegating the power to the Secretary of War.545 They
felt the Militia Act infringed upon separations of power.
Cadwalader understood that the details of a compulsory draft were necessarily not
simple. He answer that compliance with such requirements by state governors, in any form was
lawful and proper.546 The commands of the President, made through the War Department, were
rightfully carried out through state governors—the most proper officials to execute them.547
Judge Cadwalader also found the President had the power to prescribe administrative regulations
and to exercise power “through the proper executive organ of the government,” the War
Department.548 The Secretary of War was the proper officer for organizing the draft and making
its regulations public.549 Regulations were necessary to craft a national compulsory draft system,
which Judge Cadwalader again noted there was “no practical experience of” in American
constitutional tradition. Congress could not constitutionally delegate to the President legislative
powers, but it could in conferring constitutional powers exercisable by the President prescribe or
omit special rules or specially authorize the President to make rules. If Congress did not, the
President had “authority inherent” to make regulations necessarily incidental to their exercise
and could choose between legitimate means. Cadwalader’s analysis was a clear victory for the
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government in McCall’s Case. Yet, in dicta, he undercut the victory by seemingly opening the
door for state habeas jurisdiction in cases arising under the Conscription Act.
Cadwalader ended his opinion by noting that the “authority of courts of the United States
to issue writs” was more “limited than that of the state courts” and thus he was not “in the habit
of granting the writ in any case without sufficient reason to believe that it may be a case proper
for the exercise of the jurisdiction.”550 Further, “even where the principal inquiry” was whether
military service as due to the United States, “important questions more proper for decision by a
state court” than by a United States could “may sometimes arise, either incidentally or
consequentially.”551 Given that the government’s preference for litigating the constitutionality of
war measures was in the federal courts in part because the administration had doubts about state
habeas jurisdiction, it is notable that Cadwalader seems to have been open to the notion that
Pennsylvania’s state courts may have been a proper venue. Still, when Cadwalader considered
challenges to the Conscription Act directly in the fall, he was silent on the jurisdictional problem.
After the tumultuous events of the summer and rising discontent over the draft,
Cadwalader saw a string of cases in September which moved passed the 1862 Militia Act and
directly challenged the Conscription Act and its Boards of Enrollment. Cadwalader heard the
combined cases of Antrim, Stingle, and Robinson, leading to a review of the whole act over the
individual immediate questions. Both Antrim’s Case and In Re Stingle saw Cadwalader again
balance a close reading of the constitutional arguments against conscription with general support
for the government’s war effort.552 The question, thus, was whether the board’s disallowance of a
claim for exemption precluded judicial inquiry into the existence of the right to appeal and
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whether the decisions of military tribunals were conclusive and final. Cadwalader first placed
limitations upon the Boards of Enrollment in In Re Stingle days before Antrim. Like Antrim,
Stingle was a small victory for constitutional conservatives because it ensured the courts would
maintain a role in reviewing decisions of the Boards of Enrollment.553 Frederick Stingle alleged
he was married and between 35 and 45 years old but was not given an exemption by the board
after they heard his allegations. Unsatisfied with his evidence, the Board refused to grant his
claim of exemption. On a writ of habeas corpus, Cadwalader accepted Stingle’s argument that
Congress did not contemplate in passing the Conscription Act that decisions of the Board of
Enrollment would be final upon claims for exemption since no person over 35 years old and
married could be legally drafted.554 Determining the truth of Stingle’s allegation was a proper
subject for inquiry and whether the subsequent refusal of the Board nor the primary mistake of
drafting him should be prejudicial.555
Cadwalader heard arguments on whether the courts had a right to review whatever
decisions might be made by the Board of Enrollment and whether the Conscription Act was
constitutional.556 The government contended that the Conscription Act “created soldiers of the
United States” of all “abled-bodied citizens” between twenty and forty-five and that the Board of
Enrollment was a military court which could not be reviewed on habeas corpus by a civil
tribunal.557 The September argument foreshadowed arguments the government would later turn
to in the Kneedler case. United States Special Counsel John C. Knox, alongside Assistant United
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States Attorney Joseph Hubley Ashton and Philadelphia District Attorney George Alexander
Coffey, appeared for the Government.558 They argued Article I, Section VIII gave Congress
power to “raise and support armies,” to call forth the militia to suppress insurrection, to organize
the militia in service of the United States, and paired with the “necessary and proper clause,”
gave the federal government “ample power to require military services of the people.” The
judiciary had “no power” to control the exercise of discretion, including whether armies were
raised by volunteerism or compelling certain clauses of persons.559
Further, exemption of service, Knox argued, was out of grace and not a right. The Board
of Enrollment held general jurisdiction over any persons drafted under the Conscription Act and
any decision on a claim for exemption was final. Young Democratic lawyer Charles Buckwalter,
counsel for Stingle, contended the court need only to decide the meaning of Section IX of the act
and not the constitutionality of “obtaining the army” by conscription.560 Enrollment had to occur
before the draft or impressment. The entire national forces as defined were not to be called out at
once.561 Courts could review the decisions of the board because they needed to ascertain whether
citizens came under the provision of the law. Congress could not have been granted
constitutionally the exercise of “arbitrary control to an unlimited degree” over citizens through
the boards. Co-counsel George Wharton argued that the Board of Enrollment could not be treated
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as a coordinate branch of inferior judicial body, since its officers were not appointed under
Article II requirements.562
Cadwalader determined that the truth of Stingle’s allegation was a proper subject for
inquiry and neither the subsequent refusal of the board nor the primary mistake of drafting him
should be prejudicial.563 The Stingle decision was likely among the cases which upset the
administration giving that Lincoln held his cabinet meeting over the Pennsylvania courts days
later. The Philadelphia Press reported an “immense increase to the habeas corpus business of the
court” in two days, with some already heard and disposed of. Cadwalader admitted frankly that
the boards were entrusted with a “most delicate duty” and perhaps decisions were “more readily
determined by them than by a court.” Yet, it questions of law were raised, he would rule on them
before referring the decision back to the board and if they refuse to discharge a party, under
McCall’s Case, parties were entitled to a discharge.564
Cadwalader was not done frustrating the Lincoln administration. Days later, in his Antrim
opinion, he ultimately upheld the power to conscript, but reserved a role for judges in reviewing
the decisions of the Boards of Enrollment. He did not explicitly argue the role was exclusive to
the federal courts. Notably, Supreme Court Justice Robert Grier, sitting with Cadwalader on the
Eastern District, endorsed the decision.565 In Antrim, the case arose out of a habeas petition from
a citizen duly drafted and notified who asked for an exemption before the Board of Enrollment.
Despite Antrim’s status as the only son of a widow, an exemption was not given. The question
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before the court was whether acts of “mere submission to military authority, where obedience
would have been compellable,” and the temporary acquiescence to their control was a waiver of
the right to appeal. Cadwalader wished to avoid or prevent “unnecessary judicial interference
with consummated military organizations embracing such parties” if drafted men had had fair
opportunity after disallowance of their claims of exemption to obtain elsewhere judicial
investigation of their alleged rights.566
The Conscription Act had, as Cadwalader noted, provided for the organization of a
national military force by enrollment, draft, and impressment.567 The act had to be interpreted so
that “usurpation of power, beyond the legislative authority conferred by the Constitution may not
be unnecessarily imputed to Congress.”568 Cadwalader noted that the case was argued before
him on the basis of the text of the Constitution and the statute and not “references to
Congressional debates, or to debates of those who drafted the Constitution, or of those who
proposed or discussed its early amendment.”569 He felt arguments concerned with original intent
were at best sometimes was “not improper” and of “legal assistance” in explaining the words
being interpreted, but lately, had been used too frequently. The proper inquiry was “not what
may, from extrinsic sources, appear to have been intended by the men whose words are in
question, but what was the legal meaning and application of the words when used.”570 When the
meaning of a word was doubtful or had changed, the language of such discussions sometimes
served, “in some degree, the purpose of a glossary.”571 Cadwalader different from other
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constitutional conservatives, as he preferred to focus solely on strict construction of the text as
opposed to constitutional conservatives who preferred to employ historic originalism.
Looking at federal power to pass the Conscription Act generally, Cadwalader agreed with
constitutional conservatives that the powers given by the Constitution to raise and support armies
were distinct from the powers conferred as to the militia of the respective states. As Cadwalader
recognized in McCall’s Case, the national army had always been raised by voluntary enlistment
and until the 1862 Militia Act, the penalty for not serving when drafted into the state militia to be
called out into the service of the United States was merely pecuniary.572 The 1862 Militia Act
first authorized impressment into military service of the United States of citizens drafted from
state militias. For Cadwalader, as he argued in McCall’s Case, Supreme Court precedent which
established the constitutional basis for the Militia Act of 1795 supported the constitutionality of
the Militia Act of 1862. No absolute authority was given by military authority over citizens not
yet in service. Jurisdiction of military law was limited to those lawfully drafted and whom
already owed military service. There was previously no question to be opened by a writ of
habeas corpus over liability to serve or the lawfulness of drafting. The Conscription Act created
a question of whether a military commission could decide the original question of liability to
serve with absolute authority bypassing the review of state or federal court review.
The power to create provisions for the preparatory enrollment and those for the draft were
separate and distinct. Cadwalader reasoned that there must be some limit on the federal power to
conscript. As he noted, the “most unlimited system of mere enrollment could not be
constitutionally objectionable” but a system of drafting “might be arbitrary and latitudinarian to
such an extent as to encroach upon constitutional rights.”573 While the federal power to conscript
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itself did not cause constitutional problems for Cadwalader, the system created to enforce it still
could. He did not entirely deny constitutional conservative views of constitutional history.
Indeed, he recognized the framers’ concerns and jealousy over the power to raise armies but felt
that worry manifested itself only through the fixed limitation on appropriation of money for the
raising of armies to two years. The power to enact the Conscription Act came exclusively from
the power to raise armies. Yet, Cadwalader recognized an upward limit on federal power. The
“necessary and proper” clause did not allow for the enlargement of the power to raise armies, as
the incidental authority of the clause could not be extended beyond the “limits of the principal
power.”574 Otherwise, Cadwalader worried as other constitutional conservatives did that a
government “previously republican” with armies raised under a draft and impressment
“administered without any restrictions” would force male citizens to serve at the “will of the
chief Executive” without any limitation of the time of service, thereby establishing a military
government.575 However, these observations about the constitutional limitations on implied
powers did not cause Cadwalader to declare the Conscription Act unconstitutional. Rather, he
found that the “general provisions of the act (are) not unconstitutional.”576 Cadwalader carefully
considered the arguments before him, but while he did not agree that national conscription was
unconstitutional, he granted a limited constitutional endorsement.
Like Judge Woodward’s opinion in the early February case of Clark v. Martin, the
duration of the war was a key question. 577 The Conscription Act limited enrollments to three
years and the exigencies of the ongoing war. Without such a time limitation, Cadwalader
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indicated the act would be arbitrary and thus unconstitutional. His skepticism suggested ways the
Conscription Act could be unconstitutionally executed. The power to conscript was again only
narrowly upheld. Cadwalader similarly narrowed the powers of the Boards of Enrollment. The
terms of final review by the board did not apply to cases of those “improperly draft[ed]” because
it depended neither on the question of disability or one of the exemptions specifically granted by
the act. The sister cases of Stingle and Robinson did “not affect the present question,” but did
also circumscribe the Conscription Act “within ascertained limits.”578 Collectively, these three
cases prescribed limitations on the Boards of Enrollment in order to ensure the act was not
carried out by unconstitutional means.
As a constitutional conservative, Cadwalader was concerned with upholding strict
separation of powers. Therefore, he addressed what he called “executive instructions and
regulations.” He wrote that executive mandates, when authorized, “promoted various useful
purposes” such as uniformity in the course and modes of enforcing the act. Instructions issued
under the act’s authorization for “enrolling and drafting” were not less binding than if “they had
been contained in the act.”579 However, instructions without any warrant attempting to regulate
the board’s exercise of duties had no binding effect. This applied to instructions regulating the
“practical course of proceeding of the board” and any attempt to furnish rules for “its decision
upon questions of exemption.”580 It was up to the independent boards themselves to reasonably
adopt any such rules of procedure and to, with proper notice, apply them to parties before them.
The Boards of Enrollment were meant to be treated like ordinary courts martial.581 The
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constitutional execution of the act and the properness of the delegation by Congress hinged on
avoiding arbitrary action. The independence given to the boards in their jurisdiction did not
allow them to exceed the limitations of being a “mere military commission.”582 The powers
conferred on the board could only be exercised as if Congress had conferred them upon any
officer of the army.
For Cadwalader, the requirements of Section XIV of the Conscription Act that any claims
of exemption be made before the local military commission or board be “reasonable and
convenient” made claims merely permissible and not a matter of right.583 However, the court
was asked whether the act properly treated the decision of the commission or board to be a final
“precluded inquiry here as to his right which was in question before the board.” Like courts
martial, the board’s independence of executive supervision meant independence of revision with
regards to proceedings. Thus, any findings and sentences did not ordinarily take effect even
provisionally until revision. The meaning of the word “final” was clear to Cadwalader. He had
no doubts that decisions by the boards were made final and “yet not conclusive elsewhere as to
the right was in question.”584 If the word “final” was not circumscribed as such, it would have
made the act unconstitutional. Further, even if exemption from military service was specified in
the act, it did not make exception a right. Exemption from the draft was a privilege and not a
right granted by the Constitution. Moreover, rights granted by exception from a general
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enactment of Congress could not affect the question of constitutional power. Thus, if the power
of “absolute selection” was directly conferred upon commissioners or a commissioner, the
question would only be as to the conditions imposed not the power itself. Thus, the power to
conscript did not appear to pose “constitutional difficulty.”585
Cadwalader’s careful examination and skepticism was geared towards avoiding any
unconstitutional execution of the act while not denying the power of conscription itself.
Privileges or immunities enjoyed through legislative action still had to be administered
constitutionally and regulated judicially.586 As armies could be constitutionally raised by
conscription, the power of selection was executive and not judicial. Significantly, Congress
could not constitutionally delegate its own powers to legislate, but it could confer executive and
judicial powers upon those constitutionally qualified to exercise them.
Only officers nominated to the Senate and appointed with their consent were qualified, as
otherwise they were inferior officers under Article II. Cadwalader looked to uphold
constitutional limits on delegation of powers and narrowly uphold the act. According to the
doctrine of separation of powers, the powers of such executive officers had to be limited. Inferior
courts, which could be established by Congress, were not in the class of inferior officers
appointed without the Senate’s consent. Therefore, “independent judicial powers could not be
vested by Congress in such a commission as the Board of Enrollment unless it regarded as a
tribunal simply military.”587 Thus, jurisdiction only existed over anyone who was already under
military rule. In other words, while decisions could be final for purposes of military jurisdiction,
they could not by act of Congress make such decisions as to the “status of a citizen final’ as to
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preclude any judicial cognizance elsewhere.588 Again, had Congress intended to do so, the act
would be unconstitutional. Such a law would “confer a judicial power not warranted by the
Constitution” and Congress could not give such military commissions or likewise court-martials
any jurisdiction over persons not in military service or amenable to the military jurisdiction.
Thus, Cadwalader maintained the line between military and civilian justice which constitutional
conservatives were deeply concerned with-the need to maintain the opportunity for citizens to
challenge their status as enrollees in civil court.589 Relatedly, Congress could not confer upon
any special tribunals the power of conclusive adjudication, even to cases within its own
explicitly granted jurisdiction. Cadwalader’s limitation on the expansion of the federal
government’s power was significant, since Lincoln and his cabinet appeared to view his decision
negatively.
Papers across the country reported Cadwalader’s decision on the 10th as being the first
court to uphold the Conscription Act.590 The Philadelphia Press reported an “immense increase
to the habeas corpus business of the court” in two days, with some already heard and disposed
of. Cadwalader “frankly admitted” the boards were entrusted with a “most delicate duty” and
perhaps decisions were “more readily determined by them than by a court.” Yet, if questions of
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law were raised, he would rule on them before referring the decision back to the board and if the
board refuse to discharge a party, under McCall’s Case, parties were entitled to a discharge.591
If the Lincoln Administration was furious with Cadwalader, Republicans were ready to
embrace Cadwalader’s decision by ignoring its finer points. His constitutional analysis in the
cases of McCall’s, Antrim and Stingle received the endorsement of the likes of Sidney George
Fisher, who had previously considered him a southern sympathizer. Fisher considered
Cadwalader’s decision to uphold the Conscription Act alongside Lincoln’s September
suspension of habeas corpus to have “weight with his party” and “take from the demagogues
two of their chief topics of declamation and agitation.” Here, Fisher placed the conduct of
Cadwalader against Judge Woodward, confusingly arguing that though Cadwalader was an
“eager partisan,” he was also withdrawn from “active or ostensible participation in politics,”
while Woodward could not show the same “wisdom of the principle of making judiciary
independent.”592 Similarly, the Philadelphia Press reacted to the decision by saying Cadwalader
had “let down” the Copperheads, as the unconstitutionality of the Conscription Act was one of
the major planks of their platform and the Lancaster Examiner suggested that here, a Democratic
judge had “utterly demolished” what Judge Woodward’s friends had so zealously labored to
disseminate. Ignoring the nuances of his narrow opinion, they declared no lawyer or citizen who
read Cadwalader’s judgment could have a “moment’s doubt” about the entire constitutionality of
the law.593 Significantly, the Press argued that Cadwalader’s decision frustrated and defeated the
movement on the part of certain Democratic lawyers in Philadelphia and New York to secure
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decisions “from certain state courts adversely to the constitutionality of the act,” since it was
impossible for any lawyer or judge to answer Cadwalader’s opinion and no state court could
question a federal tribunal with a different opinion.
On September 9th, the same day Cadwalader released his Antrim opinion, Judge John
Read of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote to Cadwalader to say that he agreed with him
“entirely as to the constitutionality of the so-called conscription law” and that he would be glad
to have a “accurate copy” of Cadwalader’s opinion.594 Read noted in the same letter that he had
been informed by counsel that the same question would be brought before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in two weeks.595 The federal courts had, as hoped by the administration, upheld
the constitutionality of Congress’s power to conscription under the power to “raise armies,” but
Cadwalader had also written a searching inquiry of the act’s structure. If the act could be
challenged not facially, but as-applied or by individual challenge to decisions of the boards, the
federal courts could still be consumed with actions to slow the draft. Constitutional challenges in
Pennsylvania federal courts had not be a total defeat or disaster for constitutional conservatives.
The door to individual challenges remained opened, as Cadwalader maintained a role for the
judiciary for review by writ of habeas corpus without answering whether it was exclusive to the
federal courts. Yet, the major constitutional argument against conscription had been dismissed.
The battle now moved to Pennsylvania’s state courts. It would not be long, as Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court would hear argument on September 23rd to its own case challenging the
constitutionality of the act.
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CHAPTER V: THE HIGH WATERMARK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES: KNEEDLER
V. LANE

In the summer of 1863, Pennsylvania State Supreme Court Justice George Woodward
was in the middle of his campaign for governor and seemed aware he would soon have to decide
on the Conscription Act’s fate. Not only were constitutional conservatives publicly interested in
a judicial solution, but he was asked directly about a potential legal challenge by former
President James Buchanan. On July 25th, six days before that case was filed before Woodward,
he received a letter from Buchanan concerning the constitutionality of the Conscription Act.596
Buchanan thought that while the law was “unwise and unjust,” it was not unconstitutional.597
Although he expected Justice Woodward would rule conscription unconstitutional, he felt the
court should uphold the law.598 By the time Woodward responded to Buchanan in September,
the Kneedler case was before him and he had issued orders for the full court to hear argument.
Woodward had considered “with great respect” Buchanan’s suggestions as to the
constitutionality of the Conscription Act.599 However, because the question was pending in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Woodward desired to avoid any conclusions on the matter and not
“intimate any until [he] shall have had the benefit of an argument.” All eyes, from Buchanan to
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Lincoln, were on the decision of Woodward and his brethren. Woodward was not about to show
his hand or make any promises he could not keep.
For constitutional conservatives, Kneedler v. Lane was the most significant case during
the Civil War. The three plaintiffs were represented by four prominent Philadelphia Democratic
attorneys who were already invested and involved in the public constitutional debate over
conscription. Throughout the public debate in 1863, constitutional conservatives hoped and
prepared for such an opportunity to win a constitutional battle in the courts. They had reached
the state supreme court with a challenge to the Conscription Act aided by their most finely-tuned
arguments. This was the best opportunity to strike a decisive, constitutional blow against the
Conscription Act. Yet, even with a favorable November decision, there would be no final
judgment nullifying the Conscription Act. The federal government acted decisively to reverse the
decision and avoid any appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Within a matter of months,
constitutional conservatives saw their most important judicial victory completely fall apart once
constitutional nationalist Daniel Agnew replaced Chief Justice Lowrie and the federal
government promptly sought to dissolve the injunctions against the act.
The Kneedler Lawyers:
At the time the Kneedler was filed on July 31, 1863, the three plaintiffs attorneys initially
involved were well-known constitutional conservatives. Charles Ingersoll was a leading
spokesman among Pennsylvania Democrats in 1863 who headed the Central Democratic Club of
Philadelphia. George Mifflin Wharton was his vice president at the Central Democratic Club and
a former United States Attorney General for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.600 George
Biddle was Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar whose distant cousin Charles John Biddle, the
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one-time Congressional representative, was editor-in-chief of the Philadelphia Age and chairman
the Democratic State Central Committee.601 These three prominent Democratic citizens
collectively brought the Kneedler case on behalf of three citizens of Philadelphia.602 By the time
of oral argument in September, Peter McCall, the former Democratic mayor of the city and
secretary of the Philadelphia bar, was also added to the legal team.603 All were marred by
allegations of disloyalty by the Republican press, but Biddle and Wharton were respected
attorneys with good reputations among the local bar and were experienced before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.604
Like the Biddles, the Ingersolls were a distinguished Philadelphia family. Charles’ father
was a prominent Congressional representative and district attorney who infamously attacked the
John Tyler administration during the “public funds” controversy of 1844 and whom supported
conscription in 1814. Charles Ingersoll was a recalcitrant Democrat who first made a name for
himself in August 1862 when Provost Marshal William H. Kern arrested him for disloyal speech.
According to Sidney George Fischer, a public intellectual and Lincoln supporter who married
into the family, Ingersoll was “wild and rabid about secession and the South.”605 In the opinion
of Fisher, Charles was an intransigent man imbued with the “narrowest partisan passions” and
“wholly insensible to argument” and ready to use violence and physical force to carry out his
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views.606 New York republican papers depicted Ingersoll as “very little of a Democrat” or much
of a politician who blossomed as a partisan under Buchanan’s administration and became a
Southern sympathizer under Lincoln’s.607
Despite attacks on his reputation by Republicans, Ingersoll was a leading Democratic
spokesman in Pennsylvania. In that role, his public speeches made clear that he felt that the
executive branch was assuming unconstitutional war powers like conscription, declaring martial
law and suspending habeas.608 He saw the war policies of the Lincoln Administration as
threatening antebellum federalism and state institutions by “cancelling” the compact and
ensuring that the state no longer had an army nor rule by the Constitution.609 As a practicing
attorney, Ingersoll in June 1863 defended a soldier before Judge Cadwalader for the charge of
resisting the draft, arguing that the enrolling was distinct and separate from the draft and that
there could an enrollment without a draft.610 He was also familiar with both Judge Lowrie and
Thompson, as all attended a celebration of Washington’s birthday in February at the Central
Democratic Club.611 Given his role with the Central Democratic Club, Ingersoll was not only
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cordial with Judge Woodward but had given speeches in favor of his candidacy.612 These were
constitutional conservatives and Democrats who were known to each other.
George Washington Biddle held the best reputation as a lawyer among the plaintiffs’
attorneys. By the end of his legal career in the 1880s, he had become Chancellor of the Bar
Association of Philadelphia, reflective of his reputation as being “brilliant” and associated with
“distinction” in running his large private practice.613 Like Wharton and Ingersoll, he had
experience before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court against the government. Biddle, for instance,
represented William Hodgson in the “Jeffersonian” case before Chief Justice Lowrie in February
which dealt with the authority of the President to order district attorneys to seize property
considered to be aiding and abetting the rebellion.614 In his later years, Biddle lectured on
constitutional development under Taney and made clear his own commitment to strict
constructionism. He called Taney, next to Marshall, the “greatest” of the Chief Justices and

612

“Our Nominees,” Erie Observer, June 27, 1863, 2.
See Encyclopedia of Pennsylvania Biography: Illustrated, Volume 13 (Lewis Historical Publishing Co.,
1921), 202 Biddle was one of the “most eminent of Philadelphia lawyers,” with a very large private practice and
some public positions. In the nineteenth century, to most lawyers in Philadelphia, Chancellor of the Bar Association
was the highest professional achievement a lawyer could ever achieve and included the greatest lawyers of the
nineteenth century in Philadelphia law. Robert R. Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer: A History, 1735-1945
(Susquehanna University Press, 1992), 167. When lifelong friend Philadelphia District Judge George Sharswood
introduced Biddle for an 1889 law lecture, he spoke to having the “highest admiration of his qualities as a man, a
citizen, an advocate, and a jurist.” Constitutional History of the United States As Seen in the Development of
American Law: A Course of Lectures Before the Political Science Association of the University Of Michigan (New
York: G.N. Putnam & Sons,, 1889), 16. Sharswood shared a law office with Joseph Ingersoll, Charles’ brother early
in his legal career and had been a student of Charles Jared Ingersoll, whom Sharswood called the “most
distinguished member of the Philadelphia bar in its palmiest days.” He also knew Biddle well enough that they were
friends who attended a political Economy Club together in Philadelphia. Samuel Dickson, “George Sharswood:
Teacher and Friend,” 55 Am. L. Reg.401, 425 (Oct. 1907).
614
“Legal Intelligence,” Philadelphia Press, February 4, 1863, 4. Hodgson, who edited the Jeffersonian in
West Chester, Pennsylvania, was described as “an opinionated and colorful newspaper.” Hodgson had “Copperhead
leanings” who would “rather die” than give the pledge demanded of him by U.S. attorney George A. Coffey. Carl B.
Swisher, The Taney Period: 1836-1864 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 912-13. Even after the Attorney
General told Coffey to drop the case, Hodgson brought suit for trespass before Chief Justice Walter Lowrie. The
case was transferred to the United States Circuit Court by Justice Strong under the March 3 Indemnity Act and put
before Justice Grier. The Philadelphia Press called Reed, Biddle, and Hiester Clymer the “angry trinity” with
“malevolence against the Union” in their certainty the war measures of the Lincoln administration were tyrannical,
arbitrary, and unconstitutional. “Letter from “Occasional’,” Philadelphia Press, April 7, 1863, 2.
613

209

found on a “careful reading” of his opinions that Taney’s opposition to centralization of power.
In his speech, Biddle referred to Taney as the “presiding genius” of the court whose judgments
with rare exception were correct “expositions or the law of the land” known for “sound and
weighty reasoning.”615 Biddle singled out Taney’s opinion in United States v. Morris as showing
his refusal to go beyond the plain meaning of a statute, as the “evident intention of the legislature
ought not to be defeated by a forced and overstrained construction.”616 Biddle praised Taney’s
opinions as characterized by “close adherence” to the language of the Constitution with no
powers construed by him to exist in it “not found in its words.” Taney too was “anxious” to
protect the states in their “full and unfettered exercise” of the powers retained by them.617 Biddle
evidently saw Taney as the embodiment of strict constitutionalism fundamental to the arguments
of constitutional conservatives in 1863. He was a serious, respected lawyer with a commitment
to strict constructionism, but Republicans still suspected he was another southern sympathizer.
George Mifflin Wharton was an “Old Line Whig” Democrat who was involved in cases
against the Lincoln administration going back to the early months of the war. He was one of the
most active members of the bar association and like Biddle, was a respected attorney who had a
long, successful legal practice.618 Wharton served for a year as the United States district attorney
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before returning to private practice in 1861. In June
1861, Wharton joined George H. Williams as council to defend three of the Baltimore rioters
who burned a bridge in April 1861 in the Merryman case before Chief Justice Taney. Merryman
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saw Taney declare Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus unconstitutional.619 That fall, Wharton
defended the rebels involved in the Jeff Davis sequestration case in 1861 before Judge
Cadwalader and Justice Grier in Philadelphia.620 He had also been the defendant’s council in the
case of Cox v. Martin before Justice Woodward in February and for the petitioner in McCall’s
Case before Judge Cadwalader concerning the Militia Act of 1862. Wharton had long been
involved in politics, rising as far as Chairman of the Democratic State Convention in 1859.621 At
a March 1863 Democratic Central Club meeting, Wharton depicted Democrats as the “calm”
party, not the “revolutionary” one, reflecting his constitutional conservative outlook. Yet,
signaling a preference for the old republic, he would rather be a “freeman in a divided territory
than a slave in a united despotism.”622
As prominent Democrats, all of the plaintiffs’ attorneys were politically active within the
party. Weeks before the convention, all but Wharton participated in a mass meeting at
Independence Square to protest the unconstitutional arrest and banishment of Clement
Vallandigham. Resolutions from the mass meetings spoke to the need to restore state authority
by the ballot, “protect state rights” and “rebuke and check federal usurpation.”623 Ingersoll gave
an “elegant dissertation” upon the cheers of the crowd on states’ rights, as the “blessed rights of
the states were our only guarantee of security.”624 The plaintiffs’ lawyers were a mix of respected
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attorneys and more overtly political figures like Ingersoll Yet, all were constitutional
conservatives intimately involved in the Democratic Party and the crafting of arguments in the
public constitutional debate during 1863. By the end of July, they had procured a lawsuit ready
to give their best strike against the Conscription Act.
The Judges
In the nineteenth century, judges and lawyers were often integrally involved in politics,
as the antebellum period saw a “national revolution in judicial politics” when many states
including Pennsylvania and New York adopted judicial elections.625 Political organizations
themselves could and did act as vehicles for constitutional rhetoric and action. Pennsylvania’s
judges, including its Supreme Court, were elected and thus its judges necessarily involved in
politics. The three judges in the Kneedler majority, Walter Lowrie, George Washington
Woodward, and James Thompson, were all Democrats involved to varying degrees in party
politics. They were all likely aware of the public constitutional debate over conscription before
they heard arguments against the Conscription Act through both Democratic newspapers and the
party meetings, they all attended throughout 1863. Woodward stands out from the trio, as he was
frequently confronted with questions about his constitutional views during his campaign for
governor. Woodward often demurred and said little in public, but the process made him keenly
aware of the public interest in the constitutional status of conscription.
In June 1863, Woodward accepted the Democratic nomination for governor of
Pennsylvania as a constitutional conservative candidate with a long history of fidelity to
Jacksonian principles. He was a native of Wayne County who graduated from Geneva Academy
alongside New York Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour. Woodward entered the study of
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law at just 19 in 1828 and became known for his “clear legal and logical mind.”626 He first made
a name for himself in politics with his participation in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Reform
Convention of 1837-38 where he proposed an amendment to disenfranchise immigrants.627
Critics called it his “Know-Nothing” speech, a repeat of the backlash he faced upon his
nomination to the Supreme Court in 1846 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1852.628
Democrats looked to protect Woodward by citing the records of the convention, where
Woodward claimed that he did not propose to exclude foreigners in any way, but rather proposed
inquiring into the expediency of preventing foreigners arriving after 1841 from voting or holding
office.629 In an 1852 letter, Woodward disclaimed responsibility for the resolution and suggested
the speech attributed to him was one he never gave nor ceased to condemn.630 Yet, despite the
embarrassment of the 1837 convention gaffe, to Woodward, the key event of his political career
was undoubtedly his failed nomination to the Supreme Court in the winter of 1845.
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In December 1845, Woodward was nominated to the Supreme Court by President James
Polk due to his strict constructionism. As Polk recorded in his diary, Woodward’s nomination
was supported by Vice President Dallas and Pennsylvania Congressman David Wilmot with
“great confidence” as a “sound, original and consistent Democrat of the strict construction
school” chosen for his judicial philosophy.631 According to Woodward’s biography, Woodward
saw his failure to secure the Supreme Court nomination as a reflection of partisanship and
disloyal Democrats under Simon Cameron in Congress.632 Polk’s diary confirmed that Simon
Cameron and five other Democratic Senators had abandoned Woodward’s nomination in support
of Secretary of State James Buchanan, who supported John M. Read’s nomination instead.633
Vice President Dallas informed Polk that Cameron pushed to reject Woodward even though he
was “eminently qualified, of irreproachable character” and was a “sound republican” in his
constitutional opinions. Cameron’s cohort of Democrats combined with Whigs to reject
Woodward by a 29 to 20 vote in part because Woodward was considered a free trader hostile to
tariffs who was not sufficiently loyal to the caucus.634 Woodward’s nomination may have failed,
but it mattered that Polk selected Woodward for his strict constructionism and restraint as a
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constitutional conservative, as Polk aimed to reject the “legal innovation” and arbitrary decisions
of Marshall and Story in favor of original intent.635
Woodward continued to mark himself as a constitutional conservative going forward.
When nominated by the Democrats to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1852 to replace the
deceased Judge Coultier, he wrote a letter arguing that the Union was a “product of the states”
best preserved by “maintaining the just rights of the states.” Woodward saw the states as
preexisting the Union and as “absolutely free and independent” sovereigns that still existed in
“all the plenitude of their original sovereignty.”636 According to his son, Woodward’s letter
reflected his Jeffersonian Democratic views that were “hostile to the whole theory of
centralization” and in favor of maintaining the reserved rights of the states. Thus, by the time
Woodward took his seat on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, his commitment to Jacksonian
constitutional conservatism was firm.
During the gubernatorial campaign in 1863, Democratic newspapers would endorse
Woodward’s candidacy on similar lines. J.S. Sanders’ Berwick Gazette noted that even the
“abolition papers” of Philadelphia had to speak well of Woodward, with the Bulletin calling him
an “able lawyer” and the Inquirer arguing the Democratic State Convention showed “good
judgment” in selecting Woodward for the ticket, who held “unimpeachable character” and was
an “able jurist and patriotic gentlemen.”637 Pennsylvania Democratic State Chairman Charles
Biddle’s The Age called Woodward a Democrat without a blemish on his political record who
had “never wavered in his devotion to the great doctrine of state rights and strict constitutional
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construction.” Similarly, the Reading Democrat called him a “unwavering Democrat of the
Constitutional Union school” and the Lewisburg Argus claimed no man in the state was more
qualified and “deep rooted and unyielding fidelity to the Constitution.”638 Numerous Democratic
papers portrayed Woodward as a humble candidate who had not sought the nomination. Going
into the convention in June, Clymer, Witte, George Sanderson and Major General William
Franklin were considered the principal candidates.639 Once made the party’s nominee, the Junitia
Democrat urged all favorable to state rights and constitutional liberty over despotism and
tyranny to rally around Lowrie and Woodward.640 There was little doubt whom Democrats saw
as the most trustworthy strict construction constitutional conservative on the court. Privately and
publicly, Woodward made that commitment clear.
In a letter to Lewis S. Coryell weeks before accepting the nomination, Woodward
commented that the Civil War represented a threat to state rights by replacing a government of
“constitution loving citizens whose hearts were large enough to embrace the whole country” with
one that showed “centralized despotism would be the death of popular liberty.”641 The framers
were the “constitution loving citizens” whose “heads were clear enough to see that a centralized
despotism would be the death of popular liberty.”642 If nominated, Woodward, promised he
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would “stand by the few state rights that are left” and do his best to “administer the Constitution
and laws as they are written.”643 To him, the Democratic nominee could not surrender states’
rights to any usurper.”644 Democrats, Woodward believed, should be defined by constitutional
conservatism and strong defense of antebellum federalism.
Woodward stood out as a constitutional conservative not only in his political campaign
for governor, but through his commitment to strict construction in his jurisprudence on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Woodward’s most notable prior decision during the Civil
War was the 1862 case of Chase v. Miller.645 Known as the “soldiers’ vote” case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision required soldiers to vote in their own precincts, finding
judges could not alter this constitutional language.646 Democrats in Luzerne County, after losing
several officers due to the soldier vote, began to investigate stories of fraud and choose the party
candidate for district attorney, Ezra Chase, to test the constitutionality of the law with George
Wharton representing him.647 Democrats defended Woodward’s decision during the 1863
campaign as having the supporting of Republican judges Allison, Strong, and Read.648 More
important was how Woodward’s decision reflected his consistent judicial approach. In Chase,
Woodward wrote that he believed constitutions, above other documents, needed to be “read as
they are written” and “judicial glosses and refinements are misplaced when laid upon them”
since a construction “that opposes itself to both the letter and the spirit of the instrument” harmed
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both the fundamental political right of voting and acted against the fidelity of the oath to the
constitution.649 Indicative of his constitutional conservative strict constructionism, Woodward
commonly referred to the “natural reading” of instruments often in his opinions throughout the
1863 term. For instance, in an estate law case, Directors of the Poor v. Royer, Woodward’s
opinion referred to both following the “strict application of legal principles” and “well-defined
principles of law” in the case and called the result one of “substantial justice” in not forcing the
directors to pay for the land again.650 More significantly, in a series of cases early in the term
dealing with the “Stay Law” of 1861, Woodward’s strict constructionism was consistent in cases
arising out of the war.
In the early 1863 case of Clark v. Martin, the defendant soldier sought such relief under
Pennsylvania law and the “Stay Law,” claiming that no civil process could be issued or enforced
against him because he was still “in the service” of the United States.651 Woodward understood
that the constitutionality of the stay law of 1861 was “supported solely on the ground that the
utmost stay it could give to the defendants was for a period of time that was definite and
reasonable.”652 He was unwilling to apply the 1861 law to the case because according to settled
doctrine, the legislature did not the constitutional power to suspend the civil remedies of a citizen
for an unascertained and uncertain period.653 In a related case, Breitenbach v. Buch, Woodward
declared the “Stay Law” constitutional under the premise that stay laws, exemption laws and
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limitation laws were ordinarily constitutional and that under Pennsylvania precedent, states could
modify the remedy but not impair obligations of contracts.654 Any law was constitutional which
gave a stay for a time that was “definite and not unreasonable, but unconstitutional if the stay be
for an indefinite time, or for a time that is unreasonable, though definite.”655 The effect of the
war on constitutional interpretation was not absolute for Woodward. The constitutional
prohibition on the obligation of contracts remained in effect. Democratic supporters of
Woodward during his campaign saw Clark as evidence of his independence and judicial ability,
as he protected the property of soldiers during their terms of service against “loyal” creditors.656
In a sister ruling in February, Coxe’s Ex’r v. Martin, Woodward expressed a “strong
desire” to give all soldiers the benefit of the stay law, but blamed Congress for “most unwisely”
making the enlistment of some soldiers definite and others indefinite, “establishing thereby an
invidious and embarrassing distinction” and making it thus “impossible to apply the act of 1861
alike to both classes.”657 Woodward could not presume the Court would sustain a legislative
suspension of civil remedies for a period “ so indefinite as during the war.” The exigencies of
war could not freely and arbitrarily supersede the Constitution. Thus, Woodward ended his brief
opinion by noting that the Civil War did not “suspend the constitutional rights of the citizen any
more than those other calamities would do.”658 Yet, as he showed in Breitenbach, Woodward did
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not wish his constitutional commitment to be confused for opposition to the war—so long as that
war was to uphold the Union and the Constitution as it was. He felt no citizen could be “blamed
for volunteering” based on an appeal as “strong as his love of country” and there was nothing
unreasonable about battling for “supremacy of the Constitution and the integrity of the
Union.”659 Yet if constitutional conservatives saw Woodward as a committed strict
constructionist based on his record, Republicans were thoroughly unimpressed. They did not see
a serious legal actor committed to a core judicial philosophy, but a disloyal political schemer.
Yet, they missed what Woodward’s own behavior indicated. He tried to both maintain his
position on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court while running for governor, an indication he valued
his position as a judge more than any political position.660
Republican newspapers spent the 1863 campaign tarnishing Woodward’s reputation by
reminding voters of his apparent sympathetic feelings towards the Confederacy. They reminded
readers of Woodward’s public and private comments in late 1860 supporting slavery and
blaming the north for secession.661 Republicans believed Woodward had not changed. Reverend
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Edward Strong told the Philadelphia Inquirer that Woodward denounced in “very strong and
decided terms” the unconstitutional abolition war.662 Worse, George W. Hart claimed that
Woodward never said “one word of sympathy” for the government or those sacrificing “their
lives for its support,” a sentiment Hart found shocking from a member of the high judiciary of
the state.663 Others agreed that Woodward showed sentiments towards secession both in private
and in public speeches. Lemuel Todd, a Republican representative and major in the Pennsylvania
Reserves, placed Woodward alongside the likes of the “traitor Vallandigham” and other disloyal
Democrats like Charles Ingersoll. Todd testified that Woodward, in conversation with friend and
War Democrat Congressman Hendrick B. Wright, apparently argued for the constitutionality of
secession while denying the “power and authority of the general government to coerce a state
into obedience to its obligations under the Constitution.”664 Woodward largely avoided public
comments in response to these rumors, but he did write to Rufus E. Shapley, the Chairman of the
Democratic Standing Committee of Cumberland County, that there was “not a word of truth in
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the story” and that he was “SO FAR FROM EVER AVOWING BELIEF IN SECESSION” that
was always in favor of suppressing the rebellion, and that his life had been spent upholding the
Constitution as “the framers framed it.”665 Woodward defended himself as a member of the loyal
opposition, a committed constitutional conservative who never embraced secession.
Chief Justice Lowrie was also running for reelection of his judicial seat in 1863, but his
race was far less politically salient. As modest as Woodward appeared to be on the political
stage, Lowrie was practically invisible. Lowrie had been on the Court for twelve years, with his
first term ending in December.666 He was remembered by his colleagues on the bench and at
Western University of Pennsylvania, where he taught for eight years before his Supreme Court
election, for his thorough historical and philosophical consideration of complicated questions.
Notably, he was also known for avoiding active participation in politics, devoting himself to the
law and literary pursuits, not for inciting crowds with fiery speeches.667
Instead, Lowrie endeared himself to constitutional conservatives with his decisionmaking on the bench.668 He was praised in February 1863 for his jury charge given in the
Jeffersonian free speech case. In the case, the jury ruled in favor of the editor of a Democratic
newspaper who had had his printing press confiscated by a United States Marshal under the First
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Confiscation Act in 1861.669 The case was brought by prominent Philadelphia Democrats
William B. Reed and George W. Biddle.670 During the Congressional debates, Representative
Charles J. Biddle quoted Lowrie’s argument that the acts of the President and his subordinate
provost marshals were “without right unless they are authorized by some article of the
Constitution or laws made under it and consistent with it…he can make no law that can invest
him or his subordinates with new authority.”671 The Johnstown Democrat saw it as proof
Lowrie’s ability to soar above the “prejudices of the hour” and that by his opinion, the
Constitution remained strong and “no President could thrust it aside.”672 As Henry Ward’s
Harrisburg Daily Patriot and Union stated after his “unexpected” unanimous June nomination,
Lowrie was nominated by acclamation, powerful evidence they said of the esteem with which he
was held, in part due to the sound principles laid down in the Jeffersonian case.673 Constitutional
conservatives continued to praise Lowrie’s decision throughout the summer.674
Besides this Jeffersonian case, Lowrie’s most significant pre-Kneedler case came mere
weeks before the Kneedler oral argument in September. In Commonwealth v. Wright, Lowrie
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upheld the authority of state courts to maintain challenges to federal law by writ of habeas
corpus. Pennsylvania judges were split on the question, with Judge Linn of the Eastern District
ruling Ableman precluded state court jurisdiction while Schuylkill County Judge James Ryon
found Ableman did not affect their ability to hear habeas cases. 675 Lowrie followed Ryon and
concluded that Ableman was a narrow decision which did not affect the general jurisdiction of
state courts to review the imprisonment of state citizens by federal officers.676
Lowrie cautioned that state judges in “deciding upon a federal law, ought to be extremely
watchful that no state or local opinions, prejudices, or excitements should so influence his
judgment as to cause him to misinterpret or misapply a federal law.”677 To him, Pennsylvania
history and jurisprudence weighed against the denial of state court jurisdiction, particularly for
reviewing enlistments and arrests by federal marshals. Lowrie had no doubt that the state court
records in Pittsburgh would show hundreds of such cases, including two tried by him.678 The
Supreme Court retained a right of review to ensure state judges did not engage in arbitrary
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decision-making. Yet, he felt the government’s argument was evidence of distrust of the state
courts while under the pressure of civil war.679 Significantly, Lowrie handed down his decision
in Wright knowing Kneedler would soon be argued and decided. Wright made it possible for the
court to make a binding decision regarding the special injunction in Kneedler as it held state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction to discharge persons restrained by federal authority under the
Conscription Act.
Lowrie’s race for reelection drew nothing like the level of partisan invective that George
Woodward’s run for Governor did, but he was still accused of disloyalty by the Republican
press. Republican papers, for instance, ran stories that Lowrie had refused to feed or give money
to two soldiers on July 4th, ordering them to leave because he would “prefer giving bread to
rebel, rather than Union soldiers.”680 Republicans painted Lowrie’s position as a judge
unimportant, as he appeared to them first and foremost as a politician and southern sympathizer
hostile to the measures adopted by the Government.681
Come October, both Woodward and Lowrie found themselves on the losing end of their
respective their political contests. Woodward lost by a margin of 15,000 votes, with Daniel
Agnew winning Lowrie’s seat by a “smaller majority.”682 When Woodward narrowly lost the
race with Curtin in October, he was reported to say that he would not allow the defeat to “prey
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upon his health or spirit” and felt he was “better satisfied to remain upon the Supreme Bench,”
hoping the “great principles of which he accounted himself but the representative, might
triumph.”683 Yet, Woodward also dejected enough over the election that he prepared to move
back home from Philadelphia to Wilkes-Barre and left his church for their pro-administration
stance.684 Republicans even theorized in August that Woodward not only wished to stay on the
Court, but wished to do so by leaving the gubernatorial campaign he was “heartily sick” of.685
Whether or not their hearts were in politics, the races both exposed Lowrie’s and Woodward’s
constitutional bonafides to constitutional conservatives while opening them to attack by
Republican critics as disloyal pro-Southern Democrats. The public constitutional debate
influenced political campaigns like the 1863 Pennsylvania gubernatorial contest, which treated
constitutional positions as politically germane. But battles were fought more frequently in the
press, where Democratic and Republican newspapers could inculcate readers to the significance
and righteousness of their constitutional arguments.
The Lawsuit
On July 30th, 1863, William Francis Nickels, a twenty-four-year-old resident of the third
ward of Philadelphia submitted a bill against the local provost marshal William E. Lehman and
members of the Board of Enrollment Charles Murphy, H.H. Marselis and Ebenezer Scanlan. He
alleged his rights had been violated and his personal liberty was about to “be invaded by the said
defendants under pretense of executing the laws of the United States.”686 The alleged injury was
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the draft notice he received from the Board of Enrollment. Nickels had received notice from the
board not from said military authorities that he had been drafted, as he waited in “daily
expectation” of receiving said notice of being required immediately to report for duty “on pain of
being regarded as a deserter from military service and of punishment by death for desertion
under the articles of war.” Bills simultaneously filed by Henry Kneedler and Francis B. Smith
attested to the same arguments.687 The bills were submitted to the Judges of the Supreme Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sitting in equity and done explicitly to test the
constitutionality of the Conscription Act.688 They asked for a special injunction to cover any
citizens of the Commonwealth. Their arguments followed the arguments made by constitutional
conservatives in the public constitutional debates, centering on questions of federalism foremost,
along with separation of powers and personal liberties concerns.
The plaintiffs principally focused on the core federalism-based arguments of
constitutional conservatives. They first had to establish that they were in fact drafted to show
injury. For instance, Nickels argued that he was drafted into military service under the
Conscription Act “without his consent and contrary to his will in derogation of the reserved
rights of the state and of the liberties and rights of the citizens thereof and that the same is
unconstitutional and void” as the “federal government had no power to enact such a law.”689 The
plaintiffs reasoned that although the act was titled “An Act for Enrolling and Calling out the
national forces” and claimed its authority from Congress’ Article I powers, the authority
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exercised was “not in fact derivable from the powers by the Constitution given to Congress over
the militia of the States.” Following the emphasis on constitutional tradition by other
constitutional conservatives, they maintained that the Conscription Act was contrary to the
manner of calling forth the militia “ever since the foundation of the Government” as shown by
the Militia Acts of 1792, 1795, 1812, and 1862. Combined with the “judgments of the Courts of
the United states and of the several states and the opinions of eminent judicial characters” in
Congress, all united in the conclusion that the federal government held a “qualified and restricted
power over the militia.” This restricted federal power left with the states and the people thereof
all authority not so parted with in the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution gave Congress “no
power over the militia” as attempted by the Conscription Act.690
Plaintiffs argued that antebellum federalism limited Congress’s power to “raise and
support armies.” The attempted use of this power under the Conscription Act was “inconsistent”
with not only the meaning of the Constitution and constitutional tradition but the “communal
principles of liberty” in a free country.691 The power to raise armies was limited to free male
citizens and was similar to that to collect taxes or regulate commerce or provide for the calling
forth of the militia. The power could not be exercised in a manner “which does not harmonize
with the whole” of the Constitution’s structure. Thus, the plaintiffs found the Conscription Act
was neither within the power to raise armies nor within the power to call forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union and suppress insurrection.692
The plaintiffs otherwise attacked the Conscription Act for its infraction upon separation
of powers, its embrace of arbitrary power in the hands of federal officials, and its essential
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unfairness. Their bill emphasized the breadth of the act which covered all male citizens ages
twenty to forty-five including immigrants who had taken an oath to become citizens as part of
the national forces of the United States “liable to perform compulsory military duty when thereto
designated in the manner prescribed by the said act.” The plaintiffs’ complained that the act
divided the United States into military districts with a provost marshal appointed by the President
and a Board on Enrollment.693 Thus, included the plaintiffs’ interrogatories or questions before
the court was whether they were in fact enrolled by the Board of Enrollment for military
services.
The plaintiffs stipulated that the act of the Board of Enrollment had already begun to
enroll and report to the board on July 20th many if not all of the persons of the sub-district
subject to compulsory military service and plaintiffs believed they had been drafted.694 Notice
itself of being drafted put citizens on the footing of enlisted soldiers in the United States army
subject to the articles of war. Further, the plaintiffs suggested that enrollment officers were
essentially granted arbitrary power, such that citizens were “universally concerned” with the
accuracy of the lists prepared for the draft and “above all in its fullness and completeness but on
the contrary every precaution is omitted against carefulness or willful misconduct of the
enrolling officers.”695
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The Kneedler plaintiffs were concerned with arbitrary enforcement and unlimited
administrative power as well as the unconstitutional underlying principle of national
conscription. Thus, the bill also embraced perhaps the most widespread objection to the act—that
the exemptions for those paying $300 for a substitute were unfair and unequal. They argued that
the section of the act allowing for paid exemptions meant that there was “an easy escape to all
other persons” which violated the Constitution’s equal distribution of rights to all. The
Constitution did not “prefer one class of citizens over another.”696 The substitution clause
showed the Conscription Act was “against common justice” without a “reasonable degree of
fairness in preparing the lists” from which the drafts were made. The argument concluded with a
prayer for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them proceeding under the
Conscription Act as to all citizens of Pennsylvania, thus demanding a statewide injunction.
Once filed, the case was delayed as Woodward awaited a hearing before the full
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as the court was out of session in August. Initially, the summons
issued to the members of the board through Chief Justice Lowrie’s clerk commanded their
appearance before the Eastern District in Philadelphia on the first Monday in September.697 The
case was assigned to Woodward, with the bill filed August 29 under the case of Francis B. Smith
v. Lane, Barrett, Wells and Young. On August 31, Woodward ordered argument for September
10th in Philadelphia. Plaintiffs’ counsel was ordered to give notice to the respondents and the
other judges.698 Days later, Woodward pushed back hearing the case due to Chief Justice
Lowrie’s inability to be present and then delayed further on the 9th due to Judge Thompson’s
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other engagements. Woodward ordered adjournment of the hearing until the 23rd. 699 Woodward
had twice pushed back the hearing to ensure the whole court, including his Democratic
colleagues, could participate. This matter of weeks ultimately meant the case would not be
decided until after the October elections, which proved a fateful decision.700On September 23,
arguments were heard by the full court.701 Not only would the government attorneys fail to
appear, but George Wharton, arguing for the plaintiffs, would introduce new arguments before
the Court to convince the judges both of its unconstitutionality and its illiberal character.
The morning of the 23rd, as Chief Justice Lowrie opened the proceedings, Ingersoll,
Biddle, Wharton, and McCall appeared for the plaintiffs, but the United States did not appear to
be represented. Biddle informed the court he believed Coffey and Knox would appear for the
United States, as they had the paper books requested and Coffey had given his intent and desire
to be present. Momentarily disorganized, the court requested proof that notice had been given to
Coffey by Ingersoll and dispatched a messenger to find Coffey and Knox, who informed the
court they were out of town.702 Because the government did not appear, the plaintiffs were
limited to argument from two of their attorneys, George Wharton and Charles Ingersoll.
Wharton’s argument took center stage, as the Philadelphia Press reported that Ingersoll only
mirrored Wharton’s comprehensive argument.
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Wharton’s argument showed that after months of public constitutional debate,
constitutional conservatives were confident they had discovered the most potent arguments
against the draft. He used the argument to expand on the core federalism-based objections found
in Nickels’ bill. Wharton attacked the Conscription Act as allowing the government to
compulsorily take at its pleasure the entire male population or an “arbitrarily-designated portion”
against their will, ignoring that state reserved powers by treating the “necessary and proper”
clause an independent grant of power. He reminded the court that before the Conscription Act,
no statute had been passed by Congress enforcing military service and thus the act was a historic
novelty. It was therefore also a case of first impression as to the constitutionality of
conscription.703
Wharton ran down the implications of the Conscription Acts’ expansion of federal power.
If Congress could conscript every male citizen, the reserved powers of the states could not be
preserved, and state forces would be absorbed by the federal army. Wharton also turned to
arguments not made in the submitted briefs to show how the Conscription Act infringed upon
federalism. Wharton argued that the Second Amendment’s protection of well-regulated militias
as necessary to the security of a free state ensured a militia system that relied upon able-bodied
citizens to render military service in emergencies for defensive warfare. He said this was why the
provisions of Article I granted Congress power over the militia while affirming the existence of
the militia as a body distinct from the United States armies. Wharton warned the court that under
the Conscription Act, when the President called out the national forces, the whole military force
of the country became a federal force subject to his orders and ceased to be militia.
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Throwing the kitchen sink at the court, Wharton even argued that the act burdened the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, since the act subverted
personal liberty in service of military duty.704 Wharton also made a clever argument attacking the
exemption or pecuniary clause. He claimed it was illegal because it was unequal in its operation
by compelling those into service who were unable to pay the exemption money. This was
“unjustly oppressive” on the poor. Further, the exemption money was not a voluntary payment, a
fine, or a penalty, but a tax. Taxes had to conform to the rule of uniformity and the rule of
apportionment. Wharton was convinced the exemption money under the Conscription Act was a
direct tax that had to follow the rule of apportionment and did not. The money raised under the
draft was to be expended for procuring substitutes through bounties.
Wharton ended his argument by addressing the appropriate remedy in the case and the
applicability of Ableman v. Booth, another issue unaddressed by the July complaint. He
understood that under the Pennsylvania Judiciary Act of 1836, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had to prevent or restrain the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial
to the interests of the community or individual rights. Wharton believed Ableman was not
controlling in this case because there was no interference of jurisdiction between the state and
federal courts nor a pending case in federal court. The plaintiffs asked for an injunction not
against any process of a federal court, but against executive officers carrying out provisions
under a federal act. State sovereignty could not act outside of its own jurisdiction, but nothing in
the Constitution gave federal courts exclusive power to decide constitutional questions, since to
do so would grant the federal government the ability to interfere with state sovereignty. Further,
the Supreme Court maintained the ultimate right of decision upon appeal from the highest state
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tribunals under the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Wharton informed the court that plaintiffs did not
contend that there could not be an appeal should the judges rule the act unconstitutional.705 It was
a reminder that ultimately, constitutional conservatives hoped the Supreme Court would take
such an appeal in order to render a final judgment against the Conscription Act.
The oral argument captured the interest of elite commentators and constitutional
conservatives. It was reported in the Pittsburgh Gazette that there were administration allies in
attendance in the courtroom and questions about whether there were prejudices in the minds of
the court against the Conscription Act. There was a “large sprinkling” of lawyers of the bar
gathered and there was a “small gathering of Democratic politicians” who were “personally
interested in the questions before the court.” However, the Gazette cautioned that “beyond this
there was nothing to suggest that any political question being discussed” or was under
consideration. The report confirmed that United States District Attorney George Alexander
Coffey and John Colvin Knox had “extended to take part in the argument” and had been
“furnished with the paper books of the case before not appearing on the 23rd.706 Indeed, in the
lead up to the hearing, George Biddle had given proper notice to United States Special Counsel
Knox and Coffey.707 In fact, Coffey and Knox had been ordered by the Court’s Chief Clerk to
appear on the 23rd, after noting that Wharton had furnished the paper books Coffey requested the
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paper books and Coffey had been sent a written notice of the intended hearing.708 Knox
requested an additional paper book which was furnished to him. Records confirm that Knox
wrote to Charles Ingersoll on the 3rd both requesting the additional copy of the bill filed and
confirming the initial date of argument, the 10th.709 The federal government had accepted to
appear on the 23rd, but mysteriously reversed in the last hour. This likely followed from their
strategy of avoidance.
Democratic papers suspected that Coffey refused to appear at the September 23rd
argument based on instructions from Washington.710 It was seen as part of a conspiracy by
Lincoln to deliberately close the courts and not allow the legality of the Conscription Act or
other major war measures to be tested judicially because “every intelligent man” knew them to
be unconstitutional. The underlying reality was that the Lincoln Administration were deeply
concerned about the court challenges and many administration members questioned the
legitimacy of state court jurisdiction. Whether an order was given, there were reasons the
Lincoln administration did not want to appear in Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court when they might
lose. As it happened, the administration waited until the outcome of the October elections and for
Lowrie to leave the bench upon losing his seat to make an appearance. Regardless of the
government’s lack of appearance, the constitutional conservatives on the bench were familiar
with the arguments against the Conscription Act.
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The Opinions
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court judges finally released their opinions in Kneedler
on November 9th, constitutional conservatives hoped that the court would be sympathetic to their
arguments. They were well-prepared by the year’s public constitutional debate to understand the
best arguments against the Conscription Act, yet it was not obvious which arguments they would
focus on, especially given Wharton’s expansive oral argument. The resulting three opinions of
the majority all focused on the core federalism-based objections to national conscription. The
key differences between the three were in Lowrie’s reluctance to overturn the act, Woodward’s
emphasis on the inequality of the act’s exemption clause, and Thompson’s focus on the Second
Amendment.
Lowrie’s opinion opened by recognizing the challenges of the case. For him, the decision
was difficult both because of the government’s refusal to appear because it did not recognize the
power the state courts to decide upon the constitutionality of federal acts and because the “great
parties of the country have divided upon it.”711 Lowrie’s analysis of the Conscription Act began
with familiar emphasis on preservation of antebellum federalism. As constitutional conservatives
frequently observed, only the state militias and regular army were recognized both by the
Constitution and constitutional history as proper military forces.712 Lowrie believed only under
the power to raise armies could the act be founded, but the act’s constitutionality ultimately
turned on the “necessary and proper” clause. Thus, the case centered around the question of
which the proper modes of were exercising the power of raising armies. Lowrie did not feel the
existence of civil war made the Conscription Act a “necessary and proper” one because the
inadequacy of the permanent and active forces of the government for rebellions was expressly

711
712

Kneedler, 45 Pa. 240-241; Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 152.
Kneedler, 45 Pa. 242.

236

provided for by the power to call forth the militia. Therefore, it was the only means allowed,
something Lowrie felt the Ninth and Tenth Amendments confirmed.713
Like other constitutional conservatives, Lowrie foresaw a “parade of horribles” that
would threaten the Constitution’s integrity if the Conscription Act could stand as precedent.
Lowrie offered other reasons why the Conscription Act was not a “necessary and proper” way to
raise armies, saying that:
“If Congress may institute the plan now under consideration, as a necessary and proper
mode of exercising its power “to raise and support armies,” then it seems to me to follow
with more force that it may take a similar mode in the exercise of other powers, and may
compel people to lend it their money; take their houses for offices and courts; their ships
and steamboats for the navy; their land for its fortresses…and their provisions and crops
for the support of the army. If we give the latitudinarian interpretation, as to mode, which
this act requires, I know not how to stop short of this. I am sure there is no present danger
of such an extreme interpretation, and that even partisan morality would forbid it; but if
the power be admitted we have no security against the relaxation of the morality that
guides it, I am quite unable now to suppose that so great a power could have been
intended to be granted, and yet to be left so loosely guarded.”714
Lowrie argued that if the Conscription Act made national conscription the regular mode
of raising armies, then it might disregard all considerations of age, occupation, and profession
and end up taking “our governors, legislators, heads of state departments, judges, sheriffs, and all
inferior officers, and all our clergy and public teachers, and leave the state entirely disorganized”
because it would admit no binding rule of equality or proportion. But these results, Lowrie said,
were structurally impossible under the Constitution. In all other matters involving forced
contribution to the federal government imposed by the Constitution, such as duties, imposts,
excises, direct taxes, and the organizing and training the militia, the rule of uniformity, equality,
or proportion was fixed in the Constitution.715 Beyond that, Lowrie stated if the founding fathers
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presumed that acts like the Conscription Act were possible, they would have regulated its
exercise. They did not because no regulation was necessary if all recruits were to be obtained
according to constitutional tradition by voluntary enlistments.716 The mode of increasing the
military force for the suppression of rebellion already lay in the Constitution such that every
other mode was necessarily excluded.
As a constitutional conservative and strict constructionist, Lowrie was clear that all
powers not delegated were reserved to the states.717 Because the power to conscript was not
expressly delegated, it could not be implied if it was incompatible with any power reserved to the
states.718 Lowrie ended his majority opinion by explaining his cautious jurisprudence with
respect to overruling acts of Congress.719 As he had in Commonwealth v. Wright he felt
distressed that he was “forced into this conflict with an act of Congress of such very great
importance in the present juncture of federal affairs” and noted that if it was an error, “it may yet
produce a different result on the final hearing, which I trust will take place so soon that no public
or private injury may arise from any misjudgment now and here.” Lowrie hedged his bets. He
believed the Conscription Act was unconstitutional but was clear it was a difficult decision he
expected could be revisited or reversed. And those concerns were hastened by his support of the
war, exclaiming that “in this great struggle, we owe nothing to the rebels but war, until they
submit.”720 The war was never far from the minds of justices considering these significant cases.
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Much as Lowrie’s majority opinion utilized arguments similar to those employed by
constitutional conservatives in the public constitutional debates, Judge Woodward’s opinion
lacked the hesitation to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. For Woodward, duty and
reverence for the Constitution and the founding tradition demanded striking down the act. He
dramatically began his concurrence by agreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument that the $300
exemption clause forced the burden of the draft on the poor. Woodward said that this objection
only went to the spirit of the act and not to its constitutionality.721 Thus, he set out to prove that
the Conscription Act was both unconstitutional and despotic in character. Like Lowrie,
Woodward principally focused on federalism-based arguments. As the plaintiffs’ bill argued,
Woodward agreed the term “national forces” in the Conscription Act was language not found in
either state or federal constitutions. According to constitutional tradition, “national forces”
applied to a standing army and therefore was “a total misnomer when applied to the militia.”722
Woodward felt that the Conscription Act clearly offended these constitutional traditions.
Like constitutional conservatives in Congress, Woodward was openly suspiciously of
Congress’ motives, believing they must have intended to draft the state militias despite the use of
the language “national forces.” Thus, the relevant question was whether Congress held power to
draft into the military service of the United States the militia men of Pennsylvania. Woodward
believed the Constitution directly answered the question, because the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution gave to Congress all the powers that are either express or are essential to the
execution of expressly delegated powers.723 Like Lowrie, Woodward was committed to strict
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constructionism and historic originalism which protected the original federalism structure of the
Constitution. Therefore, he understood “raising armies” to refer to the mode of raising, not to the
size of the army. Woodward found that the framing generation derived their ideas of government
principally from Great Britain and not from any of the more “imperial and despotic governments
of the earth.”724 Woodward observed that the British army had generally been recruited by
voluntary enlistments, stimulated by wages and bounties, since any attempted forced
conscriptions was immediately met with disfavor. Therefore, he felt any power conferred on
Congress was the power to raise armies by the ordinary English mode of voluntary enlistments.
Constitutional tradition informed the extent of federal power and limited the modes Congress
could properly use.
Giving these limitations, Woodward found that the Conscription Act improperly drafted
men directly into the service of the United States army and did not call them out as militia.725
Woodward agreed with Lowrie that “necessary and proper” only referred to the ability to execute
enumerated powers.726 He was clear that the primary constitutional issue was the Conscription
Act’s attack upon antebellum federalism. The “great vice” of the Conscription Act was that it
took away the “security and foundation” of a citizen’s state rights.727 Like Lowrie, Woodward

724

Ibid; This paralleled arguments made earlier in the summer by Democratic newspapers who used nearly
the same language to spell out their constitutional objections. See “The Conscription”, Democratic Watchman,
August 7, 1863, at 1 (quoting a Mr. Daggett, a Congressional Representative, that in Great Britain, a nation known
for tyranny, such an oppressive measure was never successfully attempted and it is thus utterly inconsistent with the
principles embedded into the Constitution at the framing). Arnold Shankman notes that the Watchman was the
“most vociferous of the anti-war journals in 1861,” seeing the war as a conflict “designed to destroy state rights.”
Shankman, “Conflict in the Old Keystone," 96.
725
Kneedler, 45 Pa. 257 (Woodward, J., concurring). (Congress acted to draft them “in contempt of state
authority” by not calling them out under state officers.)
726
Ibid.
727
Ibid., 259.

240

agreed with other constitutional conservatives that the primary threat of conscription was to
federalism.
Judge James Thompson wrote the last of the three concurring opinions in Kneedler. His
concurrence found little of the same popularity amongst Pennsylvanian Democrats or outrage
among Republicans, as Thompson had not be involved in a heavily contested election attached to
the outcome of this case Yet, Thompson too held a long background in Pennsylvania Democratic
politics, having been involved in Democratic politics since the 1830s.728 His concurrence
followed Lowrie’s and Woodward’s in paralleling the existing constitutional conservative
constitutional arguments emphasizing preservation of federalism and employment of strict
constructionism.729 Beyond the core federalism-based arguments of constitutional conservatives,
Thompson also felt the Second Amendment was evidence the framing generation were
apprehensive about such a “dubious power” as the power of the federal government to coercively
conscript.730 Plaintiffs’ counsel had not made this argument in oral argument or in their
complaint, but many constitutional conservatives like George Ticknor Curtis had broached in the
public constitutional debate. Thompson saw the threat as dire, writing that the militia could not
be destroyed by an act of Congress.731 The Constitution forbade this by granting a positive
injunction to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia meant to supply states
security against the federal government. Thompson also felt the Conscription Act ignored the
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Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795, because through its provisions the militias were to be enrolled as
part of the national forces.732 The act thus broke with key constitutional tradition regarding
calling out the militia.
As Lowrie and Woodward similarly argued, the Conscription Act ignored the distinction
between the militia and the regular army and improperly designated federal officers to command
those enrolled in each state.733 Like Woodward, Thompson insisted the act was at odds with
English precedent and historic originalism.734 He thought no one could be “credulous enough to
believe that if a power had been supposed to exist” to raise an army by coercive means that it
would have been ratified by the states.735 Like Lowrie, as a constitutional conservative,
Thompson clearly recognized the stakes of the war and desired to witness “the suppression of
this unjustifiable and monstrous rebellion” which must be “put down to save the Constitution and
constitutional means for the purpose I believe to be ample; but we gain but little…..if we
voluntarily impair other portions of it.”736 The reality of war weighed heavily on the minds of
these three judges even in midst of courtroom battles over the constitutional viability of key
Lincoln war measures. For constitutional conservatives like Lowrie and Thompson, the
Constitution did not grant emergency powers and war did not alter the Constitution’s structure of
federalism. The war needed to be won but not at the expense of the Constitution.
Still, despite the unity of the three majority opinions, the Pennsylvania Court’s decision
in Kneedler was a close and divided one. Two justices dissented vigorously to defend the

732

Ibid.
Ibid., 270.
734
Ibid., 266-273.
735
Ibid., 267-268. To think otherwise, Thompson argued, would be “preposterous” and would suggest that
the framers allowed a latent evil to lapse for three-quarters of a century.
736
Ibid., 274.
733

242

Conscription Act based on the inherent powers of nations at war. Justices William Strong and
John Read, like the majority, wrote opinions paralleled existing arguments made in the public
constitutional debates. 737 Strong emphasized the exigencies of the war and employed the
argument of necessity. The requirements of fighting a civil war and protecting the existence of
government itself made it apparent that conscription was constitutional. As Strong suggested,
“the necessity of vesting in the federal government power to raise, support, and employ a
military force, was plain to the framers of the constitution, as well as to the people of the states
by whom it was ratified.” Such power was necessary for the common defense and to preserve the
existence of any independent government, and none has ever existed without it.738 Strong
recognized constitutional limits on the federal government’s power over the militia, but those
were explicit limitations to calling out the militia only, not to raising armies.739 For him,
Congress’ powers over the militia “must be held to mean what its framers, and the people who
adopted it, intended it should mean” and that judges were not “at liberty to read it in any other
sense” or insert “restrictions upon powers given in unlimited terms, any more than we can strike
out restrictions imposed.”740 Strong employed a similar approach to the majority using historic
originalism, but instead found that the Conscription Act was constitutional.
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Unlike the majority, Strong was clearly willing to accept the notion of implied powers.
Strong’s dissent relied upon an expansive understanding of the “necessary and proper” clause.
For him, Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden stood for the principle that all the powers
vested by the Constitution in Congress were “complete in themselves, and may be exercised to
their utmost extent,” and the only restrictions upon them were those explicit in the Constitution.
The power to raise armies was no different from the power to borrow money or to regulate
commerce.741 Strong also felt that Democratic critics and the plaintiffs ignored the precedent of
Houston v. Moore, which “exploded” the objection that conscription was unconstitutional
because the decision allowed a drafted man to be punishable as a deserter before he was
mustered into service.742 He saw constitutional conservatives as misunderstanding constitutional
tradition and a proper reading of Article I powers.743 Employing their approach, Strong
discovered what he thought was ample support for national conscription.
Because Justice Strong’s opinion addressed Congress’s constitutional powers under
Article I, Justice Read narrowed his focus on addressing the state court’s lack of proper
jurisdiction. Read felt that the plaintiffs had clearly entered a suit in equity only because the writ
of habeas corpus was suspended. This was improper and novel, not conscription. As Read said,
“the present application is a substitute for the writ of habeas corpus” since the plaintiffs allege
that “they have been drafted, and have received notice of the draft, and are placed on the footing
of enlisted soldiers, and liable to be punished as deserters, should they fail to report for duty,
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which they have done.”744 Ableman v. Booth directly answered the question of jurisdiction for
Read, denying state court judges the power to issue writs against federal officers executing
federal law.745 He did not accept as proper the constitutional conservative strategy to get around
the denial by Lincoln’s proclamation of state court jurisdiction in habeas cases.
On the merits, Read, like Strong, was certain that precedent and constitutional tradition
clearly granted Congress the power to conscript. He observed that other courts had already found
the act clearly an exercise of constitutional power.746 Read cited Hamilton’s argument in
Federalist 23 that must the power to raise armies must “exist without limitation; because it is
impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies” and that “no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to….provide for the defense and
protection of the community in any manner essential to its efficacy.”747 For Read, Hamilton’s
understanding was broadly accepted by the founding generation, as evidenced by General
Knox’s 1790 plan to make all males 18 to 60 liable to service and Rhode Island’s 1790
recommendation of an amendment to allow that “no person shall be compelled to do military
duty, otherwise than by voluntary enlistment, except in cases of general invasion.”748 He
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believed that the Monroe plan during the War of 1812 only confirmed the expansive Hamiltonian
understanding of the power to raise armies.749
Both Strong and Read agreed that the Constitution and historic originalism supported the
power of the national government to conscription. For both the majority and dissenting in
Kneedler, the public constitutional debates may have influenced their arguments. All the
opinions in Kneedler ran parallel to the constitutional arguments already made in the public
debate. Constitutional conservatives seemed to have won a majority victory and celebrated as
such. But a shadow of growing uncertainty remained as they wondered how long it would last.
The Aftermath: Public and Political Reactions and Overturning the Injunction
The reaction of both the Republican and Democratic press overtly displayed the level of
ongoing engagement on the part of elites involved in the public constitutional debate over
conscription. Republicans saw the Kneedler decision as obviously a political decision meant to
question the constitutionality of the entire war effort. The Democratic press celebrated the
vindication of constitutional conservative arguments against the Conscription Act. The
Democratic Banner were clear that the decision reflected what they and other constitutional
conservatives had stated since the law was passed—the law violated the Constitution’s structure
of federalism. This was their opinion from the beginning, and they did not “hesitate so to express
it.” Either the “preposterous” law was unconstitutional or “all our ideas about state sovereignty,
states’ rights” and Pennsylvania’s power to control its own militia were “grossly wrong.”750 The
Johnstown Democrat wrote that the opinions of the majority were “unanswerable” because they
were what “any person expected who had any regard for the Constitution” and the rights of
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citizens would expect.751 They proclaimed that they had “never heard of any lawyer” with “any
respect for his professional reputation” that doubted the unconstitutionality of the Conscription
Act given that the act obliterated the right of states to furnish their own militia. Similarly, the
North Branch Democrat incredulously felt even a “mere schoolboy” could understand
Woodward’s “clear exposition of the Constitutional mode of raising armies.”752
Democratic papers also remained frustrated by the government’s lack of appearance at
the September 23rd hearing.753 Because of that decision, some Democrats expected the Kneedler
decision would not be given its proper judicial effect. Harvey Sickles and the North Branch
Democrat predicted that it was “more than probable” the decision, like the Constitution itself and
the reserved rights of the states, would be treated as a nullity by Washington.754 Still, some
Democratic papers felt it was more important to recognize that Pennsylvania’s highest judicial
tribunal had pronounced the Conscription Act to be no law and that the decree was “binding
upon the Executive as it is upon the humblest citizen.” As the plaintiffs demanded, they believed
the decision created a statewide injunction halting the act. Thus, until it was before the Supreme
Court or reversed by the state supreme court itself, any attempt to execute the Conscription Law
in the state should and must be “resisted as any other unlawful attempt to interfere with the rights
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of the citizen.”755 The question of the constitutionality of the Conscription Act was settled unless
overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States or the “high law of Federal Dictatorship.”756
Pennsylvania’s Democratic press saw other reasons to be skeptical of the decision’s
lasting effects. Just days after the Kneedler decision on November 11th, a report from New York
suggested that recruiting in Pennsylvania would be “severely affected” by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision. The Daily Picayune argued it was unlikely Republican Governor
Curtin would “interfere in any way to sustain” the decision which until reversed was “claimed to
be of binding force within that state.”757 Still the Picayune’s editor did not believe that judgment
would stand long since Chief Justice Lowrie’s replacement Agnew was an “unconditional
friend” to the administration. They presciently assumed the election results settled the judgment
of the courts and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reverse its own decision when it
next met. Constitutional conservatives were aware that while they had secured a significant
victory, they remained in a precarious position. It was possible they only achieved a pyrrhic
victory.
Meanwhile, the Republican press was swift in its condemnation of the Kneedler
majority’s decision. Philadelphia lawyer and public intellectual Sidney George Fischer felt the
court’s majority were “partisans” whose object was to “oppose the government in the
prosecution of the war.” The intended effect of the decision was to create a collision between the
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civil authorities of the state and federal government to grant a “desired pretext” for mob violence
like the draft riots.758 For Fischer at least, there was no difference between street violence and
judicial solutions. Similarly, The Philadelphia Press stated that the majority advanced the
“dangerous doctrine that state rights are above national authorities,” the very doctrine used by
“traitors to destroy the Republic.”759 Woodward and the majority used the law “as an instrument
to embarrass the government” and relied on a “forced construction” of the Article I powers
which ignored the lack of any limit to Congress’s power.760 Similarly, Philadelphia’s Daily
Evening Bulletin saw this argument as the heart of Woodward’s “elaborate” and “radical”
defense of “state rights” which was clearly political because he saw the law a “poor and
inefficient war measure.”761 The Press desired to avoid speaking harshly of Woodward, but felt
the opinion read with the tone of a politician not reflective of an eminent and respected
lawyer.762
The Franklin Repository was blunter about the political nature of the decision,
referencing the court’s “judicial vengeance” for their election losses. Only those guilty of “open
treason” were not filled with shame upon the decision and they thought mainstream Democrats
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who supported Woodward in the election could not have expected this outcome.763 It was
“narrow prejudices” and “petty political uses” which had invaded the sanctuary of the Court by
“tempting its high priests with the dazzling bauble of ambition.” The Repository theorized that
the decision was planned as soon as the Pennsylvania draft was announced in early July when
Democratic politicians in Philadelphia resolved to test the constitutionality of the act in the court
in order to achieve political results.764 The charge was less that the Democratic judges of the
court were party to the plot, but that these Philadelphia Democrats confidently relied upon the
Democratic majority on the Court to accept their constitutional arguments. The Repository even
asserted that the case of the three conscripts was “made up” by the trio of Philadelphia attorneys
and rebel sympathizers.765
Despite the bold, vindictive language of some Republicans who were certain the decision
was purely political, other Pennsylvania Republican papers focused on rebutting the majority’s
constitutional arguments. The Philadelphia Inquirer spent a week issuing daily responses to the
decisions of Lowrie and Woodward, primarily arguing that they ignored the founders’
Constitution and the needs of a nation at war.766 For instance, one headline proclaimed that
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Lowrie disagreed with “Madison and the Fathers.”767 The Inquirer editors argued Lowrie’s
ruling that the Conscription Act was unconstitutional was mere dicta, because he had only
directed an order be entered granting the preliminary injunction to protect the plaintiffs.768 Thus,
Lowrie’s order could have neither a statewide or national effect on the act. Further, Lowrie’s
argument was counter to constitutional tradition, especially the 1814 conscription plan. The
Inquirer cited Monroe’s plan as having passed both houses with a discussion “so prolonged and
comprehensive as to settle the questions in the minds of large majorities, in both the Senate and
the House.”769 The editors emphasized that any student of history would conclude Congress in
1814 supported conscription, as despite “able and bitter opposition” similar to that against the
Conscription Act, the bill passed the Senate 19 to 12 and the House 84 to 72.770 Once again, even
if constitutional conservative motives were pure, Republicans believed their constitutional
arguments failed to convince.
The press reaction to Kneedler attests to the way rather than concluding the debate over
the constitutionality of conscription, Kneedler reignited the public constitutional debate over the
Conscription Act. Constitutional nationalists felt it was obvious both that the arguments of
constitutional conservatives were wrong and that their constitutional victory would be lost in due
time. Constitutional conservatives were convinced they needed to act to secure the fruits of their
November victory. The battle would temporarily move back to Congress.
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Congress Reacts
After the November press debate, constitutional conservatives in Congress spent the few
days before the December recess attempting to secure the fruits of victory from Kneedler. In the
House, Pennsylvania Democrat Philip Johnson submitted a preamble resolution recognizing that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the Conscription Act was contrary to and violative of
the Constitution and therefore null and void. It was thus the duty of the President and his officers
to either acquiesce that decision or bring the question involved before the Supreme Court for
final adjudication. Johnson’s resolution recognized that Congress could also choose to pass an
act which removed the objectionable sections.771 Thaddeus Stevens brought laughter by
responding that he hoped Johnson would withdraw the resolution since the decision had been
overruled, an apparent premonition that the ruling would be overturned.772 At that moment,
arguments had yet to be presented before the Court in the review of the preliminary injunction
but the government had submitted its motion to dissolve the injunction and arguments were
scheduled. Johnson demanded a vote when it was moved to lay the resolution on the table, a vote
he lost 80 to 43.773 The following day, fellow Pennsylvania Democrat Sydenham Ancona
introduced a resolution for unconditional repeal of the Conscription Act. Ancona’s resolution
emphasized federalism-based objections and labeled the Conscription Act “oppressive, unjust,
and unconstitutional” which removed state control of their militias and subjected states and the
people to the “unlimited power of the federal government.”774 Unfortunately for Ancona, by the
time Congress reconvened in early January, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already heard
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argument to rescind the injunctions. Whatever slim chance constitutional conservatives had in
Congress fell to the wayside as constitutional conservatives also faced the prospect of seeing
their greatest victory fall apart.
As 1863 came to a close, the federal government prepared to ask the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to reverse its decision. They did so before a court with a new member, Daniel
Agnew, who had made clear in a widely-distributed pamphlet in 1863 that he supported the
constitutionality of conscription.775 The government had waited for Chief Justice Lowrie’s term
to close. Constitutional conservatives had tried to capitalize on their greatest victory in the
constitutional struggle over conscription. By January, the fight would already be mostly over
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed itself.
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the militia.” The President had “unconditional” power to use the whole force of the nation.
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CONCLUSION: POST-1863 JUDICIAL BATTLES AND 20TH CENTURY CHALLENGES TO CONSCRIPTION
By the time major challenges to conscription came once more during World War I, the
sands had shifted significantly. For one, the most important victory constitutional conservatives
secured in 1863, Kneedler v. Lane, was quickly reversed in January 1864 and no appeal ever
made it to the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Taney awaited the opportunity to strike down
the draft. Once the war was over, state and federal courts continued to fight over issues stemming
from the Conscription Act, most prominently state court habeas jurisdiction and the power of
localities to tax citizens to pay bounties for substitutes. In these cases, some constitutional
conservative judges and lawyers hoped to secure the right of state courts to intercede in any
future draft. But when the Supreme Court reiterated in 1872 the rule of Ableman v. Booth while
upholding the power of the federal government to conscript in dicta, the judicial war was over.
The cases during World War I cemented this shift, as despite the efforts of lawyers in numerous
federal cases to leverage the Thirteenth Amendment against conscription in combination with the
federalism-based objections of 1863, the arguments were seen as untenable in the context of a
world war. The Civil War cases were understood to uniformly uphold the power of conscription
and any sense of the struggle against this power was erased. By the Vietnam Era, the longstanding doctrine was well-secured. The question had been settled a century before.
By January 1864, the tide had entirely turned against the constitutional conservatives who
had briefly tasted victory. The federal government waited barely a month after the issuing of the
November preliminary injunction in Kneedler before asking the court to revisit the case. On
December 12, 1863, special counsel John Knox appeared for the government to ask the court to
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dissolve the preliminary injunction granted in the case.776 Justice Strong heard the motion, which
he granted to be argued before a full bench.777 Oral argument, once it began on the 30th,
meandered on for days. Peter McCall, George Biddle, and Charles Ingersoll all made arguments
against reversing the injunction, but only Ingersoll left a personal record of what was said.
Newspaper accounts suggest that Biddle argued the motion to dissolve was out of order, as there
were no new facts to show any harm had been done to the defendants. McCall and Ingersoll
argued the Conscription Act remained unconstitutional and that the state court took proper
jurisdiction over the case.778
In the re-argument, Ingersoll could not merely reiterate the core federalism-based
arguments that were successful in November. He had to deal squarely with the jurisdictional
issue. Ingersoll asserted that the defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction was “so
extraordinary that it would be vain to look for precedents to justify it.”779 He started by revisiting
the circumstances of the government’s lack of appearance in September, believing it be a cynical
ploy. Ingersoll noted accurately that at the September 23 argument, government counsel and the
enrolling officers did not appear despite being given notice of the argument after having ask for
the copy of the bill for a special injunction and communicating with the plaintiff’s attorneys.780
He argued that by Pennsylvania rule, unlike open judgments at common law, special injunctions
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once granted were only reversed if something happened to “induce the Court to pick out their
own work.” Otherwise, such motions would be made endlessly after any such loss.781 Even if
Ingersoll was wrong about the novelty of the motion to dissolve, the federal government’s
actions were consistent with a strategy to avoid a decision at the Supreme Court level at all costs.
Outside the jurisdictional issue, Ingersoll’s constitutional arguments mostly followed
constitutional conservative constitutional rhetoric, focusing solely on federalism-based
arguments with no mention of personal liberty. Ingersoll made two core arguments: the power to
“raise and support armies” was not unlimited and secondly, the power to impose military
conscription was a power to take possessions and transfer them to “the public chest” and thus not
properly a constitutional power.782 Looking to constitutional history, Ingersoll believed Strong
and Read misread precedents in their November dissents and failed to understand the
significance of the distinction between the army and militia. He did not believe there was
American or English precedent for military conscription since any government with a power to
conscript and an “unlimited right to raise armies by force” was necessarily tyrannical.783 Like
other constitutional conservatives, Ingersoll did not reject the power to conscript per se—he
noted that states always had the power to call out the militia and compel their service. The
difference between the two forces was that the militia were drafted by the states and the regular
army filled by volunteers.784
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Precedent and constitutional history occupied much of Ingersoll’s argument. Answering
Read’s November dissent, he contended that General Knox’s attempt as the first Secretary of
War to enact conscription was an unapproved plan for the “general arrangement of the militia,”
not a compulsory draft, and one ultimately scrapped when the 1792 Militia Act was passed.785
Ingersoll aimed to convince the court that the “fiercest” and “most ingenious opposition” at the
Constitutional convention was made to giving any congressional power to raise armies.786 He
believed the norm at the founding was no compulsory military duty outside of voluntary
enlistment, as conscription was the recourse of tyrannical European despots. Ingersoll also
believed constitutional nationalists and the federal government wrongly employed the Monroe
plan of 1814, ignoring that it left the draft at the hands of county courts or militia officers and the
successful opposition to the plan.787 The constitutional argument against conscription was
victorious in 1814 because some of the “ablest men” in Congress “violently assailed” the bill,
including Daniel Webster and Jeremiah Mason.788 Ingersoll felt that the American constitutional
tradition made clear that national conscription was unconstitutional and undemocratic beyond its
injuries to the poorest citizens.789 Nothing had changed in the interim other than the participation
of the government’s attorneys.
The following morning, United States Special Counsel John C. Knox appeared before the
court to present his oral argument, certain that the court should never have issued its November
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ruling. His motion to dissolve made clear that the government did not believe that the state courts
held jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutionality of federal acts. Knox began his argument
with three questions. He asked whether the supreme court of a state could by injunction prevent
the officers of the United States from executing an act of Congress on the grounds it is
unconstitutional, what the remedy should be for such a tort against a government officer, and
whether the Conscription Act was constitutional.790 Knox’s argument primarily focused on three
considerations: an expansive interpretation of the “necessary and proper” clause under
McCulloch v. Maryland, the understanding that the draft acted upon male citizens directly to take
them into the United States army and thus did not affect the state’s militias, and that the state
courts held no jurisdiction in such cases, involving the novel use of equity law by the plaintiffs’
lawyers.
Knox argued that in Ableman, Taney’s decision unanimously decided that state courts
could not by writ of habeas corpus or any other proceeding interfere with acts of an officer of
the United States. The Ableman decision was not premised upon the constitutionality of the
underlying Fugitive Slave Act, but that officers acted under the authority of the United States.
Knox did not see any distinction that could be made between the acts of a commissioner under
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and those of the Board of Enrollment under the Conscription Act
of 1863. From here, Knox imagined the horrors of nullification that would be revisited should
the court uphold the November special injunction. Knox reasoned that if state courts could enjoin
officers from executing their duties under an act of Congress on the grounds it was
unconstitutional, nothing could prevent state courts from nullifying “all the acts of the National
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Legislature” and threatening the “very existence of the Government.”791 As many Republicans
argued in the public constitutional debate, the constitutional argument against conscription
appeared to be treasonous in its cascading effects, if not on its face.
Still, even if the court had proper jurisdiction, Knox was certain that the Conscription Act
was clearly constitutional. He paralleled the existing arguments of constitutional nationalists by
noting that Article I, Section Eight provided the power to “raise and support” armies, which was
“absolute in its nature.” The Constitution was “entirely silent” as to appropriate means, leaving it
entirely to Congress to determine according to the exigencies of the time. Thus, Knox’s
argument rested on the meaning of “necessary and proper” and the rule of McCulloch v.
Maryland.792 The Conscription Act was not plainly unconstitutional because it did not wrestle
away control of states over their militias.793 Nothing, Knox argued, precluded the federal
government from in times of exigency compelling a portion of the militia to render military
service in the national army. To close, Knox prayed that the judges would deny the effort to take
away the federal government’s power to compel military service in order to protect itself against
the “vile Rebellion” and the commission of the “most horrid crimes.”794 As much as
constitutional conservatives were certain of their constitutional arguments, they never lost sight
of the primary need of government to win the war and save itself and were confident the same
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history did not preclude their ability to use all means to do so. In a matter of weeks, Knox and
the government would secure the victory that would end the threat to conscription.
Just over two months after the November decision, Justice Strong, joined by Justices
Read and Agnew, issued his majority opinion in Kneedler II dissolving the injunction issued in
November and upholding the constitutionality of the Conscription Act.795 Knox and the
government won on all three counts. Strong agreed with Knox that plaintiffs had not presented “a
proper case for the interference of a court of equity, by injunction, even if the act of Congress
was unconstitutional.”796 The November orders were merely pending and could have no possible
beneficial effect upon the condition of the three complainants. Otherwise, they would “hold out
to every drafted man a temptation to resist all attempts to coerce him into military service.”797 It
followed that no statewide injunction resulted from Kneedler even if the injunction declared the
act unconstitutional.
Lastly, Strong felt that the November decision was of an “extraordinary and
unprecedented” character since he could not recall a state court finding a Congressional act
unconstitutional upon a motion for an interlocutory order.798 He saw the injunction issued in
Kneedler I as having effectively nullified Lincoln’s order suspending habeas corpus within
Pennsylvania while ignoring the rule of Ableman v. Booth. Justice Read’s brief concurrence
dramatically followed Strong’s invoking of nullification.799 Read believed he had support both in
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Pennsylvania and New York precedent. After the September oral argument in Kneedler I, Read
had copies of Cadwalader’s Antrim opinion and Judge Bacon’s from In RE Hopson sent to him.
Bacon’s opinion proved to Read that the use of the habeas corpus by state courts to take persons
out of the custody of officers of the United States acting under the authority of Congress failed
“entirely.”800 Injunctions could not be used by state courts to effectively circumvent the denial of
state court jurisdiction.
With both Strong and Read focusing their opinions on denial of state court jurisdiction,
Justice Daniel Agnew addressed the constitutional validity of the Conscription Act. Agnew
echoed other constitutional nationalists in his plenary interpretation of the “necessary and
proper” clause. For him, the power to “raise and support armies” was exclusively vested in
Congress and therefore any legislation upon the subject was exclusive. Constitutional tradition
made clear the inherent powers of a nation to make war for self-preservation came with “all the
means of making war effective.”801 Finally, Agnew responded to the plea that he should sustain
Kneedler I as good precedent under the rule of stare decisis. He responded that he would not
sustain the decision of a “bare majority against a strong dissent establishing the doctrine that
national forces cannot be raised to suppress insurrection,” a preliminary decision made in a “onesided hearing of the opponents of the law during a time of high excitement, when partisan rage
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was furiously assailing the law.”802 Agnew, along with Strong and Read, certainly felt that they
had done so according to their convictions of law and patriotism.
In his dissent which Judge Thompson joined, Woodward, who became Chief Justice upon
Lowrie’s electoral defeat, protested what he believed was an unfair and unprecedented reversal.
The dissenters argued it was the Republican majority who had performed a parliamentary trick
and acted politically. The United States’ failure to have counsel make an appearance in
September 1863 did not mean that the defendants were not given a full opportunity to be heard.
To Woodward, Kneedler I was thus both binding on the defendants as if they had appeared and
on all citizens of the state—the injunction had statewide effect. He complained that it would have
been easy for the defendants to “put the record into shape for review” by filling answers to the
bills of the plaintiffs.803 Then the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have made the interlocutory
decree final without further argument and the record thus could be presented if desired to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, Woodward imagined if proper procedure had been
followed, constitutional conservatives would have gotten their wish to get the final decision of
the Supreme Court. Instead, he believed the federal government simply waited for Lowrie to
leave the bench in December. Only on December 17 did the government appear before Judge
Strong and moved to dissolve the injunction and the motion gave no answer, plea, demurrer,
affidavit, or reason filed on the record but was granted anyway.804 Woodward did not avoid the
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implications of his argument. As he remarked later in his opinion, he felt that if Lowrie had been
reelected, the motion would have never been made.805
It was an extraordinary claim. Woodward felt the stability of an injunction should not fall
upon the personnel of the court and their different constitutional opinions, for no other cases of
constitutionality could be considered settled. Woodward accused the government of awaiting the
outcome of an election in order to get their desired result. Constitutional conservatives did not
feel they politicized the constitutional debate over conscription—the administration did by
pursuing a strategy to avoid unfriendly courts at all hazards. Woodward also was certain the
November majority did not create new, unbounded precedent for the court to set aside federal
acts. Instead, it was Justice Strong’s majority that now raised the possibility that dissenting
judges could regularly overrule majority decisions on the same record and facts. Otherwise, a
dissenting judge “may undo the work of the whole court, or, what is worse, compel them to go
over the same ground again and again” undermining institutional stability.806 Lastly, Woodward
thought the November decision should stand for public interest reasons. He felt the November
decision gave the government ample opportunity to obtain a Supreme Court resolution which the
public demanded.807 Woodward thus openly admitted he shared the aspiration of other
constitutional conservatives that the case might get appeal to the Supreme Court.
Woodward otherwise used his dissent to revisit the key constitutional arguments against
conscription, with concerns over maintaining antebellum federalism at the heart of his points. He
again emphasized strict constructionism and structuralism as the proper approach for
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constitutional review.808 Woodward believed that the Constitution could not simultaneously
authorize the militia to be drafted irrespective of state authority when it expressly recognized the
right of states to maintain their militia. Finally, he answered the majority’s argument that the
November majority had improperly used equity to get around the suspension of habeas corpus.
Woodward reasoned that habeas corpus, normally the proper venue for relief, was suspended
and because equity jurisdiction could only be ousted if an adequate remedy otherwise existed,
the court had acted properly.809 Ableman did not alter jurisdiction, because Woodward
interpreted it to mean that while state courts had no power to interfere with or resist the process
or judgments of the federal courts, the rule was reciprocal.
Strong’s decision was a bitter pill for Woodward and Thompson to swallow. The
dissenters and majority accused the other of diverting from court norms and scheming to gain a
political result. Both sides felt they were defenders of the Constitution against brinkmanship and
political warfare. The stakes were high and judges on both sides fully understood the
consequences for the Lincoln administration and the war effort. Yet, under the circumstances and
despite the accusations of politicization, between the two decisions, the justices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had spilled nearly one hundred pages on the constitutionality of
conscription. Along with Judge Cadwalader, ever judicial actor considering conscription had
employed historical originalism and shared reverence for the founders’ Constitution. The losses
for constitutional conservatives in both state and federal court in a matter of months secured the
Conscription Act’s constitutional footing while avoiding a final decision before the Supreme
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Court. Ultimately, the government’s victories were part of the way in which the Civil War
bolstered the expansion of federal power and jurisdiction, sowing the seeds of the modern federal
system.
Taney’s Draft Opinion
Kneedler II was a supreme disappointment for constitutional conservatives, especially
because they were unable to get the case reviewed by the Supreme Court. Unbeknownst to them,
in the spring of 1863, Chief Justice Taney drafted a private, unofficial opinion finding the
Conscription Act unconstitutional. It was apparent he would have gladly accepted an appeal from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to uphold Kneedler I and declare conscription
unconstitutional.810 In his unofficial opinion, Taney shared the federalism-based objections of
constitutional conservatives as he attempted to explain away his strong assertions of federal
power in Ableman.
Taney understood the primary question concerning the Conscription Act to be whether
the Constitution, under an appropriate understanding of federalism, gave Congress power to draft
citizens directly into the federal army. In dual sovereignty language similar to that of Ableman,
Taney described each sovereign government as operating independently within the limits of
assigned sphere of action and supreme within its own limits. He believed Ableman was
consistent with his position on conscription, as “neither the federal government, nor that of a
state, could lawfully afford protection to the citizen beyond the limits of their respective
powers.”811 Taney believed Article IV meant that the federal government had “no inherent and
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original powers of sovereignty,” but only what the states had delegated to it.812 Any other
exercise of power was usurpation of state sovereignty.813 Under Taney’s understanding of
federalism, each government operated independently of the other within its assigned sphere and
thus, neither the federal government nor the state could lawfully claim allegiance due from its
citizen beyond those limits.
Taney’s attempt to reconcile Ableman with his position on conscription was the most
unique aspect of his unofficial opinion. He otherwise largely hewed to the consensus position of
constitutional conservatives. Taney saw two distinct and separate military forces established by
the Constitution with their own obligations and duties. The power to “raise and support” armies
was a general grant of power exclusively federal which necessarily carried with it the power to
select personnel and officers and make rules and regulations necessary to control federal military
forces completely independent of control by any state.814 Congress could not at its own pleasure
use the power to control the distinct and separate militia.815 Likewise, under Article II, the
President could not “dictate to the militia” unless called into service. Taney believed the
Conscription Act entirely ignored this distinction by making every able-bodied male citizen
belong to the national forces, effectively eliminating the militia.816
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Like other constitutional conservatives, Taney felt even the crisis of the Civil War did not
expand Congress’s powers. He observed that the framers anticipated precisely such crisis and
granted limited powers to the federal government “sufficient to cope” with insurrection.817 To
construct the Constitution otherwise reduced it to an act subject to the mere will of Congress.818
But Taney could also not stray far the language of antebellum states’ rights, writing that power to
disorganize state governments was “carefully and jealousy excluded” from the Constitution as
well as any right to “interfere in the domestic controversies and difficulties of a state.”819 Had the
opinion been converted into a Supreme Court majority opinion, Taney would likely have penned
an abrasive denouncement of Lincoln’s unconstitutional war policies. This never happened, as
the Lincoln Administration successfully avoided a constitutional challenge to conscription
reaching the Supreme Court while Taney died in November 1864.820 If the constitutional
conservative campaign to challenge was not dead in January, it now had little chance of
resurrection without its most powerful supporter.
The Bitter Aftermath of Kneedler in Pennsylvania
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While Kneedler II resulted in upholding the constitutionality of the Conscription Act, it
did not entirely foreclose the constitutional battles over conscription in the Pennsylvania
courtrooms or among some constitutional conservatives in Congress. In 1865, just weeks after
the war came to a close with surrender of Joseph Johnston’s army to William Tecumseh
Sherman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the issues in Kneedler in multiple cases
related to the Conscription Act. In Speer v. Borough of Blairsville, the Court declared the State
Bounty Act of March 1864 constitutional. Payment of bounties for volunteers to fill the
government’s quota for troops in anticipation of a draft was legal. The case dealt primarily with
questions of the extent of the taxing power, but it was fascinating because it saw former Chief
Justice Lowrie join Jeremiah Black, another former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice,
as counsel for the appellants.821 Lowrie and Black argued that “no man could serve two masters”
and Pennsylvania had improperly enacted a separate system even though Congress had
“occupied the whole ground” under its Article I powers.822 To uphold the state law was to grant
states the right to abrogate Congressional acts—a step towards nullification and secession.
Lastly, the law was an improper use of the taxing power because it had no proper public
purpose.823 Lowrie, two years after Kneedler, appeared to have accepted the final outcome of the
case, reflective of the caution he showed in November 1863. He now argued against the
appellees, who made strict constructionist arguments that the federal government had no power
to govern the militia, that the Constitution treated the militia and army as distinct units, and that
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it was “not long since it was strenuously argued that it was unconstitutional for the United States
to draft men; that volunteering was the only mode contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution.”824
Justice Agnew saw no conflict between the power of states to raise money to provide
payment of bounties for volunteers and the federal power to “raise armies.”825 Judge Thompson,
joined by Chief Justice Woodward, concurred, finding the Pennsylvania law to be a tax for
private and individual purposes, not for a proper public purpose.826 Thompson, noting that the
court had ultimately upheld the Conscription Act, wrote that there was no public interest in
raising bounties for individuals.827 Two years later, in Washington County v. Berwick, the court
upheld the May 1866 act paying bounties to veteran volunteers.828 That July, over a year passed
the end of the war, elite citizens were still fighting over the constitutionality of conscription. The
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Congressionally waged) I cannot comprehend the right of a state to interfere, except in case of actual invasion; and
then the interference must be for that purpose primarily, and not secondarily, or as a consequence to flow from want
of success against the common enemy.” Ibid., 178.
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the Bounty Law of 1864, with Woodward and Thompson dissenting). Notably, in an 1867, Judge Agnew, with
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case of Reilly v. Huber involved a deserter Henry Reilly who failed to report in July 1864.
Congress’s act of March 3, 1865 authorized the President to relieve deserters like Reilly from the
penalty of death by proclamation if the deserter returned within a specified time to discharge the
“manifest duty he owed to the government.”829 If he deserted again and rejected the pardon, he
would voluntarily forfeit his citizenship.
During oral argument, Republican Pennsylvania House Representative Alexander Kelly
McClure, representing the government, eventually turned to the military powers of the federal
government and revived arguments from the 1863 debates. A long-time party broker, McClure
spent the 1863 election cycle referring to Democrats as “faithless to their country” and attacked
Woodward as being “dangerous,” even if he was able and intelligent, because he would throw
Pennsylvania to its enemies.830 In a September 1863 speech, he noted that if an honest man
believed that the Conscription Act was unconstitutional, he would “not resist now, in the face of
the enemy,” since it was a law of Congress created for the good of the country.831 Before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1866, McClure’s argument sounded strikingly reminiscent of the
one John Knox gave a few years earlier. McClure claimed that the “want of supreme power in
the national government had been learned by bitter experience” by the framers. Thus, the right to
“raise and support armies” was followed with the “sweeping delegation of power to make ‘all
laws which shall be necessary and proper’” in order to oppose “the pernicious doctrine of the
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“The Disfranchisement of Deserters is the Act of Congress Constitutional? The case of Reilly v. Huber
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argument of A. K. McClure,” Franklin Repository, July 4, 1866, 1; Huber v.
Reilly, 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
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“The City: Spirited Meeting in the Tenth Ward,” Philadelphia Press, September 12, 1863, 2. (McClure pointed to
Woodward’s infamous 1860 Independence Hall speech as evidence that he was disloyal and never supported the
war)
831 Ibid. McClure also noted that it was of “no violence to the Constitution to exercise every power necessary for its
preservation” and accused the Democrats of declaring against every measure adopted to sustain the government and
tried “every means….short of invasion” to stop the government.

270

supreme sovereignty of the states.”832 The power to “raise and support armies” had only one
express limitation, which prevent the appropriation of money to support armies for longer than
two years.833 Notably, McClure felt that constitutional tradition evidenced no valid limitation on
Congress’s means of exercising its constitutional war powers. Simply because the government
since its inception had yet to have an occasion to exercise its “extreme powers,” it was no reason
to “hesitate to sanction them” during the Civil War.834 Raising armies meant more than calling
for a specific number of troops or a quota and when facing armed insurrection, Congress needed
to be able to enforce obedience to its call for volunteers or conscripts.
Chief Justice George Woodward now saw his opportunity to rehabilitate Kneedler I. He
interrupted McClure, chastising him that the country had never had any conscription law in its
history previously. McClure snapped back that if that was true, then the people had “conscripted
themselves without law” and while there was no “general government empowered to make such
a law,” conscription was still enforced during the Revolution. Woodward and McClure jostled
back and forth as to whether drafts were made during the Revolution and War of 1812.835
Woodward thought it was uncertain that the people ever delegated the power to conscript.
McClure responded that this was not done expressly, but because the states had raised armies by
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Ibid. Justice Thompson interjected that while there was no federal draft, states did draft in 1812. At this
point, the court was given an original copy of the call for volunteers by Pennsylvania Governor Simon Snyder
during the War of 1812, which ordered a draft for counties that failed to fill their quotas. McClure argued that under
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conscription when the power belonged to them and with “conscription and war were still fresh in
their recollections,” they “parted with the entire power” without reserving any rights. To
Woodward, even if the people and the states had the power to conscript and delegated certain
powers to the national government, it did not necessarily follow that they delegated the power to
conscript.
Justice Strong interjected that he “scarcely” thought this discussion was “relevant to the
question at issue.” McClure admitted that the question had been raised by the court, but he had
“no desire to pursue it” since it was “needless to discuss the constitutional power of the
government to raise armies by conscription” given that the Court had already ruled the
Conscription Act constitutional in Kneedler II. Woodward explicitly denied this was true, saying
that the “constitutionality of the conscription law was never affirmed by this court.”836 McClure
was perplexed. He responded that the case report he had which purported to be the opinion of the
court and its final judgment affirmed the constitutionality of the Conscription Law in “the
clearest terms.” Justice Reed agreed that the court had certainly asserted the constitutionality of
the Conscription Act, but the intransigent Woodward again denied this, saying that “on the
contrary,” the court had decided the act unconstitutional “in regular form.”837 Strong dismissed
Woodward’s pleas, stating once again that the court had already decided in favor of the
Constitution Act and imploring McClure to proceed with his argument. Ultimately, the debate
over conscription was superfluous. The court found Congress’s March 1865 act constitutional
but allowed Reilly to vote on the grounds he had not been convicted as a deserter.838 Yet, Reilly
reflects the degree to which even three years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revealed the
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high stakes of the 1863 constitutional debate over conscription. The justices understood that
Kneedler, with no Supreme Court resolution, was the most significant conscription case because
other courts would look to it for its precedential value. Both supporters and detractors needed to
ensure in the record that their side had won out in the debate and Woodward forcefully
maintained that Kneedler I remained good law never properly overruled. Even once he left the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1867 for Congress, the battle still seemed on his mind as he
introduced a bill in 1868 to test the constitutionality of “questionable acts of Congress.”839 The
battle lingered on.
The Continued Fight over Ableman in New York
Unlike the judges of Pennsylvania, New York judges did little to revisit the 1863 judicial
battles over conscription. When it did come up before Judge John McCunn in 1871, the only
remaining issue was the removal provision in the act intended to give federal officers the
protection of the federal courts. McCunn, the same city judge who found conscription
unconstitutional in 1863, sidestepped the issue and dismissed it on jurisdictional grounds. Yet, in
other post-war cases, the jurisdictional fights over the meaning of Ableman and the extent of
concurrent state court jurisdiction of habeas cases never quelled.
With some New York state judges still fighting to claim that Ableman did not restrict
their habeas jurisdiction, they found support in a single federal district judge. Judge Hall, who
wrote an opinion in late 1862 suggesting state courts had concurrent jurisdiction, upheld it again

See Journal of the House of Representatives, 1867-1868, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 616 (April 13,
1868). Woodward would end his fifteen-year term in 1867 and was thereafter elected to Congress as a Democrat to
replace the deceased Charles Dennison, serving until March 1871. In Congress, Woodard began a rapid opponent of
black suffrage, stating in a February 1869 speech against the Fifteenth Amendment that the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790 did not recognize negro suffrage because the “negro race had never become part of the social
compact of this country” and a “subject, inferior, ignorant and idolatrous race” did not consent to be governed under
American law. Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 205. He maintained that states properly held power
over suffrage and to grant negro suffrage would make Americans the first great people in world history to surrender
political trust to one of the “lowest and feeblest races of the world’s population.” Ibid, 207.
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in 1867 in In Re Reynolds. In a case of alleged desertion, the government argued that state court
Judge Lamont had no jurisdiction. Hall concluded that Lamont’s decision in favor of state
jurisdiction had no effect on the proceedings in federal court.840 On the question of state court
jurisdiction, Hall wrote that for decades before Ableman, doctrine was well-settled in favor of
state court jurisdiction, as the general government tacitly conceded and recognized this
jurisdiction was “constantly exercised by state courts.”841 He noted that in his own service as a
state court judge, he frequently released minor soldiers on writs of habeas corpus and he knew
other state judges to do the same. Hall cited state court precedent from 1808 up to 1860 from
Georgia, Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin and Maryland.842 He disregarded Judge Smith’s opinion in Jordan and Bacon’s in
Hopson denying state court jurisdiction by citing Judge Leonard’s opinion in Barrett and noting
that Bacon’s colleague Judge Mullin disagreed with Hopson in “an elaborate and able opinion”
in Bailey’s Case.843
Hall understood many of the contrasting state court precedents not as denials of
concurrent jurisdiction, but rather as reflective of careful examinations of the facts in each
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showing that the petitioners were lawfully held in federal custody.844 He also understood that
Ableman had been relied upon during the Civil War to deny the rightful authority of state courts
and judges in enlistment cases.845 But Hall believed Taney’s opinion had to be understood
according to its facts. Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court ignored both Supreme Court
precedent and numerous state court decisions in finding the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional,
Taney saw its actions as a “gross and wanton violation of the Constitution.”846 Additionally, Hall
thought Taney’s ruling understood “judicially apprised of lawful federal authority” to be a matter
of fact and law. It did not create a presumption absent legal proof that a prisoner was under
federal authority.847 State court judges could still properly inquire into the cause and authority by
which prisoners were held within their territorial limits. Finally, Hall found that under New York
law, inquiries into detention only ended “when it is shown that they are detained by process
issued by a court or judge of the United States in a case where such court or judge has exclusive
jurisdiction.”848 Hall still thought in 1867 that the consensus favored concurrent jurisdiction,
doubting that Ableman could have so drastically restricted state courts. He was not alone.
844

For instance, Hall understood Justice Nelson’s 1851 grand jury charge similarly—Nelson did not deny
state court jurisdiction when imprisonment was unlawful—and interpreted Justice McLean’s opinion in Norris v.
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can be scarcely doubted (Taney) must be understood to mean that until the person who holds the prisoner in custody
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The same year, the New York Supreme Court reviewed the habeas petition of Owen
O’Connor, who sued Major General Daniel Butterfield on behalf of his son John O’Connor,
claiming John was a minor at the time of enlistment. He appealed the denial of his motion before
Judge Leonard, Clerke and Ingraham. Leonard, who previously upheld state court jurisdiction in
Barrett, found himself in dissent of Ingraham’s denial of jurisdiction. Ingraham found that the
Congressional acts of 1862 and 1864 granting the Secretary of War authority to discharge
enlisted minors preempted state court jurisdiction. Ingraham noted that before these acts, state
court judges might have exercised jurisdiction.849 Leonard vehemently disagreed, noting as he
had in Barrett that the weight of authority was in favor of state court concurrent jurisdiction in
cases where the prisoner is not held by the process of a federal court.850 He reiterated that the
basis for denial of state court jurisdiction as argued by the government’s attorneys still rested on
Ableman and Bacon’s understanding of Taney’s opinion in Hopson.
Leonard emphasized that Ableman dealt with two cases affecting the same party, one
under process of a federal commissioner and the other upon conviction of a federal court.
Agreeing with Hall, he argued Taney’s decision had to be understood with reference to the facts
before him.851 Thus, if a prisoner was arrested by a federal officer on criminal charges without
any process, it would not preclude a state court or judge from discharging the prisoner not held
by authority of law.852 The acts of 1862 and 1864 was not different from previous authority
granted to state judges to discharge minors enlisted without consent of their parents. Otherwise,

United States, having exclusive jurisdiction in the case” or by virtue of a final judgment or decree from “any
competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.”
849
In Re Connor, 48 Barb. 258, 260 (N.Y. 1867).
850
Ibid., 261 (J. Leonard, dissenting) Citing In Re Stacy, 10 John. 328, In Re Metzger, 1 Barb. S.C. Rep.
248, In Re Dobbs, 21 How. Pr. 68, In Re Webb, 24 How. Pr. 247.
851
In Re Connor, 48 Barb. 262.
852
Ibid Leonard pleaded that it was time that Ableman’s citation as an “authority to uphold acts done
without the authority of any law, state or national, should cease..”
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Leonard felt Congress would be given complete jurisdiction over the whole subject matter
involved in the enlistment of soldiers.853 He concluded by admonishing his colleagues for
ignoring the authority of New York law and precedent in favor of the “new and sole advice” of
one federal judge, as there was “no sufficient reason” to refuse jurisdiction.854 Leonard remained
certain that state courts held concurrent jurisdiction. Between both New York federal and state
courts, consensus on state court habeas jurisdiction seemed no clearer than it was in 1863.
Yet, by 1871, the sands were shifting. Now on the Superior Court, Judge McCunn, the
much-derided Tammany Hall judge who had overturned conscription in the New York City in
1863, sidestepped an opportunity to give a robust defense of state court jurisdiction. In Mitchell
v. Dix, the petitioner challenged the removal provisions both of the March 1863 Conscription Act
and the May 1866 amended Enrollment Act in an action for false imprisonment and trespass
against a federal officer. Mitchell’s attorney Roger Page argued that both the 1863 and 1866 acts
were unconstitutional because they conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts in cases
in which state courts held concurrent, if not sole jurisdiction. Notably, Page cited multiple
Pennsylvania cases for this proposition, looking to not only Kneedler, but Lowrie’s opinion in
Commonwealth v. Wright and Judge Ryon’s in Bressler.855 McCunn demurred, deciding that he
did not have the authority to rule on the merits. The acts provided removal during the rebellion
and the petitioner’s arrest occurred on June 14, 1865. As a matter of judgment, McCunn ruled
that by June 14, the rebellion had ceased with the Confederate government annihilated with “its
authority everywhere overthrown; its armies dispersed or surrendered; its resources and its
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territory all in the possession of the federal forces; the power and dominion of the Union reasserted and established.”856 It seems that at least for McCunn, the matter of state habeas
jurisdiction had been tried and won by the war.
Tarble’s Case: Establishing Federal Judicial Supremacy
According to mid-nineteenth-century doctrine, Judges Hall and Leonard were not without
ample support in suggesting that in the post-Ableman, postwar world, state courts could still take
habeas-based challenges to federal authority. At least one legal contemporary encyclopedia
claimed that until 1871, generally, state courts were believed to have jurisdiction on writs of
habeas corpus to release soldiers who were illegally enlisted.857 Even twenty years later, the
1891 edition of the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law cited cases from New York,
including Husted’s Case, Ferguson’s Case, Carlton’s Case, and United States v. Wyngall as well
as Pennsylvania cases, such as Lockington’s Case, Com v. Callan, and Com v. Fox.858 Even by
1871, Judge Horace Gray of Massachusetts—who would soon sit on the Supreme Court—could
comfortably state that, “The jurisdiction of the state courts to discharge upon writ of habeas
corpus minors illegally enlisted into the army of the United States is too well settled, by the
concurrent opinions of the highest judicial authorities that have had occasion to pass upon it, and
by a practice of more than half a century in accordance therewith, to be now disavowed, unless
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in obedience to an express act of congress, or to a direct adjudication of the supreme court of the
United States.”859 The line of delineation did not come with Ableman or any Civil War case, but
the 1872 Supreme Court case of Tarble’s Case.860 Once again, the case came out of Wisconsin,
after a Dane County citizen Edward Tarble enlisted in 1869 and his father sued for a writ to
release his minor son from federal custody.861
Justice Stephen Field’s March 1872 opinion aimed to answer the question state courts
had been fighting throughout the Civil War period: Did any state judicial officer have
jurisdiction, upon habeas corpus, to inquire into the validity of the enlistment of soldiers into the
military service of the United States and to discharge them from such service when in his
judgment their enlistment has not been made in conformity with the laws of the United States.862
Field held that state courts held no jurisdiction to discharge soldiers on habeas petitions since the
national government held the power to “raise and support armies” and to regulate the “land naval
forces.” He made apparent that although the question was not before the court, national
conscription was authorized under those powers and state courts could not act to halt it.863 In
fact, Field surmised that habeas petitions in state courts examining the validity of enlistment
were so dangerous they could harm even troop movement. He found that the Civil War showed
in times of “great popular excitement,” states could have “large numbers ready and anxious to
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embarrass the operations of the government” by using habeas writs to the “great detriment of the
public service.”864
Ultimately, Field reasoned that Ableman was meant to avoid such a clash of jurisdictions.
If state courts held the power claimed by Wisconsin’s Supreme Court in Ableman, “no offense
against the laws of the United States could be punished by their own tribunals without the
permission and according to the judgment of the courts of the state in which the parties happen to
be imprisoned.”865 Thus, although state judges and state courts under state law undoubtedly held
the right to issue the writ in any case where a party was allegedly illegally confined within their
limits, this did not extend to prisoners confined under federal authority.866
Perhaps the most remarkable footnote to Tarble’s Case is the brief dissent of Chief
Justice Salmon Chase. During the September 1863 Lincoln Administration cabinet meetings, he
took the position that state courts had the right under precedent to issue writs of habeas corpus
against federal officers to inquire into the underlying federal authority. Chase had not changed
his mind in the intervening nine years. He had “no doubt of the right of a state court to inquire
into the jurisdiction of a federal court upon habeas corpus and to discharge when satisfied that
the petitioner for the writ is restrained of liberty by the sentence of a court without
jurisdiction.”867 If the state court erred in deciding the question of jurisdiction, the error was to be

864

Ibid., 408-9 Field argues that even troop movements could be delayed or interfered with if state courts
held jurisdiction over such cases. Field noted that the delay between bring a habeas case from the highest state
tribunal to the Supreme Court while discharging soldiers would interfere with the energy and efficiency of the
national government by allowing for another sovereignty’s tribunal to control.
865
Ibid., 403. Further, Field thought Taney was right that “temporary supremacy” until federal judicial
decisions could be had was “essential to the preservation of order and peace, and the avoidance of forcible collision
between the two governments.” Ibid., 407.
866
Ibid., 410-11. Field also addressed the disputed meaning of Ableman and the theory espoused by New
York Judges Leonard and Hall that it was limited to its facts. It was evident to Field that Taney decided whenever it
appeared to the judge or officer issuing the writ that the prisoner was held under undisputed lawful authority, he
should proceed no further.
867
Ibid., 412 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).

280

corrected under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, not by denial of the right to make inquiry.
Chase had “less doubt, if possible” that writs from state court could be used to inquire into the
validity of imprisonment or detention by an officer of the United States when it did not interfere
with the proceedings of another court. To dislodge state court jurisdiction was to “deny the right
to protect the citizen by habeas corpus against arbitrary imprisonment in a large class of cases,
and, I am thoroughly persuaded, was never within the contemplation of the Convention which
framed, or the people who adopted, the Constitution.”868 Chase’s dissent recognized the serious
doctrinal arguments in favor of state court jurisdiction during the 1860s, but Field’s majority
opinion sealed its fate.869 The end of the nineteenth century, especially with the passage of the
landmark Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, saw further erosion of the powers of state
courts in favor of federal courts.870 By the time conscription was challenged constitutionality
again during World War I, the judicial landscape was a remarkably different place.
Retrying the Constitutionality of Conscription during World War I
Over five decades after the Civil War, the constitutional and political landscape in
America had notably shifted. The vibrant constitutional culture of the mid-nineteenth century
had receded in favor of legal realism which rejected veneration for the founders’ Constitution.
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have taken the position that Tarble is wrong, or that it is better explained as an example of Congress’s having
implicitly made exclusive its grant to lower federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to address unlawful federal
detention.”
870 The act extended the jurisdiction of United States circuit courts to hear all disputes over $500 arising under the
federal Constitution and United States law and for plaintiffs to have a right to remove any disputes arising under
federal law or where there was diversity of parties. “An act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the
United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other purposes,” 18 Statutes at
Large 470, March 3, 1875.
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When President Woodrow Wilson and Congress declared war on Germany and its allies in April
1917, entering America into World War I, Congress almost immediately passed a national
conscription act. The scale of the war and the act was immensely different from the Civil War.
Seventy two percent of those who served during the war were drafted, an incredible 2.8 million
men, far greater than the impact of the Civil War draft in either the North or the Confederacy.871
337,000 citizens drafted failed to report or deserted, while between 2.4 and 3.6 million evaded
registration entirely compared to the 2.4 million who complied.872 The passage of the Civil War
amendments altered constitutional resistance to massive conscription during World War I. As
legal historian William J. Ross notes, conscription “provoked profound constitutional questions,”
especially given that the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, prohibited involuntary
servitude and the Constitution gave no explicit authority to “take people from their homes” and
occupations and press them into military service.873 President Wilson, like Lincoln, downplayed
the threat of conscription and claimed the central idea the policy was to “disturb the industrial
and social structure of the country just as little as possible.”874
The conscription legislation enacted in April and May 1917 was based on a bill drafted
by the War Department with Wilson’s support. The debates were contentious, and opposition
came from those Midwestern and Southern representatives whom already opposed or questioned
the war and feared that conscription was “unwarranted without any actual threat” to American
security. Texas Democrat Atkins Jefferson McLemore argued that the “mad rush of so-called
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Ibid., 31. The federal government had to hire “vigilantes” to apprehend draft evaders through “slacker
raids” that caught at least 50,000 men.
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Ibid. As Ross notes, conscription raised questions of federalism, separation of powers, due process,
equal protection, and religious liberty and doubts about its constitutionality “cried out for prompt judicial resolution”
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Ibid., 15.
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progressivism, our Constitution is regarded as an ancient document, merely designed for the
period at which it was written” and that act create the showed that its “precepts have been
trampled underfoot until today it is referred to often to create a laugh and sometimes a sneer.”875
Similarly, Wisconsin Senator Robert M. LaFollette, whom the New York Times considered the
leader of the anti-war delegation, declaring conscription the “beginning of the end of our
constitutional government” by permitting the president to force men into military service.876
Yet, these objections show that by 1917, constitutional conservatives had lost much of
the ground on which to challenge conscription and were left with vague constitutional defenses
alongside partisan responses. Constitutional resistance looked less like well-structured
constitutional arguments aimed at preserving antebellum federalism than pleas to allow for any
consideration of the Constitution’s limits on federal power. Most in Congress believed necessity
was a sufficient constitutional justification for conscription and disagreement mostly came over
whether or not Germany posed an actual threat to America’s security.877 Unlike the opposition in
February 1863, there was no legislative success in 1917 and they were scoffed at as unprincipled
obstructionists comparable to Clement Vallandigham.878 Compromise bills were rejected in both
the House and the Senate. Wilson’s bill was breezily enacted, passing the House 397 to 24 and
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81 to 8 in the Senate. Draft resisters were left confused and outraged that the Congressional
opposition had crumbled so easily.879
Most tests over the constitutionality of conscription in 1917 and 1918 came out of
prosecutions for failing to register or abetting defiance of registration, generating 19 cases testing
the draft.880 Opponents argued there was no constitutional basis for the draft and that it violated
several specific Constitutional provisions, focusing on the same principles constitutional
conservatives had in 1863—federalism, separation of powers, and personal liberties. Echoing
1863 arguments, 1917 draft opponents felt that conscription violated due process because the
courts could not review the decisions of district draft boards improperly exercised Article III
judicial authority. Opponents in 1917 also pushed federalism-based arguments that state officials
could not be compelled to participate in administering a federal law. There were two crucial
differences. For one, legal challenges to the 1917 draft emphasized violations of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude. Two, opponents argued that conscripting state
militia members for service in a national army abroad violated Article I, Section 8’s power to
call for the militia only to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions.”881

879

John Chambers argued that the overwhelming support for conscription came “as quite a surprise” for
the House, who pivoted like “a weather-vane in a windstorm” and completely reversed itself in a week. See John
Chambers, To Raise an Army, 161. Ross suspects that Congressional members wished to protect their patriotic
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In 1917, the means by which soldiers and draftees challenged both their enlistment and
the constitutionality of the underlying Selective Services Act had not changed much since 1863.
Writs of habeas corpus were still filed claiming that enrollees were minors made soldiers
without parental consent or foreign citizens who could not be made subject to the draft. The
difference was that writs were now solely applied for in federal court and courts were much less
sympathetic to the pleas of soldiers in 1917. One of the earliest cases came before the Eastern
District of Michigan in July in United States v. Sugar. In a criminal indictment for conspiracy to
commit an offense against the United States and conspiracy to defraud the United States, the
defendant argued that the Conscription Act was unconstitutional. Judge Arthur J. Tuttle first
addressed the Thirteenth Amendment. The Slaughterhouse Cases proved the Thirteenth
Amendment was never intended to prevent, or to apply to, the rendition by an individual of
duties to the government properly imposed by law.882 Tuttle wrongly believed the amendment
was only intended to apply to slavery and enforced labor by private individuals, not public duties
such as juries and the militia.883 The defendants also maintained that the act deprived district
courts of jurisdiction under Article III to review exemptions provided under the act which were
solely given to the draft boards. Tuttle observed that this did not violate Article III because
Congress granted the boards power under its Article I, Section VIII powers to create rules for the
regulation of land and naval forces. Because the act fully and clearly provided the general means
adopted for carrying out the purpose to temporarily increase the military presence of the United
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States, the powers conferred upon the President were “merely powers to regulate the details
necessary to make practically effective the provisions of the act.”884
Finally, Tuttle addressed the argument that Congress was not granted the power to create
and enforce compulsory military service. Under the “necessary and proper” clause and the rule
of McCulloch v. Maryland, the federal government held all necessarily implied powers. It was
“too plain for argument” to Tuttle that that the power “to raise armies” was conferred in broad
terms and “without the imposition of any limitations thereon, such power naturally involves the
power to determine the means whereby such armies shall be raised.”885 He cited McCall’s Case
and other Civil War authorities as upholding conscription under the logic of necessity and
government self-preservation.886 Tuttle concluded by quoting extensively from Justice Read’s
concurrence in Kneedler II upholding the Conscription Act, noting that the case presented “an
exhaustive and able opinion the constitutionality of the Civil War Conscription Act was upheld,
so fully and clearly expresses the principles applicable to this question.”887 As would become the
pattern in World War I cases, Kneedler was cited without any of the full context of the case,
treating it as proof that Civil War courts unanimously upheld the power to conscript.
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powers of self-preservation and self-defense, whether assailed by traitors at home or enemies abroad. Full authority
in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces is conferred upon Congress."; Allen v. Colby, 47 N.H.
544, 547 (1867) The grant of power to “raise armies” left “no doubt that Congress has power to make and authorize
such orders and regulations as may be necessary to prevent those who are liable by law to military service from
evading that duty.”
887
Ibid 436-37 (quoting Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 311-14 (Read, J., concurring)).
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Judge Emory Speer of the Southern District of Georgia dismissed a similar habeas
challenge on behalf of two black conscripts who failed to register. The New York Times treated
the case as the illegitimate mission of Thomas E. Watson, the attorney, one-time 1904
Presidential candidate of the People’s Party and editor of The Jeffersonian, which he used to
carry on a “furious campaign” against the draft. The Times described the case of Albert Jones
and John Story that of two “negro slackers coached by Tom Watson.”888 Story and Jones’ core
contention was the conscription conflicted with the Thirteenth Amendment, an argument Speer
declared “abhorrent to the truth” and “degrading to that indispensable and gallant body of
citizens trained in arms.”889 Soldiers were not slaves. Speer was no more willing to consider
Story and Jones’ arguments that the Congress’ Article I powers over the militia were limited and
did not extent to conscripting citizens for duty in a foreign country. Congress’ power to “raise
armies” was plenary and not restricted in any manner, as decided by Justice Fields in Tarble’s
Case. States could not prevent Congress from the raising of armies by treating the national
guard, which had effectively replaced the state militia, as a separate body that could not be
conscripted. Finally, Speer thought the idea that Congress could not use the national army for
offensive war in foreign territory ridiculous, finding that the “necessary and proper” clause was
the “greatest reservoir of power to save the national existence” and reflective of the inherent
powers of nation states.890
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By October and November, the consensus of the federal courts supporting conscription
became evident. In October, the Second Circuit heard an appeal from a foreign citizen of Austria,
John Angelus, who sought an injunction against three members of the local draft board in
Angelus v. Sullivan, claiming that he was not subject to conscription because he had made no
declaration of his intention to become a citizen.891 He sued the District Board of New York City
claiming they should have granted his exception. On appeal, Angelus argued that the
Conscription Act was unconstitutional. The Second Circuit swiftly dismissed the argument,
saying they had no doubt as to the act’s constitutionality because Article I expressly granted
“fully, completely, and unconditionally” the power to “raise and support” armies and to make
rules and regulations for that army. 892 Judge Henry Wade Rogers argued that at the founding,
conscription was “not an unknown mode of raising armies but had been resorted to by
governments throughout the world.”893 Citing Kneedler and McCall’s Case among others,
Rogers misleadingly claimed that all Northern and Southern courts upheld the validity of draft
laws.894 Regardless, he felt the 1863 arguments that compulsory military service before and after
the adoption of the Constitution was reserved to the states only “has always been regarded as
extremely weak.” As proof, Rogers looked to Lincoln’s unpublished constitutional argument in
favor of conscription, Secretary of War Henry Knox’s 1790 plan for conscription, and Justice
Field’s opinion in Tarble’s.895
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Ibid., 58. Citing Confederate cases as well without noting Chief Justice Pearson’s notable denial of the
constitutionality of conscription on the North Carolina Supreme Court.
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As was typical of World War I cases, Thirteenth Amendment arguments that conscription
amounted to forced labor were routinely and easily dismissed. Rogers that the Thirteenth
Amendment was intended to end slavery and make peonage impossible, as held by the
Slaughterhouse Cases.896 Significantly, in the 1915 case of Butler v. Perry, a state law requiring
every able-bodied
male person and resident over the age of 21 and under 45 to work on the roads and bridges of the
county for six days and not less than ten hours in each year when summoned to do so. Justice
McReynolds held in Butler that the Thirteenth Amendment created “”no novel doctrine with
respect to services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict
enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the state, such as services in the army,
militia, on the jury, etc.”897 Because conscripts were not held in slavery or involuntary servitude,
Rogers could not see how the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to withdraw from Congress
the power to conscript. Ultimately, Rogers denied relief to Angelus because he ruled equity
courts were not entitled to jurisdiction over criminal matters or offenses against the public peace
of a political nature.898
Washington District Court Judge Jeremiah Neterer similarly dismissed constitutional
arguments against conscription in United States v. Olsen in November. He briskly swept aside

the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be
received, and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which
he shall be assigned.” Tarble’s Case, 13 Wall. 408. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts confirmed
Field’s view, saying a citizen “may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, and without regard to his
personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks
of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.”
896
Angelus, 246 F. 59.
897
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1915).
898
Angelus, 246 F., at 66. Courts of equity could not interfere by injunction for the purpose of controlling
the action of public officers constituting inferior quasi-judicial tribunals, on matters properly pertaining to their
jurisdictions, and that they do not review and correct errors in the proceedings of such officers, the proper remedy, if
any, being at law by writ of certiorari.
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the contention the act was unconstitutional as unfounded, as it ignored not only Congress’s
Article I military powers, but the power to “provide for the common defense and general
welfare” and the President’s Article II powers as “Commander-in-Chief” over the militia.899
Neterer recognized the distinction between the militia and regular army that constitutional
conservatives constantly hemmed to. But he did not intend to take federalism-based objections to
conscription seriously, nor did he believe that the fact that the Constitution did not explicitly
grant the power to conscription to be significant. Rather, Neterer bluntly stated that the “liability
of all inhabitants of the United States to be drafted into military service in time of war, it appears,
cannot be questioned” and like Rogers, he found the validity of the Civil War draft acts was
uniformly sustained in the north and south, citing both Kneedler and Judge Cadwalader’s opinion
in McCall’s Case.900
Likewise, Delaware District Judge Edward Green Bradford II agreed federal power to
raise armies as “unconditional, unqualified and absolute” with Congress as the exclusive judge of
means.901 Again, the clause providing for “calling forth the militia” was not a limit on
Congress’s power, as it was predicated upon the organization of the militia and applied only to
the organized state militia.902 Thus, Bradford argued it did not follow that Congress lacked power
to organize the militia of the United States and “send it to any part of the globe deemed best for
the conduct of military operations,” as there was “no necessary or logical connection between the
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two propositions.”903 The purpose of the Conscription Act was to raise an army and Bradford
held no doubts about its constitutionality.
By the time the question reached the Supreme Court in the case of Arver v. United States,
Chief Justice Edward Douglas White’s unanimous opinion seemed to rest on the existing
consensus among lower courts. His ready dismissal of federalism-based constitutional arguments
came despite the efforts of Joseph Arver’s attorneys—including Thomas Watson. In their brief
before the Supreme Court, Arver’s attorneys exhausted both arguments from constitutional
tradition and the federalism-based objections of Civil War constitutional conservatives. Their
brief made use of ancient English history, noting that at the time the Constitution was adopted,
there were two kinds of recognized military service in the English world—the militia and the
standing army.904 There was a “great hostility” in England towards standing armies, while the
militia could never be employed for foreign invasion.905 Arver argued that the same opposition to
standing armies prevailed in America in 1787 and thus, the President was not given the power to
raise and control the army. His case rested as much on older arguments about federalism and
state sovereignty.906 Like earlier constitutional conservatives, he complained that the
Conscription Act improperly delegated legislative power to the President and other officials to
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raise an army. Citing Hamilton in Federalist 24, Arver aimed to show the framers did not intend
the President to have kingly powers over the militia, declaring of war, or raising and regulating
armies.907 It followed that the President, under Article II, was limited in his control over the
militia to when the militia was in actual service of the United States.908
Arver believed that 127 years of legislation since the founding showed that the founders
intended to raise the regular army by volunteer enlistment. The two exceptions to this were the
failed attempt by Congress in 1814 and the Conscription Act in 1863 and he did not think
conscription was properly established as a proper method of raising armies in either instance.909
Arver claimed that the question of the constitutionality of the Conscription Act was not
determined by the federal courts during the Civil War, overlooking or missing Judge
Cadwalader’s decision in Antrim’s Case. He noted that Kneedler v. Lane resulted in a grant of a
preliminary injunction holding the act unconstitutional which was reversed upon the election of
Justice Agnew. Arver argued that the elaborate opinions rendered by the individual judges were
pertinent to the present case, especially Chief Justice Lowrie’s contention that if Congress could
conscript, it held power over all social, civil, and military organizations of the states.910 He
likewise referred to Woodward’s contention that a careful study of the Constitution elicited no
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intent to authorize raising armies by conscription under Article I, Section VIII. Arver peculiarly
argued that the Act of 1917 ignored Kneedler I and for the first time in United States history
attempted to provide for raising a regular army by conscription.911 His position was that
Kneedler I remained useful, convincing precedent and that it was therefore apparent that
Congress could neither conscript during a civil war nor use the militia for offensive war in a
foreign nation. Significantly, he suggested that one distinguishing feature of the Civil War draft
was the “high pitch of the public nerves” after the Conscription Act passed, as it “engendered
terrific opposition” because theretofore such an act had been considered unconstitutional.912
Here, Arver made his most notable argument, connecting the constitutional opposition to
the draft with the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude. He first
argued that precedent showed that the executive could not hold persons in that capacity in a
condition of involuntary servitude.913 Arver concluded that there was substantial authority to
show that the federal government could not permit as master and lawmaking forms of slavery or
involuntary servitude. Because compulsory military service would essentially return to principles
of feudalism and vassalage, it would violate the Thirteenth amendment.914 Arver cited the
opposition to conscription during the Civil War as evidence that conscription was “so clearly in
the mind of the public and all bodies” proposing and voting on the amendment that had its
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drafters intended to make an exception for conscription, they would have done so in the text.915
The Thirteenth Amendment was evidence that even if Congress had the authority to raise an
army by conscription, it lost that right under the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
Finally, if Congress could conscript, it could not delegate that power to the President, nor could
the President require state officials to engage in raising the army, as such compulsion destroyed
state sovereignty.
Applying this evidence to the May 1917 Conscription Act, Arver concluded that
Congress could not conscript for purposes of a foreign war..916 He pointed again to English and
American constitutional tradition which held that militia could not be ordered out of their own
country outside of “urgent necessity” and could be used only for internal defense.917 Despite the
long-term trend towards unfettered federal power to raise armies, Arver argued that this
limitation was only recently the position of the federal government. In a 1912 memo, Attorney
General George Wickersham found no power to use the militia in foreign warfare. Wickersham
wrote that while the term “to repel invasion” might be “more elastic” in meaning, there was no
“warrant (for use) of the militia for this purpose.”918 Wickersham recognized that three
exigencies listed in Article I were of “strictly domestic character,” limiting the use of the militia
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to the United States and its territories.919 Arver’s brief necessarily targeted the 1917 act’s novel
expansion of Congress’s power to draft to include overseas offensive warfare, but it also
harkened back to the 1863 constitutional conservative federalism-based objections. While the
Thirteenth Amendment offered another constitutional basis to challenge conscription, Arver
emphasized this was because among its original objectives was to include compulsory military
service under “involuntary servitude.” The brief showed hope that updating the traditional
objections would still hold water in 1918, but the Supreme Court gave no quarter to any of the
concerns Arver presented.
Chief Justice White treated the constitutionality of conscription as readily apparent.
White accepted the Solicitor General’s argument that courts had uniformly upheld conscription,
citing Kneedler first and foremost among Civil War precedents. White scathingly dismissed the
arguments against conscription, writing that, “As the mind cannot conceive an army without the
men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does not given power to
provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for further notice.”920 White understood the
argument as framing state citizenship as primary and dominant under the Constitution, a
contention that “simply assails the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in conferring
authority on Congress, and in not retaining it as it was under the Articles of Confederation in the
several States.”921

919

Ibid., 598. This was precisely because the Constitution recognized the militia as distinct from the
regular army, made up of regular troops or volunteers, which could be used to invade a foreign country.
920
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918). In the Government’s brief, Kneedler was cited
positively by the government as holding that the power to declare war and to call the requisite force into service
“inherently carries with it the power to coerce or draft” or else it would be a solecism. Casper & Kurland, Landmark
Briefs, 661. Kneedler is cited as the single Northern case to hold the Conscription Act of 1863 to be a valid exercise
of the power to raise armies. Ibid., 681.
921
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 377.
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To White, Arver’s argument willfully ignored the text’s grant of power to Congress to
raise armies. He was no more convinced by arguments from tradition that appealed to the
volunteer, citizen soldier-based army and suggested that conscription was repugnant to free
government and individual liberty. To White, the idea that the authority to raise armies was
limited to volunteer soldiers was so “devoid of foundation that it leaves not even a shadow of
ground upon which to base the conclusion.” He pointed to Vattel and Blackstone, paragons of
the founding generation, who spoke to the reciprocal obligations of citizens to render military
service in times of need and cited the government’s brief, which exhaustively listed all the world
governments which used conscription.922 White saw conscription as a long-accepted practice of
civilized nations under their implicit war powers.
Like lower courts, White looked to English and colonial history for support. Before the
Revolution, there was not the “slightest doubt that the right to enforce military service was
unquestioned” as states enforced military service during the war.923 This argument ignored the
fact that constitutional conservatives in the Civil War north never denied the power of states to
compel service—they denied that the federal government could do so. For White, the two
clauses—the power to raise armies and the power to call out the militia—did not speak to the
reserved powers of states to maintain their militias, but rather the two combined powers
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The Government’s brief cited the “Statesman’s Yearbook for 1917,” which listed all the nations which
had conscription, from Argentine to Belgium to France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, etc.,
and the Government noted separately the 1916 conscriptions of Britain and Canada. Casper & Kurland, Landmark
Briefs, 665.
923
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 379-380. White also argued that nine state constitutions expressly
sanctioned compelled military service, pointing to the Pennsylvania Constitution’s clause, “That every member of
society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or
an equivalent thereto.” The government argued that a compulsory draft was a normal method of raising armies at the
time the Constitution was adopted and that the history of the clause at the Constitutional Convention showed no
intent to limit the power to voluntary enlistments. They noted that militia duty was imposed on all arms-bearing
citizens of the original thirteen states and was used by the Continental Congress to recruit for the Continental Army
using state quotas. Casper & Kurland, Landmark Briefs, 668-69.
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delegated to Congress all governmental power on the subject, giving it complete authority. It was
the states which were expressly limited in their powers, not the federal government. What was
left to the states was the undelegated the control of the militia to the extent that such control was
not removed by Congress’s power to raise armies.924 When called, the militia was under the
dominant authority of the federal government.
In considering the history of nineteenth-century conscription, White mostly ignored
constitutional opposition. He likewise disregarded opposition during the War of 1812, saying
that “we need not stop to consider it because it substantially rested upon the incompatibility of
compulsory military service with free government, a subject which from what we have said has
been disposed of.”925 White saw Monroe’s proposed bill as good precedent and viewed the 1863
Conscription Act as following suit by making citizens subject to be called by compulsory draft
into a national army according to the President’s discretion.926 Under the Civil War legislation,
the means by which the act was to be enforced were directly federal and the force to be raised as
a result of the draft was therefore national as distinct from the call into active service of the
militia as such. Discussing Kneedler, White accepted the government’s finding that Kneedler
was the only case where the “constitutionality of the Act of 1863 was contemporaneously
challenged on grounds akin to, if not absolutely identical with, those here urged, the validity of
the act was maintained for reasons not different from those which control our judgment.”927 The

924

Selected Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 383. This did not “diminish the military power or curb the full
potentiality of the right to exert it but left an area of authority requiring to be provided for (the militia area) unless
and until by the exertion of the military power of Congress that area had been circumscribed or totally disappeared.”
925
Ibid., 385.
926
Ibid., 386.
927
Ibid., 388. White cited the same Confederate precedents as lower courts, also discounting the finding by
North Carolina Chief Justice Pearson that the Confederate conscription, as amended in December 1863 to abolish
substitutions, was unconstitutional-a conclusion a few lower state courts agreed with. See G. Edward White,
“Recovering the Legal History of the Confederacy,” 68 Washington & Lee Law Review (2011), 544. In so doing,
White obscured both the first hearing in Kneedler finding the statute unconstitutional as well as the contested nature
of the second hearing which upheld the act. And much as Justice Strong, Read, and Agnew upheld conscription on a
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conclusion that the act was constitutional was “inevitable” to White, following both from
constitutional history, the text, and the policies of other nations.
White was also unmoved by the notion that conscription for purposes of foreign service
was constitutionally significant. He quickly discounted the remaining arguments that the act
violated the First and Thirteenth Amendments and that it was an improper delegation of
legislative and judicial power. These were too wanting in merit and unsound to require further
notice. With relative alacrity, White has found constitutional opposition to conscription entirely
lacking. In the space of over five decades, the battle conditions had changed significantly.
Involved in a foreign war with demands for millions of men within the year and a global
environment which embraced conscription, the federalism-based objections of nineteenthcentury constitutional conservatives seemed passé. While World War I plaintiffs still used these
constitutional conservative arguments to attack conscription, there was no Kneedler or Judge
McCunn in 1918. No longer was this a fraught battle—it was now a full rout and it would be
another five decades before anyone else tried to revisit the unconstitutionality of conscription in
federal court.
Months later, the Supreme Court confirmed Arver in Cox v. Wood, with White again
writing for a unanimous court. The petitioner argued that under Article I, while Congress could
conscript citizens, it was limited to the purposes stated in Section XIII—"To execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” Thus, it was illegal for Congress to call
the militia out for purposes of service in a foreign country. White declared that the Selective
Service Cases made clear that Congress had power to compel military service and it was the duty
of the citizen to render it when called for, these powers were not qualified or restricted by the

broad theory of federal power, it was not as expansive as White’s conception and it also rested on Marshall’s
interpretation of “Necessary and Proper” in Gibbons v. Ogden.
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provisions of the militia clause, and the power to call for military duty under the authority to
declare war and raise armies and the duty of the citizen to serve when called were coterminous
with the constitutional grant from which the authority was derived and knew no limit deduced
from a separate provision.928
The rest of the twentieth century tells a story of continued constitutional resistance to
conscription, but increasing, the reluctance of the courts to treat those arguments seriously as
they had during the Civil War. In 1940, before the United States entered World War I, two
defendants caught evading the peacetime draft under the Selective Service and Training Act of
1940 moved that peacetime conscription was unconstitutional. In United States v. Cornell, Idaho
Federal District Judge Cavanah found that history and precedent uniformly recognized the
constitutional power of Congress “to compel military service of a citizen in case of need, when it
so declares, whether in peace time or war time, and to make preparation, if Congress declares
that it is imperative or necessary, or that an emergency exists requiring the raising and support of
an army.”929 White’s opinion in the Selected Draft Law Service Cases made it clear that the
power to “raise armies” was without any limitation as to whether in war time or peace time.
Cavanah concluded that Sugar and Kneedler before it proved that the Constitution must be
construed as a whole and “where a grant of power is vested in plain language without exception
or limitation such power should not be crippled by interpolating a limitation.”930 There was
simply no room for the kind of strict constructionism which held sway in 1863 in 1940.931
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Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3, 6 (1918).
United States v. Cornell, 36 F.Supp. 81, 83 (Id. 1940).
930
Ibid., 84 The conclusion that the power to conscript was incidental to the power to “raise armies” was
“irresistible.”
931
Other courts similarly upheld peacetime conscription. See United States v. Garst, 39 F. Supp. 367, 23768 (E.D. Pa. 1941) Pointing to Tarble’s Case, the 1790 Rhode Island Convention proposal, and Hamilton’s
Federalist 24 as evidence that the founders intended the power to “raise and support armies” to include conscription
in times of peace; United States v. Rappeport, 36 F. Supp. 915, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) “ It cannot be assumed that the
929
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Thereafter, courts confirmed the logic of the World War I precedents and dismissed the
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment was an obstacle to conscription.932 And as Judge
Goodrich wrote in United States v. Lambert, the Supreme Court in Arver settled the question of
whether the power to “raise and support armies” allowed Congress to implement compulsory
service.933 Challenges to the Selective Services Act of 1948 were no more successful.934
By the time of Vietnam, constitutional arguments against conscription were out of vogue
amongst the judiciary. Leon Friedman and the ACLU made a valorous effort over the course of
years to bring a challenge to the Supreme Court, but in 1968 in United States v. O’Brien, Chief
Justice Earl Warren wrote that “The power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower for
military service is beyond question.”935 Under this power, Congress could establish a system of
registration for individuals liable for training and service and require such individuals “within
reason to cooperate in the registration system.” This would not stop challenges to conscription,
but the rejection by the courts became more summary over time. In 1970, the Eighth Circuit

Constitution intended to prevent the raising of an army by voluntary enlistment or conscription until war has been
declared or actually begun.”
932
See Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d. 798, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1944) “The Thirteenth Amendment has no
application to a call for service made by one's government according to law to meet a public need, just as a call for
money in such a case is taxation and not confiscation of property…(it is within the government’s power) under those
parts of the Constitution which authorize Congress to declare war and raise and equip armies. There can be no doubt
whatever that Congress has the constitutional power to require appellant, an able-bodied man, to serve in the army,
or in lieu of such service to perform other work of national importance.”. See also Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d
146, 148 (9th Cir. 1959) Case holding that the compulsory civilian draft was not limited by the Thirteenth
Amendment.
933
United States v. Lambert, 123 F.2d. 395, 396 (3rd Circ. 1941) The power to “provide for the common
defense" and "to raise and support armies" was not to be interpreted in a way which “will make the power
ineffective against an enemy, actual or potential.”
934
See United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d. 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1950) In a case focusing on whether
conscience objectors were unconstitutionally included in the peacetime draft, the court noted that Article I, Sect.
VIII gave Congress “unqualified power” in order to protect the very existence of government, as there was neither
express nor implied limitation in the Constitution to this power.
935
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The same term, Justice Douglas dissented from a
denial of cert in Holmes v. United States to suggest that the Supreme Court had yet to directly address the question
of peacetime conscription. See 391 U.S. 936, 938 (1968) (J. Douglas, dissenting) (“It is clear from our decisions that
conscription is constitutionally permissible when there has been a declaration of war…(but in the absence of an
declaration) our cases suggest (but do not decide) that there may not be.”).
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rejected a challenge to the Military Selective Services Act of 1967 by a conscientious objector
George William Crocker. In United States v. Crocker, Crocker argued that under Article I and
the Second Amendment, Congress had no power to conscript “armies,” as they could only
compel military service by “calling forth the militia,” and the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 was not a “proper” means of “raising armies” under the “necessary and proper” Clause
because it circumvented the constitutional process for “calling forth the militia.”936 The Eighth
Circuit also denied a claim that draftees could not be conscription for the Vietnam War because
it was an undeclared war.937
Meanwhile, in 1969, Friedman published the arguments at the heart of his briefs as a
book entitled, “Conscription and the Constitution.” Friedman argued that the Constitutional
convention, Federalist Papers and state ratifying conventions showed that the “contemporary
understanding” of the time was that the “regular army would be composed of volunteers who
could not legitimately object if they were exposed to the dangers of questionable domestic
conflicts or foreign entanglements.”938 History, Friedman claimed, showed that the framers gave
the federal government wide powers to use the army but not to gather it while granting the
militia specified functions with its power source unlimited. In particular, he sought to revisit
White’s opinion in the Selective Services Cases. Friedman argued that White’s opinion dismissed
“in a single sentence” the arguments against conscription made only decades after ratification as
“irrelevant.” He noted that this statement “blithely dismissed” the most significant part of the
Monroe Plan, in that Congress never passed the proposal due to the opposition of a “substantial
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United States v. Crocker, 420 F.2d. 307, 308 (8th Cir. 1970).
See also United States v. Murray, 321 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (Minn. 1971) (upholding Crocker and
Garrity in conscientious objector case)
938
Leon Friedman. Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 57 Mich. L. Rev.
1493, 1525 (1969).
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number of congressmen” who did not believe the Federal Government held the power to pass a
conscription law.939 As Friedman observed, the strong opposition made passage of the Monroe
Plan impossible, while outside of Congress, the Hartford Convention later passed resolutions
noting the unconstitutionality of federal conscription.940 Unfortunately for Friedman, he found no
more legal success than the World War I opposition. Instead, he had to suffice with reminding
his contemporaries of a long-forgotten constitutional drama.
If the constitutional drama over conscription seemingly ended with the Vietnam War, it is
mostly because conscription ended with the removal of ground troops in December 1972. There
has been no draft since, despite the continued presence of the Selective Service Act. Conscription
looms as a sleeping issue for current and future generations. Without an active draft, it is difficult
to foresee today’s judiciary ever hearing, let alone openly considering, a challenge to the
constitutionality of the draft given that Arver is now a century-old precedent. The better lesson is
that despite the closure of the judiciary to constitutional challenges to conscription over the
twentieth century, lawyers and plaintiffs did not stop coming up with ways to revisit the issue
and scholars have often noted the insufficiency of Chief Justice White’s opinion in Arver. That
despite judicial reticence, legal actors continued to object to the constitutionality of conscription
reflects the seriousness of the Civil War constitutional battles. Rediscovering that its
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Ibid., 1541-42. Friedman called some of the attacks “detailed,” as Senator Jeremiah Mason addressed
the problem of whether the Constitution granted the power and found “several grounds” that it did not, as nothing in
the Constitution “imposed limits upon the sweeping power” sought. Impressment under the power to “provide and
maintain a navy” was something the British tried before the Revolution, not an American practice but “utterly
repugnant” to the Constitution. Friedman notes the address made by Daniel Webster to the House of Representatives
on December 9, 1814 that conscription went beyond the power to call out the militia and was a plan to raise a
standing army. Webster had wondered if conscription would compel citizens “to fight the battles of any war in
which the folly or the wickedness of government” may engage in. In Friedman’s view, Webster had “summarily
dismissed” the Government’s claim of the power to conscript, as the “abominable doctrine” had “no foundation in
the Constitution” or free government or “any notion of personal liberty.” If the claim that the power to “raise
armies” granted such a power to conscript was allowed, Webster suggested the “reasoning could prove anything”
and mean that whenever a legitimate power was found, “new powers may be assumed or usurped” when deemed
expedient.
940
Ibid.,1543-44.
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constitutionality was never assumed informs us of that despite its current status, the draft was
constitutionally resisted for a reason. Beyond base politics, conscription went against the
volunteer tradition and was seen by nineteenth-century Americans as a harbinger of European
despotism. It was not clearly intended to be a proper mode of exercising Congress’s power to
“raise and support armies,” especially given how it conflicted with the residual state powers of
the militia. Whether constitutional conservatives and later 20th century constitutional resisters
were accurate in their opposition, they made an important contribution to our understanding of a
number of constitutional issues that rises far beyond their immediate political goals.
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